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PREFACE
The National Agricultural Biotechnology Council (NABC) was established in
1988 with funding from the Joyce Foundation to promote dialogue on the
emerging issues of agricultural biotechnology. The Boyce Thompson Institute,
Cornell University, Iowa State University, and the University of California were
the initial members. Today, the NABC has grown to include 26 of the leading
not-for-profit research and educational institutions in North America.
Representatives to the Council include senior management of these institu-
tions.
 The goal of the NABC was, and still is, the early identification of agri-
cultural biotechnology issues and their discussion in an open forum; the
safe, efficacious and equitable development of the products and processes
of agricultural biotechnology; and the development of public policy
recommendations.
The NABC has a record of early identification and broad consideration of
the major issues, and provides all stakeholders — including representatives
from academe, government, industry, public interest, farming, and others —
the opportunity to speak, to listen, and to learn about the key issues. Through
its meetings, the NABC has addressed many major issues: sustainable
agriculture in 1989; food safety and nutritional quality in 1990; social issues in
1991; animal biotechnology in 1992; risk in 1993; public good in 1994;
discovery, access, and ownership of genes in 1995; novel products and new
partnerships in 1996; and challenged environments in 1997. More than 50,000
NABC reports of its annual conferences have been freely distributed
worldwide.
Environmental quality was the focus of NABC 10. “Agricultural Biotechnol-
ogy and Environmental Quality: Gene Escape and Pest Resistance” was hosted
May 31 - June 2, 1998 by NABC member institution Clemson University and
was held in Greenville, SC. The two key environmental issues for transgenic
plants — gene escape to wild and weedy relatives and the development of pest
resistance to pesticidal transgenes — were considered. The expanding
experience base — about 70 million acres of transgenic crops were grown in
1998 — has not yet revealed problems in either of these risk areas but they
will probably occur in time (e.g., pests have developed resistance to most
pesticides). Can management systems like those being implemented by
governmental agencies, seed companies, and growers effectively minimize the
extent and delay the appearance of these problems? The encouraging factor is
that discussion of these concerns, such as occurred at NABC 10, is coinciding
with transgene seed use and the development of science-based management
techniques.
However, there are still individuals, especially outside the United States,
who express strong opposition or concerns to anything that is transgenic.
The major issues in the US for transgenic crops appears to be moving from
environmental risks to the risks from the consolidation of the input and end-
user industries of crop production (e.g., how consolidation affects food security
and sustainability). Within the last year, a few US chemical companies have
spent more than $10 billion in consolidation and vertical integration. The
consolidation into the end-user area is less developed than the input side, but
considering the value on the end-user side investments could be substantially
greater. The 1999 NABC annual meeting — “World Food Security and
Sustainability: The Impacts of Biotechnology and Industrial Consolidation’’ —
will be held June 6-8, 1999 at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
Candid forums such as NABC10 help to promote better understanding of
the many diverse viewpoints, and provide an opportunity for addressing
concerns about agricultural biotechnology. We believe that the NABC has
helped contribute to the informed and relatively favorable environment for
transgenics in the US in contrast to the disarray regarding transgenics in Europe
where there appears to have been no equivalent organization to NABC.
In 1998, the NABC took a leadership role in generating a concise, compre-
hensive, and compelling vision statement on agricultural research and
development for the 21st century. This statement, supported by the member
institutions, projects that not only improved feed, food, and fiber from the
agricultural research of the 21st century, but agriculture’s key role in securing
our future through the biobased production of energy, chemicals, and materials.
The statement is included as an appendix of this NABC Report.
Ralph W.F. Hardy Jane Baker Segelken
NABC President NABC Executive Coordinator
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Concerns about the risks of altered genes migrating into non-crop plants and
the risks of pests, such as insects and viruses, developing a resistance to
genetically modified plant pesticides are of critical concern to people opposed
to genetic engineering, such as Britain’s Prince Charles and the Greenpeace
organization.
Yet, with more than 67 million acres of transgenic crops in the world today,
just 25 years after the discovery of gene splicing technology, we cannot turn
back the clock. If anything, the demand for genetically modified food and fiber
crops is accelerating.
To address the concerns about gene escape, the National Agricultural
Biotechnology Council’s 10th annual meeting, Agricultural Biotechnology and
Environmental Quality: Gene Escape and Pest Resistance, hosted by Clemson
University, debated the research and development, regulatory and public policy,
and industrial and economic issues surrounding genetic engineering. More
than 130 participants from 30 states and three foreign countries, representing
consumer groups, industry, government and academia, attended the conference.
In addition, news media representatives, from CNN television, Progressive
Farmer, Chemical and Engineering News, and Southeast Farm Press served as
moderators for the plenary sessions.
Conference participants heard presentations by nine authorities representing
the full spectrum of viewpoints on biotechnology, from strongly supportive to
strongly opposed. In keeping with the tradition of NABC conferences, all
exchanges were conducted in an open forum, respectful of diverse opinions.
Contrasting the general acceptance of agricultural biotechnology by growers
with the public’s fears was Carl B. Loop, Jr., president of the American Farm
Bureau Federation. “Biotechnology is here to stay and will be the future of
agriculture,” Loop said. “Farmers have seen plants produced on land that
couldn’t produce crops before biotechnology provided plants that are resistant
to drought and disease, and require less pesticides and herbicides. Biotechnol-
ogy is traditional plant breeding speeded up. If we had continued to call it plant
breeding instead of biotechnology, it would have been more acceptable to the
public. We must be aware that there is fear in some people, so we must find a
happy medium between ‘full speed ahead’ and doing nothing because of fear.”
Public opinion is not always based on scientific research, agreed Frederick H.
Buttel, professor of rural sociology at the University of Wisconsin. “The public
is not aware of the benefits of agricultural research because there is widespread
ignorance of biotechnology and of science in general, and because the groups
opposed to biotechnology question the validity of scientific research,” Buttel
said. “Agricultural biotechnology has remained controversial for the past 25
years; but there are other areas of more immediate concern to the public than
biotechnology, such as food quality and safety, and the impact of chemicals and
livestock waste.”
Fred Gould, professor of ecology at North Carolina State University, pointed
out the importance of providing refuge areas to prevent insects from developing
resistance to Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) crops. “The tobacco budworm that
attacks cotton is resistant to traditional pesticides so it would be difficult to
come up with a suitable alternative to Bt,” Gould said. “To avoid the possibility
of insects becoming resistant to Bt, the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) recommends that four percent of the cotton crop be left as a refuge where
no insecticide — neither Bt nor chemicals — is used. This strategy was
developed for American farming practices. It could have a different effect in
developing countries where US regulations are not enforced.”
New genetic engineering strategies are being developed to produce plants
that resist viral infections, explained Roger Beachy, head of plant biology at The
Scripps Research Institute in California. “The tobacco mosaic virus resistant
genes have proven very stable and durable over the past 25 years,” Beachy said.
“We can change the interaction of viruses and plants by changing a single
amino acid so it does not act as a virus. But not all viruses are the same and not
all risks are the same. The question becomes: Can we minimize risk to where it
is more favorably accepted? The challenge for molecular biologists is whether
we develop a resistance gene that is effective against multiple viruses since there
are more than 2,000 plant viruses.
Public opinion varies widely from one country to another, observed Thomas
J. Hoban, professor of sociology at North Carolina State University. “Consumers
in Canada, the United States, and Japan have a higher acceptance of biotechnol-
ogy than consumers in Europe,” Hoban said. “The lowest acceptance levels are
in Austria and Germany where about one-third of consumers find biotechnol-
ogy acceptable. This compares to acceptance by two-thirds of consumers
surveyed in North America and Japan. This is because of the early strength of
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opposition groups in Europe, such as Greenpeace, which held dramatic public
demonstrations against genetically modified soybeans and corn. However,
there are widespread misperceptions in all countries because people do not
understand food processing, much less agriculture. Results clearly show the
need for much greater education of consumers and opinion leaders.”
Biotechnology is one of many techniques that can be used to increase food
production in a sustainable manner, pointed out Thomas E. Nickson, a scientist
with Monsanto Company. “The world’s human population is projected to
double in the next 40 years, and the demand for food is projected to triple
because of the growing middle class,” he said. “Currently, an area the size of
North America is under agricultural cultivation, and we cannot significantly
increase that without destroying the world’s wildernesses, deserts, and rain
forests. No single technology can address these issues; but we have many tools
available now, including genomics, marker-assisted plant breeding, new
agrochemicals, biological controls, improved farm management practices, and
biotechnology. We must apply science-based risk assessments to the products
from biotechnology, and develop appropriate risk management strategies
founded in stewardship.”
Sounding a strong cautionary note was Mae-Wan Ho, a senior research fellow
at Open University in England who warned of moving too far too fast with
biotechnology. “Scientists should not ignore sociological and economic issues,”
Ho said. “Big business and science are run by selfish individuals who see nature
as objects to be exploited. A few major corporations are poised to take over
food production and distribution throughout the world, and internalize the
profits while they externalize the risks and costs. This will turn farmers into
hired laborers and concentrate farming into giant corporations that are
accountable to no one. Europeans are calling for a five-year moratorium on
genetic engineering and a return to traditional agriculture because they feel
biotechnology today is unethical, unnecessary, unsound, and unsafe.”
There are strict safety regulations for plant-produced pesticides in the United
States, explained Sharlene R. Matten, a biologist with the EPA. “Plant pesticides
have been regulated by the EPA since 1994,” Matten explained. “The EPA does
not regulate the plant, but the pesticidal substance in the plant (Bacillus
thuringiensis) and the genetic material used to produce it. The EPA reviews the
possible effects on humans, birds, fish, beneficial insects, other plants, and the
environment. The Science Advisory Panel of outside experts reviews the EPA’s
findings and makes recommendations for Bt crops. The EPA also receives input
on pesticide regulations from many other groups, including growers, the US
Department of Agriculture, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Interna-
tional Life Sciences Institute, and Greenpeace.”
Biotechnology developments should be guided by scientific research and a
close association with regulatory agencies such as the EPA and the USDA,
agreed Murray Robinson, president of Delta and Pine Land Company. “I’m not
a scientist, I’m a businessman,” Robinson said. “Our customers have found that
Bt crops are good for business and the environment. One customer reduced
costs by $100 per acre and increased production by one bale per acre with Bt
cotton. The beneficial insects thrived because he did not use any chemical
insecticides. Bt cotton also eliminates pesticide exposure for farm workers and
surrounding property. There are also significant advantages with Roundup
Ready® soybeans and cotton for growers plagued with weed problems. These
crops allow growers to use conservation practices, such as reduced tillage, to
preserve the topsoil and reduce erosion.”
WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS
This year’s workshops focused on three areas: research and development,
regulatory and public policy, and industrial and economic perspectives.
Participants weighed the many sides of the issues, from profitability to social
acceptance, and came to the following conclusions:
• Research and Development Perspectives
(See page 15 for the full workshop report.)
• Educate growers so they understand and practice resistance manage-
ment techniques.
• Enhance basic research to prevent gene escape into non-target
organisms.
• Develop better monitoring techniques.
• Form a new, independent agency for agricultural biotechnology that
would be a coalition of private industry, growers, and government
agencies, similar to the National Institutes of Health.
• Regulatory and Public Policy Perspectives
(See page 23 for the full workshop report.)
• Seek scientific input on all levels of biotechnology development and
regulation, and take action to guarantee that this input is free from
bias.
• Develop regional pest management plans.
• Create a separately funded agency to fill in the gaps in regulatory
policy and work to keep this policy scientifically and socially sound.
• Form a network of product/technology stewardship involving
government, industry, and growers to monitor and manage the
development of pest resistance.
• Build trust among growers, industry, consumers, and environ-
mentalists.
• Include sociological and value considerations in biotechnology
development, such as in the Human Genome Project.
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• Industrial and Economic Perspectives
(See page 33 for the full workshop report.)
• Encourage cooperation between industry and university scientists to
develop a standard method for monitoring genetically engineered
crops.
• Rekindle and strengthen industry-university research efforts.
• Impose a penalty for growers who do not comply with biotechnology
regulations, similar to the penalties imposed for misuse of chemical
pesticides.
• Create an independent oversight committee to set standards and decide
research priorities.
• Develop plain-language information for policy makers, news media,
civic groups, school children, and the general public.
• Designate land-grant universities to take the lead in disseminating
plain-language information to the public.
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Development Perspectives Workshop
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National Program Leader, Biochemistry/Biotechnology
US Department of Agriculture
Washington, DC
This workshop is on research and development perspectives on genetically
modified crops containing pesticidal substances, and the possible development
of pest resistance to those substances through biological selection.
Modern biotechnology has the potential to provide highly specific bio-
pesticides for protection of agricultural crops from the ravages of pests that
were formerly controlled by conventional chemical pesticides. The use of
chemical pesticides can result in negative outcomes such as: 1) toxic residues
in soil, water, and food; 2) emergence of secondary pests; 3) development of
pest resistance; and 4) pest resurgence following the development of resistance.
In addition, certain uses of some chemical pesticides may be discontinued as
a result of the Food Quality Protection Act enacted by Congress in 1996.
Whether these same problems will plague the use of biopesticides will
depend on the nature of the biopesticide, and may depend on how it is used.
For example, should biopesticides be expressed in plants at high levels to
maximize killing of pests, or at low levels to minimize selective pressures for
the development of pest resistance?
The most widely used biopesticides at the present time are those derived
from insecticidal proteins of a soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt).
These insecticidal proteins act by binding to receptors in the insect gut thereby
disrupting digestion and leading to the insect’s death within a few days. There
are more than 50 different Bt proteins with differing toxicities for caterpillars,
beetles, flies, and nematodes. Bt insecticidal protein can be applied to plants
either as an external spray, as it has been for about 40 years, or inserted into
the genetic blueprint of crops by the newer transgenic techniques.
The growing acreage planted to Bt crops has caused some scientists and
interest groups to express concern about the development of pest resistance to
Bt insecticidal proteins. In 1997, for example, there were close to four million
acres of Bt corn, two million acres of Bt cotton, and 25,000 acres of Bt potatoes.
In the next few years, alfalfa, canola, soy, sorghum, and wheat containing Bt
genes are expected to reach the market.
The economic costs of losing Bt as a viable biopesticide due to the emergence
of resistance in large populations of insects would be enormous. Organic
farmers would be particularly hard hit. Resistance to Bt insecticidal proteins has
been reported in insect populations that are exposed extensively or continu-
ously to the toxins. Resistance to Bt in the diamondback moth has been
documented in field populations in Asia, Central America, and the United
States (Hawaii, Florida, and New York). Researchers from the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA) have shown that the Indianmeal moth can become resistant
to Bt if it lacks a key enzyme needed to activate Bt toxins.
There are a number of strategies to minimize or delay the development of
pest resistance. In general, limited use and rapid degradation of biopesticides
after release decreases selection pressures for the development of pest
resistance. Specific strategies to delay the development of pest resistance
include:
• Multiple toxins
• Low expression levels
• Partial resistance
• Timed expression
• Tissue-specific expression
• Mixtures of resistant/susceptible seed
• Provision of refuges
To protect the continued use of Bt-based biopesticides, the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) currently requires companies developing transgenic
crops to submit and implement pest resistance management (PRM) plans as a
condition of product registration. The major components of the current PRM
plans are a high dose of the insecticidal protein to kill as many insects as
possible, and the mandate of refuge areas where nonresistant insects can grow
and breed with any resistant ones that might arise.
Some interest groups and scientists have taken issue with the EPA-approved
PRM plans. They contend that some insects are not getting sufficiently high
doses of insecticidal protein in the field to be killed, and that the refuge areas
provided are not large enough relative to the area planted with transgenic crops.
These interest groups have asked the EPA to suspend current transgenic plant
registrations, and stop new ones on the basis of their belief that the transgenic
plant varieties will worsen the pest-resistance problem.
There is an apparent lack of consensus among academic, government, and
other scientists about many aspects of PRM. Knowledge gaps in basic pest
ecology clearly exist, but there is also disagreement about:
• How the knowledge gaps should be filled
• What assumptions can be made now
• How quickly resistance will develop
• What regulatory and farming practices should be followed in the meantime
One solution for pest resistance to Bt is to develop a more diverse array of
insecticidal proteins for agricultural use. In addition to Bt, there are a number
of insecticidal proteins being studied, but they are not as far along commer-
cially. These include lectins, antibodies, protease inhibitors, insect peptide
hormones, vegetative insecticidal proteins, and wasp and spider toxins.
The USDA has funded research that transfers insecticidal genes from
soybeans to corn to combat crop damage from corn rootworm. This research
identified a whole series of inhibitor genes with different modes of action that
are available for use in case the corn rootworm acquires resistance to the
original inhibitor now in the field. The USDA National Research Initiative has a
major research area entitled Pest Biology and Management. This includes a sub-
area on Biologically Based Pest Management that solicits proposals for a variety
of biological pest management research including resistance management
studies.
We at the USDA are open and receptive to suggestions developed at this
workshop on directions that future research on pest resistance management
could take.
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Pest resistance has evolved against every form of pest control applied in
agriculture to date. There are more than 600 species of insects resistant to
insecticides, nearly 200 weed species resistant to herbicides, and more than 100
plant pathogens resistant to fungicides and bacteriocides. It is expected that
pests will eventually evolve resistance to new transgenic technologies including
plant pesticides (such as insect resistant, Bacillus thuringiensis [Bt] transgene
crops now in use), herbicides combined with herbicide resistant crops, and
transgenic crops with resistance to plant pathogens. Delaying the evolution of
resistance will depend on carefully constructed and thoroughly implemented
pest resistance management strategies. The US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has required such a plan for registration of plants and pesticides.
The current approach is a combination of high doses of insecticidal protein and
provision of refuge areas. (Note: A refuge is a set-aside part of a field that is
planted to maintain a population of insects that is sensitive to Bt, i.e., non-Bt
transgenic crops not protected against insects.) This plan, which marks the first
such regulatory requirement in the pesticide registration process, appears to be
working. However experience with the effectiveness of this plan is limited, and
flexibility in modifying it may be required if resistance begins to evolve.
A similar situation may occur with the use of herbicide-resistant transgenic
crops where increased herbicide use may accelerate the evolution of weeds with
resistance to the herbicide. Transgenic plants resistant to attack by plant
pathogens are under development. Proteins introduced via transgenes for this
protective trait will be considered as plant pesticides, thereby requiring resistant
pest management plans for EPA registration. Research experts and concerted
efforts by professional societies will be needed to assist in developing these
strategies. Such was the case for use of viral coat proteins to confer resistance to
TOM BROWN
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Workshop Report: Research and
Development Perspectives
CO-CHAIRS
viral pathogens where the EPA, with input from experts in the field, has granted
an exemption from plant pesticide regulation.
In general, it is most important that transgenic tools be viewed as only one
aspect in the overall scheme of integrated pest management in agriculture.
Furthermore, it is important to continue to improve the transgenic approaches
to pest management to maintain the benefits for the future.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF GENE ESCAPE
The workshop groups were asked to discuss several issues concerning the long-
term ramifications of gene escape, and the existing or potential natural and
artificial barriers to gene escape. The first issue involved the potential benefits
of transgenic technologies in plant systems. In general, this technology allows
improved yields from a variety of crops with reduced environmental impact
from use of toxic chemicals. Probably the best example is the use of transgenic
Bt plants that provide resistance to insect pests with no toxicity to humans,
wildlife, or most beneficial insects, while reducing the need for toxic and
expensive chemical pesticides. A similar situation occurs for transgenic
resistance to viruses that allow protection against devastating viral diseases and
reduces the need for toxic–pesticides commonly used to eliminate the insect
vectors of many viruses. Finally, the use of transgenic resistance to herbicides
allows the use of relatively benign herbicides for weed reduction.
The second issue concerned the potential risks associated with this
technology. Ironically, the first and perhaps the greatest, risk identified is the
potential loss of the benefits conferred by the technology. For example, the
potential loss of Bt insect resistance in plants and the development of Bt
resistant pests due to misuse or overuse. Another potential risk is the possibility
of escape of the transgene into non-target organisms, in particular wild relatives
of the transgenic crop. An example is the acquisition of herbicide resistance by
weeds or by non-weed plants that then become a weed.
Do the benefits of the technology justify the risks? Can the risks associated
with this technology be reduced? The technology provides great benefits to
society, to the economy, and to the environment. To preserve these benefits an
effort should be made to reduce the risks (or perceived risks) associated with
the technology.
A number of proposed strategies for risk reduction centered around an influx
of money into research that would focus on attaining a basic understanding of
the biology of the targeted plant/pest interactions. It is crucial that efforts to
develop more sophisticated biocontrol begin immediately. This development
depends on an understanding of the basic science of the particular system. For
example, basic research into the nature of the interaction between Bt toxin and
the insect receptor for the toxin could lead to designer toxins that provide
better resistance. Thus, the second generation of transgenics could be in hand
in time to supplement the expected failing resistance of first generation
transgenics. It is unfortunate for everyone involved that this type of innovative
basic science is currently woefully under-funded, and that many opportunities
to preserve this beneficial technology are being lost.
A second proposed method to reduce risks is the development of programs
designed to educate the users of biotechnology. The education would focus on
the importance of implementing current pest resistance management principles
to slow down development of resistance in the pests, and on integration of
transgenic technology with other management techniques.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Enhance basic research to develop effective resistance-management plans.
The focus of the research should be towards development of a second (more
sophisticated) generation of plant pesticides to supplement the first
generation. An understanding of the molecular mechanisms that lead to
transgenic resistance will facilitate the development of more sophisticated
approaches.
2. Take steps necessary to slow down the development of resistance to current
biocontrol while developing the second generation of pesticides.
• Educate growers, crop consultants, extension agents, salespersons and
international users on current pest-resistance management principles.
• Incorporate biocontrol strategies as a component of integrative pest
management.
3. There is a critical need to create a source of funding for research into
innovative approaches for the safe and effective use of biotechnology in
agriculture. It is important that these efforts take place in a timely manner so
that the new transgenics become available before the first generation has
failed. The group suggests an alliance between the private sector and the
government to provide funding for a new government agency (National
Institute for Agricultural Biotechnology?), or a free-standing research
institute, co-funded by industry and government.
Research and Development Perspectives
Agricultural biotechnology represents a new range of tools for production and
processing, and for numerous new agriculturally based products. This year’s
conference — Agricultural Biotechnology and Environmental Quality: Gene Escape
and Pest Resistance — is on a topic of great importance to all. This workshops
deals with public policy and regulations. Collectively you represent diverse
interests, ranging from state and federal regulators, agribusiness providers,
public scientists, educators, and farmers and other users. Interests as diverse
as these typically generate healthy debate. We can expect that a discussion
about regulating environmental impacts of gene escape and pest resistance will
be no exception.
Discussion during the first workshop session has to do with pest-derived
resistance to transgenic plants; the second session will consider gene escape.
I have been asked to set the stage for both.
REGULATORY AND PUBLIC POLICY
As one who represents cotton farmers and processors, I am sensitive to the
specter of unnecessary regulations. Having said that, I will concede the
necessity for more regulations in cases where there is a clear inadequacy for
protection of health, safety, environment, and economic well being.
The cotton industry has firsthand experience dealing with costly regulations.
Most recently we supported the sound principles of the new Food Quality
Protection Act (FQPA) because we agreed that reform of pesticide and food
safety regulations was essential because the old regulations were archaic and
unreasonable, and made little sense from a risk-avoidance standpoint. The act
eliminated the Delaney Clause, an eccentric provision in the old law whose
origin was driven by emotion rather than scientific merit. We embraced the
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basic proposition that pledged a more sensible and more holistic approach to
decisions about pesticides and food safety.
Given assurances that the new act would be better for all of us, we were
disappointed to discover that execution appeared to differ markedly from
expectation. In our view many regulatory decisions in implementing the new
act were arbitrary and without merit. Furthermore, there was no clear plan for
implementing the new law.
Confusion abounded. This chaos proved to be burdensome to farmers. It
was expensive in terms of denied access to important agricultural chemicals,
costly due to untimely decisions (sometimes after crops had been planted and
materials purchased), and unsettling with respect to the cloud of uncertainty
for planning a year-long pest management strategy. It was clear the decisions
were not based on improving diet and reducing risk to human health but
instead were made to fulfill the passionate needs of some individuals.
Of course, there are those who disagree with me because of a different
experience, agenda, bias, emotion, or understanding of risks and benefits.
There are those who consider theirs a noble cause and are immovable in
their conviction that some products should be regulated out of existence.
While I seem to belabor the point of regulation, it is for the following
purpose: We will be discussing public policy and regulations affecting
transgenic plants. I foresee a path that potentially could parallel development
of pesticide regulations in complexity, and in emotional attachments to
positions. No doubt, decisions of federal agencies regulating real or perceived
hazards become bitterly controversial. One person’s passion for purity will be
pitted against another’s desire to provide basic human needs. Economic benefits
will be challenged by perceived risks, and interpretation of one expert’s facts
will go against another’s interpretation.
GOALS
We will have made a major contribution if we succeed in providing early
enlightenment to the debate on regulation of transgenic plants. We need to
strive for reliability and objectivity in the scientific assessment of pest resistance
and the environmental effects of gene escape. In our hearts we may desire to be
impartial, but there is no escaping the fact that by necessity there invariably will
be subjective evaluations.
Another of our goals should be to identify those institutional mechanisms
that best form a constructive partnership between science and government. We
should consider whether we could create alternative public policy mechanisms
to support the goal of acceptable risk demanded by society. Rhetorically, can
this technology be used without the burden of over-regulation? Can it be done
with no regulation? Perhaps not. So if regulations are deemed necessary, let’s
ensure that the rules are based on the best available scientific knowledge.
The public policy-setting task is complicated even further by the unavoidable
collision of conflicting interests that impact most important regulatory
decisions. The fact that costs and benefits of regulatory policies fall unequally
on different groups makes the task a daunting one.
RESISTANCE AND GENE ESCAPE
The plenary speakers presented interesting ideas. They set the stage for
discussion if not debate. While each of us has a notion as to our level of
agreement with the speakers, our aim is to discuss these topics in the context
of public policy.
Dr. Gould made a good case as to why he thinks that alternative protein
toxins will be hard to identify. He also discussed the alternative refuge/high
dose approach endorsed by many scientists. I will want those of you from
industry and academia to help elucidate whether you think Dr. Gould’s theories
are sound. If I understood Gould correctly, he said (to paraphrase) that we will
be wasting effort looking for alternative Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) proteins.
Dr. Beachy discussed resistance to virus infections in transgenic plants. He
cited studies that suggest that specific transgenes may be more likely than
others to develop pathogen-derived resistance. In that light, I will want to hear
your opinions as to the significance of those studies.
The afternoon plenary speakers presented interesting but disparate views.
Dr. Nickson asserted that biotechnology could be an environmentally
responsible way to meet increasing requirements for feeding a hungry world.
On the other hand Dr. Ho presented an entirely different view. While the title
is long, it appropriately captures Dr. Ho’s emotion. While we individually may
disagree with Dr. Ho, we must recognize that hers is an opinion shared by many
around the world. Those beliefs represent issues that must be considered and
responded to in an appropriate and science-based manner as we debate public
policy.
Drs. Gould and Beachy suggested uncertainties in our knowledge gap about
resistance. Drs. Nickson and Ho, while not corroborating deficiencies in
information, clearly disagreed on whether biotechnology would help feed and
clothe the world or whether the gains from biotechnology are only short term.
If we are to believe any or all of our plenary speakers, we must accept the fact
that there are uncertainties. In the absence of good research to sort out answers
to these questions, a cloud of doubt and mistrust will shadow this new
technology. Good sound research is key to addressing the risks and benefits of
transgenic plant technology.
In the meantime we must decide in the context of public policy how to deal
with uncertainty with the information now available. Agreeing that there is no
such thing as zero risk, our challenge will be to help set a framework of
decision making to establish a level of acceptable uncertainty. Given that the
best of scientists don’t always agree, we must decide which science is
dependable and how to generate acceptable risk models.
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
• What potential risks do resistant pests pose to society? Are they real or
perceived?
• What are the social costs of the wrong decision or the wrong regulation?
• By what mechanisms do we weigh consequences of over-regulation vs.
under-regulation? Are they social, economic or political? All of the above?
• Whose best interest are we regulating for — how do farmers fit into the
equation? Do they really have a say?
• What conditions would warrant a regulatory strategy that is as permissible
as possible early on, monitored for effect, and then adjusted to respond to
the expanding experience base?
• Conversely, what conditions would warrant a strategy that is “highly
restrictive early on, followed by strict laboratory research, and then
loosening of regulations if new information dictates”?
• What are the consequences of wrong decisions? Are they catastrophic, or
can eco-systems recover?
• The EPA convened a Scientific Advisory Panel for Bt products. They agreed
that BT is an important IPM tool and that we need to protect the
technology. Can we make an informed recommendation as to the proper
ratio of transgenic crop to that left for refugia? What’s magic about four
percent, 20 percent, or even 50 percent?
• As we are dealing with resistance or gene escape, who is responsible for
monitoring? Is this a public responsibility? An industry responsibility?
A farmer responsibility?
• Is our reliance on population models appropriate?
• In absence of definitive field data, can we appropriately extrapolate
laboratory data to the real world? Under what circumstances should these
data be extrapolated, and where should they not?
• I would like to hear discussion on how to best quantify benefits of
transgenic technologies compared with the risks. In doing so, we need
to answer the questions as to how benefits and risks are measured and
assessed. Can risks identified with this technology be reduced to levels
acceptable to the public?
• Finally the last question: Who should be responsible for deciding the
future of plant biotechnology, and how does the public participate in this
decision-making process?
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the task facing this technology is
awesome. Plainly, there are questions; some more important than others are.
We will not have the last say, but what we do at this conference will make a
difference. If I were to summarize all our goals into a single objective, it would
be to promote understanding of the issues.
This workshop broadly discussed the issues of transgenic crops and the
environmental concerns of gene escape and development of pests resistant
to the transgenic pesticide. Risks of resistant pests, resistance management,
benefits and risks, food safety, and communication were examined. Several
key recommendations were proposed.
RISKS TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY POSED BY
RESISTANT PESTS
Many general questions and observations were made concerning the risk of
pests, especially insect pests to a crop containing a transgenic pesticide, e.g.,
the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxin. If pests cannot be controlled, food and
fiber crops will be jeopardized and may negatively impact society throughout
the world. As a result, farmers may choose to plant crops that require an
increased use of fertilizers and pesticides, which may negatively impact soil
conservation and water use by increasing the amount of chemical runoff. In
addition, the hazards associated with mixing and loading pesticides should
be considered.
For example, if pests develop resistance to the Bt toxin transgenic crops,
Bt microbial sprays will lose their effectiveness and Bt could be lost as a
control measure. Growers faced with pests resistant to Bt would likely
increase or return to the use of higher risk synthetic chemical pesticides.
That will entail higher costs to growers, which would be passed on to
consumers. A return to chemical pesticides is likely to be unfavorable to
the environment and society in comparison to the use of Bt.
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COMMUNICATION
We must improve communication among the variety of groups concerned
with or impacted by agricultural biotechnology, including academics,
environmentalists, consumers, industry representatives, farmers, and others
who use biotechnology. Many distinguish between the use of biotechnology
to improve food and fiber production. However some crops, e.g., cotton, are
both food and fiber crops making such a distinction difficult to impossible.
It is important to remember that the development of a pest-management
system is an ongoing task; it requires constant adaptation to changes in pest-
control technologies as well as response to the development of resistance on
the part of pests. The problem of pest resistance is not new nor is it widely
understood. Pests developed resistance to chemical pesticides before the use of
biotechnology in agriculture. Communication is the linchpin to understanding.
Some people are worried that agricultural biotechnology will create super-
pests. Are their worries unfounded? If so, this needs to be made clear because
fear of this sort impedes progress. One participant stressed that not all fears
are ungrounded. Those that are ungrounded should be identified as such and
addressed through education and communication. Those fears that are based
in reality must be responded to with safeguards. Sometimes we do not have
adequate information to determine if the fears are legitimate and work should
continue to define their legitimacy. Are there cases where public fear is based in
reality and use continues anyway, or are there cases where public fear is not
based on reality and the use is stopped? The alar scare may be an example of
the latter.
Public perception is very important. It should be made clear that agricultural
biotechnology is not the field of the proverbial mad scientist or of scientists
driven by greed or other improper motives who ignore real dangers. With this
last point in mind, it was stressed that research and development activities
need to be monitored with the interests of public health and welfare and good
science in mind. The system of monitoring these activities must be responsive
to the changing needs of the public as well as to changes in scientific
knowledge. In addition, the design of this system must include appropriate
incentives.
RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT
The major focus to minimize/delay the development of pest insects resistant to
Bt toxin in transgenic crops is management of the planting patterns of the crops
and monitoring for appearance of resistant insects. The group raised many
questions: Who is monitoring for pest resistance to Bt and what is being
monitored? Are farmers complying with regulation and licensing agreements?
Is the development of resistance being observed? Are both being watched and
if so, by whom? In this connection, the workshop participants expressed deep
concern about the role of state regulatory agencies in terms of statutory
authority and capability. Another question raised was whether the size of refuge
set-asides will eliminate the participation of small farmers.
The answer to the first question was immediately provided: the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA), and industry are following up on the licensing agreement. Yet it
was questioned whether auditing procedures and the enforcement tools are
sufficient, and whether industry can adequately enforce its agreements with
users. Currently, industry monitors efficacy by means of field sampling and
comparing field susceptibility to baseline susceptibility levels. However,
detecting resistance proactively is very difficult for large-crop acreage. There
are at least two sources of difficulty here — field sampling itself and the
sensitivity of the monitoring technique. Moreover, monitoring of this sort
will not provide all of the information that is needed.
Education of growers of Bt transgenic crops is very important. If farmers
know that the rules are not arbitrary or capricious, they are more likely to
comply with them. The big picture — the whole-system— needs to be laid
out for the users. It is important to develop close connections between public
officials and private parties for the purpose of monitoring. Protocols for
resistance detection should be revisited, reviewed, and revised as appropriate.
What degree of change in the level of resistance or level of crop loss is
acceptable and how long should it be before additional control measures are
taken? Should genes be re-engineered? Should crop insurance, which might
prevent farmers from taking steps that are unwise or illegal in an effort to save
a crop, be mandatory? These matters are of concern to all entities involved with
the system, and action is required by all.
Farmers and industry should be willing to undertake monitoring because it
is in their own best interest. Government involvement is important for the
purposes of promoting trust and communicating to the public that what needs
to be done is being done honestly, carefully, and in accordance with objectively
rational standards. Government can be an honest referee. On the other hand,
overly severe regulation based on misinformation may seriously hamper
effective agricultural biotechnology.
A key concept here is product/technology stewardship involving all the
stakeholders so as to establish trust and legitimacy.
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS
Clearly, there are economic benefits for the producer and the end user,
including the fact that a decreased use of conventional pesticides will result
in substantial health benefits for farm workers. Others, both human and non-
human, will benefit through enhanced air and water quality. Herbicide tolerant
plants have a positive impact on crop management practices and soil conserva-
tion. In addition, production and equipment costs go down and control systems
are simplified (mixing of chemicals for example, is less of a problem).
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One area of risk is the creation of herbicide resistance in weedy relatives of
the transgenic herbicide crop. The herbicide-resistance gene is transferred by
the pollen of the transgenic crop to a cross-pollinating relative (weeds) in the
area (gene escape). A similar problem could occur with insect resistance. There
is a general concern about unintended effects of biotechnology as a result of
gene flow or gene escape.
If out-crossing occurs, does it have negative environmental or social results,
for example, in the form of super pests — new weeds, new viruses, new insects,
and new and dangerous species? We need to know more than we do. The
group agreed that there is a need to develop methodologies for measuring the
probability of out-crossing and assessing its potential impact on the ecosystem,
and defining an acceptable level of risk. In making these evaluations, one would
consider sexual compatibility, geography (centers of origin), presence of out-
crossing plants in the area of production of transgenic crops, and mechanisms
of pollination (e.g., wind, hummingbirds, bees, animals).
GOOD SCIENCE
Good science is key to the successful use of biotechnology in agriculture.
Scientific input should be sought at all levels of the decision-making process.
Such input is essential, and is needed to answer such questions as whether
another host crop can constitute a refuge and whether the extensive use of a
bioengineered genotype will limit biodiversity. It is also essential that scientific
input be free from bias. In the effort to guarantee that we have good science it
will be necessary to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
Legitimacy is very important. Once trust is developed it has to be maintained
by continuous effort. One way to insure that effort is the involvement of
stakeholders — producers, users, government regulators, and academics — in
the decision-making process. Another way is adherence to high standards of
professional and moral ethics. The integrity of the parties (people and
institutions) and the integrity of the processes have to be maintained.
We need to find ways to incorporate value considerations in the decision-
making process by encouraging more research regarding the social issues
surrounding agricultural biotechnology. Not all decisions in this area turn on
empirical, scientific determinations. Not all of the questions that have to be
answered are purely scientific questions. Of this we must not lose sight.
OTHER ISSUES/CONCERNS
Other issues and concerns came up during our discussions. Thinking that they
are worthy of consideration in any case and may be topics for future confer-
ences, we record them briefly here: What are the risks and benefits of food
quality enhancement by biotechnology? What about the development of plants
to produce pharmaceuticals, and the genetic engineering of plants to make or
be sources for polymers and industrial products?
FOOD SAFETY
Concern about the risks of consuming transgenic crops already exists in
Europe. One participant noted that labeling of genetically engineered products
in Europe is not a safety matter; it is done to facilitate informed choice. Are
such concerns shared by those in the United States? US regulatory agencies
(Food and Drug Administration [FDA] and EPA) assess biotechnology products
and evaluate industry data. In the US there is a need for more objective data and
more communication.
One reason that labeling of genetically engineered plants might be necessary
is to inform consumers of potential allergens (e.g., if genes from peanuts or
brazil nuts were inserted into other plants).
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. There should be scientific input into decision-making at all levels. Because it
is essential that input be free from bias, an independently funded research
institute should be established. This institute would conduct scientific and
social/value research to provide information to fill in the gaps of regulatory
policy and ensure that regulations are thoroughly debated for scientific and
social soundness. With respect to the research to be undertaken in the values
area, it was suggested that the ELSI (Ethical, Legal and Social Impact)
research program of the Human Genome Project could serve as a model.
2. The EPA should be encouraged to continue working with scientists and
industry to define the safety parameters of transgenic plants and determine
how these plants are to be regulated. Regulations should be based on the
transgene and the crop, using validated scientific field data, model, and
laboratory findings. Work on methodologies for measuring the probability of
out-crossing and assessing its potential impact on the ecosystem should
continue. It will be necessary to define acceptable levels of risk.
3. Efforts should be undertaken to develop an appropriate network of product/
technology stewardship involving technology providers, users, government
regulators, and other stakeholders. Protocols for resistance management and
detection should be reviewed and refined as necessary. At the same time,
efforts should continue to be made to define acceptable levels of resistance.
Also, regional cooperation must be increased, specifically with respect to
regional pest management plans.
4. In order to achieve legitimacy for the decisions that come from the decision-
making process, we must find ways to involve the public, producers,
government, academics, environmentalists, industry, and other stakeholders
in that process. Close connections should be developed between public and
private parties to monitor and manage resistance.
5. Communication is critical. Communication must be initiated and maintained
in accessible ways with targeted audiences. As an example, farmers are on
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the front-line for resistance monitoring and management. It is critical that
they are aware of the reasons for regulations and that they receive assistance
in compliance. Similarly, it is important to communicate with the general
public to address and put to rest ungrounded fears. To be effective communi-
cation must not be a one-sided affair. Rather, it must be in the form of
dialogues among concerned and impacted parties. Related to communication
is the idea of developing trust among technology users, providers, and
regulators. Effective dialogue will be a valuable tool for the achievement of
this goal.
6. We must find a place for value considerations in the decision-making process,
for after we answer the question as to whether it can be done the key
question of whether it should be done remains.
The adoption of the products of biotechnology has proceeded at a much faster
rate than almost anyone anticipated. The potential of these products to deliver
significant value and change agriculture has driven enormous research funding
over the last 15 years. In the case of Pioneer Hi-Bred, we increased our research
spending from three percent of sales to more than eight percent of sales at the
same time that the total sales were increasing rapidly. The need for research
funding to develop and apply the new technologies has driven considerable
change in agrobusiness and the farm sector. In particular, it has sparked a wave
of consolidation of agricultural chemical companies and seed companies. Along
with the enormous promise of the technology, there are concerns related to
the wide-scale use of this technology. This meeting deals with one of those
concerns: the development of pests that are resistant to the genetically altered
host. I have been asked to share my thoughts on the management of the new
technology so as to minimize the risks as we explore practices that might
mitigate the risks of development of pest resistance. Our workshop is to explore
these issues from the perspective of industrial and economic concerns.
Resistance to synthetic agrochemicals or to gene products produced in crops
can develop in insect, pathogen, or weed populations. The general mechanisms
and basis of the development of resistance is well understood since it is a
case of natural selection. However, the specific controlling factors and their
management are much less clearly understood. Current models for minimizing
selection pressure and maximizing efficacy of the transgenes is much more
limited. Although there are only a few transgenic crops introduced into the
market at this time, many more are at various stages of development. A few
transgenes like Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis endotoxin) and various types of
herbicide tolerance are finding broad acceptance and are being introduced
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across crop species. Transgenic crops with insect resistance and herbicide
tolerance have significant value to farmers by replacing synthetic agrochemicals
for insect control and expanding the ability to use broad spectrum and
relatively environmentally safe herbicides in production systems. The farmers’
desire to solve these problems using genetic solutions has resulted in rapid
acceptance of the new technology. Meanwhile, our understanding of resistance
management has been useful but has not been adequate to result in widely
accepted management programs. Nor has the efficacy of implemented
management plans been established. The need for resistance-management
programs to function across geographical areas, crops, state and national
borders, and different company products makes the development and
implementation of compliance with management plans particularly challenging.
It is worthwhile to explore the nature of the participants in the industrial
and economic arena, and consider the strengths and weaknesses they bring to
resistance management. This exercise might suggest approaches that maximize
the strengths of the participants and minimize the weaknesses.
TECHNOLOGY PROVIDERS
University programs, small companies, or the technology development efforts
of large companies discover genes providing crop protection traits. The strength
of the technology providers is that they are extremely aggressive in applying
both basic and applied science to important problems. Their activities drive
changes in competitive positions as new products with improved characteristics
displace or reduce the use of existing products. An example is the transition
from synthetic chemical control of pest insects to genetic control. These
technology generators tend to move very rapidly and to focus narrowly on
the technology. They are more likely to concentrate on their business and their
technology, and not have the resources or time to devote to addressing larger
societal issues. Some projects are done because they are possible technically,
while a discussion of the broader social, economic, and environmental issues
may lag the technology.
CROP INPUT COMPANIES
Over the last 15 years there has been significant consolidation of the companies
involved in providing crop production inputs. Recently there have been
significant moves to consolidate crop-input companies and chemical/
agrochemical/pharmaceutical companies. Many of the remaining players in
this area are large “life sciences” companies that have activities in agricultural
chemicals, seeds and other traditional inputs, as well as pharmaceutical,
nutritional, and processing activities. These companies bring significant,
positive capabilities. They are willing to spend large sums of money on research
and to move new products quickly into the hands of farmers and consumers.
They concentrate on selling products not traits, and have the resources and
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scope to address regulatory requirements and to move technologies around
the globe. These companies, because of anti-trust concerns, are limited in
their ability to cooperate with one another once they begin to compete in the
marketplace. In the case of herbicide-tolerant soybeans, a number of companies
are selling varieties across the entire soybean growing area and they are limited
in their ability to plan among the companies for restrictions on acreage or usage
of the products. Additionally, these companies are gaining benefit from moving
quickly and being the first to introduce products, and would like to avoid
multiple-year discussions of societal impacts. Their businesses may involve one
or two crops, but not all the crops containing a trait like Bt for insect resistance.
This means that resistance-management planning that goes across regions and
crops may not be addressed by the same companies. Pioneer, for instance, sells
Bt corn, but is not in the cotton business. In spite of this, a resistance-
management plan in the southern United States must consider both crops.
FARMERS
American farmers are the most efficient producers of grain in the world. They
do this at a low cost, and have provided a reliable, inexpensive source of food
for the US, and increasingly the world. They are in competition with farmers
in other countries and tend to adopt technology quickly to optimize their
own position. In dealing with questions of transgenic insect resistance, they
recognize that in a low-margin commodity business there are significant
benefits of new technology that accrue to the early adopters. Consequently
their interests are not always in concert with those of their neighbors or
those of the companies selling the products. This divergence tends to make
coordinated planning for minimizing the development of pest resistance
difficult.
SUMMARY
The opportunity for an extended theoretical discussion of the issues surround-
ing the development of insect resistance to transgenes is well past. There are a
number of new technologies and genes currently being developed that extend
well beyond the Bt insect resistance or herbicide tolerance traits that are in the
marketplace. These traits represent both alternate genes for insect resistance
as well as other traits that have yet to be commercialized. The discussion
of resistance management shouldn’t be seen as being for or against a single
technology. In the case of insect resistance, the replacement of chemical
technologies by genetic technologies offers an additional approach. This
transition offers many benefits to the environment and farm safety, but also
raises questions. It is unlikely that the groups listed above will reach durable
approaches to minimizing insect resistance without a dialog that ensures a
representation of them all and that recognizes and minimizes their specific
weakness.
It is in all our interests to manage the genes for insect resistance in a way that
prolongs their useful lifetime. Increased understanding of the nature and
efficiency of resistance management programs has significant value.
The workshop on Industrial and Economic Perspectives was highly diverse in
membership and included representatives from industry, academe, government,
farmers, and others. Most of the discussion focused on transgenic crops
containing the gene for biopesticidal toxin from Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis.)
A major concern discussed in the plenary sessions, as well as in the workshops
of the NABC conference, was the potential for insects to develop resistance to
the Bt toxin. Although at the time of the workshop no cases of insect resistance
to transgenic crops containing the Bt gene had been documented, there was
great concern expressed about this possibility.
WHAT POTENTIAL RISKS DO RESISTANT PESTS POSE TO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY?
The loss of the ability to control a plant pest via a biopesticide produced in a
transgenic crop could result in crop losses to growers and the return to reliance
on the use of chemical pesticides. However, this type of risk is not new.
Resistant pests have always developed in response to conventional hybrid
resistant varieties or use of chemical pesticides. Over the years various weeds,
insects, and fungi have become resistant to a variety of chemicals. Yet with
management plans that include cultural practices, alternative chemistries, and
crop rotations, the pests have been controlled.
If pest resistance occurs with transgenic pesticidal plants, regulatory hurdles
could be increased (especially with Bt) and become a liability in both the
domestic and global arena. Even if the pest is ubiquitous in many crops (e.g.
lepidopteran) and the gene for resistance is also in those crops, pest resistance
may not develop if the exposure of the pest to the gene is seasonal and
appropriate refuges are used.
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Because Bt is a natural resource, care must be taken to ensure its usefulness is
maintained. Resistance to Bt could lead to a negative perception of Bt crops by
consumers and have a negative economic impact on producers and manufactur-
ers. Meanwhile, industry (seed, agricultural, chemical, and biotechnology
companies) is working to identify new genes as alternatives to Bt that target
pests not controlled by Bt. Academic institutions and other credible groups can
play a role in educating the public.
HOW IS DEVELOPMENT OF RESISTANCE MONITORED AND WHO IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING?
Both the companies that have commercialized the technology and the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA) are monitoring for the development of pest
resistance to transgenic Bt plants. However, the effectiveness of monitoring
techniques is not yet clear. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
requires that companies monitor for pest resistance. Industry has a vested
interest in resistance and the proper use of its products. Concern was expressed
that industry may be seen as ‘the fox guarding the chicken house’ and it was
suggested that a third party should be involved. Such an approach could use
universities, extension services, or private consultants under contracts to verify
industry’s findings.
A European suggestion is to put in place an organization comprised of
university and government personnel to oversee and monitor pest resistance in
transgenic plants. There is a need to find a credible source for monitoring, for
public disclosure, and for educating the legislature and all parties involved.
IS THERE AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RESISTANCE?
Pest resistance to control measures, per se, is not new. Future generations of
transgenic plants will come with new variants of the Bt genes or other genes for
insect control. There will also be new synthetic chemical pesticides to
complement and assist the effectiveness of the transgenics. Resistance to a pest
control agent is almost inevitable when the agent’s mode of action targets a
single site. However, due to the effectiveness of the transgenics, the benefits to
the growers, and the investment of industry, the goal is to minimize and/or
delay pest resistance to biopesticides produced by transgenic plants by
following recommendations for refuges and alternative chemistries. Guidelines
should be developed with the following questions in mind:
• Breadth of pest resistance (e.g., is the resistance confined to a specific
insect or many insects?)
• Alternatives (e.g., do safe and economic alternate methods of pest control
exist?)
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES
Questions about the responsibility for enforcement and use and size of penalties
for non-compliance have not been resolved. For example, what is the penalty to
the grower who does not follow the guidelines? What should the size and
location of the refuge be? How can this be implemented in third world
countries where there are many farmers with very small acreage? Much more
research is needed to generate real data to answer these questions. Matching
grants from industry and government may provide the funds needed to conduct
such research.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TRANSGENIC TECHNOLOGY
IN PLANT SYSTEMS?
There are many benefits projected from the use of transgenic crops:
• Decrease in the amount of crop protection chemicals used, which is better
for the environment, water quality, and overall health and safety.
• Increase in food production in third world countries.
• Value-added crops for growers.
• Increase quality traits such as oils, proteins, etc.
• Allows crop yield to approach its potential.
• Less capital.
In addition, society may benefit from the use of transgenic plants in
phytoremediation, and in the production of bio-based products such as plant
vaccines, nutraceuticals, and industrial products.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF TRANSGENIC TECHNOLOGY IN
PLANT SYSTEMS?
While there are many benefits, there are also some risks that need to be
managed. One threat is the potential for gene escape. For example, the pest
resistance gene(s) may be transferred from the transgenic host plant to a native
relative (weedy) plant in the field area. Further investigations need to be done
on the probability of this happening. As with failures with conventional
products, companies are liable when the product fails or causes a side effect.
From an industry perspective, there is concern that the transgenic biopesticide
product life will be shorter than that of a chemical product. In addition,
inventory control is more difficult since the seeds for the next year’s crop are
grown during the current year. The demand for a mix of traits (e.g., Bt plus
high oil) also make inventory management more difficult. With transgenic
plants there is also the problem of increased regulation and trade barriers. The
major consolidation in the agrochemical/biotechnology/seed industry suggests
that there will be less diversity in the research of a few consolidated companies
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than the primary companies that pre-existed consolidation. Furthermore, large
consolidated companies will have larger market share and more control of
germplasm, and may have a monopoly in some markets.
TO DECREASE THE RISKS OF GENE ESCAPE:
• Develop technologies so that the transgene is not expressed in next
generation.
• Avoid planting transgenic crops in their evolutionary center of crop origin
where there may be wild and weedy relatives.
• Rotate crops so that other types of chemical or cultural pest control
measures can be used.
HOW SHOULD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE OF PLANT BIOTECH
BE DECIDED AND HOW DOES THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATE?
The EPA currently has regulations governing the registration of transgenic
plants. Should there be additional standards for safety and efficacy? Should
there be an equivalent of the Centers for Disease Control to oversee the use of
transgenics? Industry might argue that the current regulations suffice and it is
in their own best interest to ensure compliance with guidelines so their plant
biotechnology products have a long life. Others could argue that a tool such as
Bt should not be ruined by overuse for the sake of immediate rewards. While Bt
is widely used by home gardeners and organic growers, other transgenic plants
for pest management (herbicide- and virus-resistant) are more like conventional
products and have similar regulatory and management issues. There is still a
gap in research on the best way to avoid/delay development of pest resistance.
In the end, the transgenic plant is just another tool for the grower to use in the
quest for maximum yield and economic return.
While educating the public seems logical, we must be realistic about who
is really interested and who is influencing public opinion. The land grant
universities should take the lead in developing methods to deliver the
information about biotechnology, genetically altered organisms and transgenics
in “plain” language. This information should be presented to (but not limited
to):
• Service groups (e.g. Kiwanis, Rotary).
• Influencers of public opinion (Note: the influencer is not always the leader
but may have the leader’s ear and trust).
• Classrooms.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) To decrease the risk of development of pest resistance:
• Maintain an integrated approach to pest management with diverse options.
• Maintain strong public and private research infrastructure to ensure diverse
options.
• Encourage shared funding between industry and government.
2) Resistance monitoring:
• Registrant (industry) should conduct baseline monitoring starting with field
trials and through commercialization.
• The strategy needs to be part of the registration package.
3) Enforcing resistance management strategies:
• Research is needed on how to delay/avoid pest resistance, and test such
theories.
• Use existing groups (e.g. Crop Improvement Association) or new non-
industry groups to monitor development of resistance and compliance with
management strategies.
• Industry and universities need to develop “certified” methods for monitoring.
• Growers should keep crop records, including the field location of transgenic
and non-transgenic crops.
• Penalty for non-compliance should be the same as for misuse of a chemical.
• Monitoring and penalties must be standardized across regions.
4) To reduce the risk of gene escape into the environment:
• Identify areas of particular concern (centers of origin).
• Develop a management plan (e.g., crop rotation).
• Express transgenes only in the current crop, not in the next generation.
• Create an oversight committee.
• Set standards for efficacy and safety.
• Identify needed research.
5) To communicate/educate the public:
• Land grant universities should take the lead to develop a plain language
delivery method of information.
• Education is needed for influential leaders and policymakers, media, service
groups (Rotary, Kiwanis, etc.), and teachers.
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Biotechnology is defendable. It is here to stay, and it is going to grow at
a faster pace. The questions now relate to its direction and boundaries.
Let me state that I am making this presentation as an agricultural
producer. I do not profess to be a scientist providing a lot of scientific
data. I will leave that aspect to those of you in this room, for I recognize
that you are some of the world’s finest agricultural scientists.
I am a nurseryman. That was my training. That has been my life.
Through the years, I have seen a great deal of genetic management in
the materials we produce in our greenhouses. I have accepted those
changes and adopted many of them. Doing so has helped me stay in
business, improve our products, and stay competitive. By and large, I
think that farmers and ranchers believe in science and research as applied
to our industry. To them, it is an easy step to accepting and believing in
the potential benefits of biotechnology. They recognize that older methods
of genetic manipulation are too slow and not specific enough. They see
biotechnology as the future.
For the past decade, agriculturalists have heard a lot about the promise
of biotechnology. It has been only in the past several years that we have
been seeing the results. So far, results have been everything we were led
to believe. We have seen crops grown on ground where growth was not
previously practical. There are plants that fight disease, drought, and
destructive bugs. We have seen dairy animals become tremendously
more efficient because of growth hormones. We have seen animals being
developed to produce pharmaceuticals for use in humans. US farmers do
not need any more convincing about new genetically altered plants. They
know that:
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• New soybeans are resistant to specific herbicides.
• Cotton repels caterpillars.
• Corn is either a new high-oil type, borer-resistant, or resistant to a specific
herbicide.
Preliminary harvest data are extremely promising. Cotton designed to fight
bollworms is yielding 15 to 17 percent more than cotton grown with applica-
tions of conventional pesticides. And this new cotton is getting a good test.
Field inspections indicate bollworm infestations at 20 times the level that used
to send farmers scurrying for their sprayers. But cotton carrying the anti-
caterpillar bacterial toxin in its genes is doing a better-than-expected job. One
southern state Extension director said that farmers with genetically altered
crops took their sprayers into the fields one time compared with the traditional
20 to 30 passes.
Think of the cost savings. Think of the reduced soil compaction. Think of
the reduced likelihood of run-off or drift. Cotton growers are enthusiastic, so
are soybean farmers. Nine out of 10 producers of genetically altered soybeans
say that they are getting the results they expected or better.
Corn growers are equally upbeat. The benefits of this new seed, genetically
altered to repel corn borers, are obvious. Farmers get relatively easy borer
control without the hassle of field scouting, calculating economic thresholds,
determining whether or not to apply an insecticide, and then worrying about
how the weather will affect the application. By planting this biotechnology
corn, farmers will save money and time and still get top yields.
Farmers know that population growth means expanded markets for food
and other products. However, the potential for conflict grows too. Farmers are
blamed for many environmental issues. By using less pesticide, fertilizer, water,
and other resources, the sustainability of agriculture will be greatly increased.
Farmers believe in biotechnology, but they have concerns. I think those
concerns are brought about not from absolute knowledge, but from a sense that
the future is going to be greatly different from the past. And they sense that
scientific projects sometimes become widely accepted before the research is
complete. As I drive through the southeastern section of the United States,
I sometimes think that Kudzu is the natural habitat. Of course, it isn’t. Kudzu
was introduced to control soil erosion, and it became a noxious weed.
In my own state of Florida, Malaleuca was introduced to help draw water
out of the ground to lower the water table. I guess it does but that’s not what
it is known for today. It has become an invasive weed that has overrun the
land, clogged ditches and canals, and in general has become an intolerable
nightmare. The point I am trying to make is that all things that appear good
do not always turn out that way. We must know how new products will react
in the real world under real conditions and not just in the laboratory.
Farmers recognize that there is risk involved as we attempt to improve
things. As scientists, you are also aware of that fact. We must be aware that in
some people there is no fear. It is full speed ahead. In other people, there is too
much fear. That certainly is the case in dealing with biotechnology.
As I look at biotechnology, there are five issues I’d like to address. They are
changes to agriculture, competitiveness, ethics, public understanding, and
public policy. Some people think of biotechnology and genetic engineering
as simple modification of plants and animals. It is far more. It will lead to a
completely changed agriculture. I’m not certain I can begin to comprehend all
the changes, but let’s think of a few. A crop that is engineered for mechanical
harvesting, instead of hand harvesting, will be far more attractive production-
wise. A crop made tolerant to colder weather or varying soil conditions will
create expanded production areas. Products made healthier and more attractive
will increase consumer demand, therefore affecting production and marketing.
Biotechnology may well change production areas, as well as who will grow a
product and who will market that product. As these things become different,
there will be waves of change in all aspects of management. The very structure
of the agricultural industry will be affected. Biotechnology has already started
to change agriculture. Its application is spreading faster than most people
realize. It is estimated that more than one-half of all cotton, 40 percent of
the soybeans, and 20 percent of the corn grown in this country in 1998 were
genetically altered. And, acceptance is worldwide. Recently, a Wall Street Journal
article estimated that one company alone would provide genetically engineered
seed for 55 million acres worldwide. That’s about equal to the farmland of Iowa
and Illinois.
Who will control agriculture is of vital concern. If a farmer is limited to the
available seeds or breeding stock, then control is exerted on him. If a company
producing the seed indicated that products coming from that seed can only be
marketed in a certain way, then more control is placed on farmers. Many people
think that whoever controls the genetic input in seeds and animals also controls
agriculture.
American agriculture has long had the reputation of being the wonder of the
world. That reputation was brought about by a great public and private research
system making information available. Our incentive system rewarded farmers
for adopting new technology. This has always given us a competitive advantage.
To let other nations move into the role of being the dominant agricultural
producer would be a tragic error. Food supply is the key to security.
We now see biotechnology research being conducted in all parts of the world.
We see technology being adopted worldwide as well. Will that make competi-
tion keener? American farmers must be able to sell products abroad. The
efficiency of our agricultural system makes that possible by requiring exports.
A concern that I have is that some nations are using the issue of biotechnology
as an artificial trade barrier. They claim there is a problem in the safety of
genetically engineered food.
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We are hearing the same concerns here at home. A coalition of consumer
groups has sued the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to remove 36
genetically engineered foods from store shelves until the items are tested and
labeled. The suit, filed in US District Court, claims consumers are put at risk
by eating foods that are genetically engineered. We must work for worldwide
acceptance of scientific standards so that safe in one country also means safe in
another. When the mainstream scientific community proclaims a product safe,
the statement should mark agreement. If people choose not to buy, that’s fine,
but let them have a choice.
A problem exists in this area because the World Trade Organization has not
yet identified any scientific body as the primary reference point for biotechnol-
ogy. One such entity does exist for food safety and animal health. I understand
that a working group is meeting and will recommend a protocol for testing
genetically modified organisms. A major concern of many people is the matter
of the ethics of the people who conduct biotechnology projects.
When research was being done on plants, no one seemed to think much
about it. As work expanded to animals, there was more concern. With the
public announcement of the cloning of Dolly, the sheep, voices have been
raised about the role of biotechnology. I suspect there are even some who fear
its future.
Certainly we will see the second wave of biotechnology progress. This will
include the development of natural compounds to fight cancer and other
diseases. There will be genetic modifications to create more nutritious, healthier
food and, in addition, the development of compounds for improved human
health.
I hope that the scientific community will take the lead in establishing
bioethical guidelines and peer review procedures. If that is not done, then
government will step in. I’m not at all sure that government would provide a
set of sound ethical guidelines.
Some people fear that scientists will become financially greedy in their
biotechnology efforts. There has always been that temptation. I believe that
most scientists are dedicated to the development and application of science in
the best interest of humanity. It seems to me that in most instances recognition
of peers and scientific accomplishments is more important to these individuals
than financial motivation.
I also recognize that a major fear on the part of some people is that of
corporate greed. There is a belief that developers of biotechnology projects
will be motivated only by money. The cost of developing new products is
tremendous. Developers must be protected. Once these products are licensed
and get into foreign hands can they be controlled? If they become obsolete, or
a better product comes on the market in three to five years, a 17-year patent
doesn’t have much value.
I am a realist who knows that financial considerations do matter. Economics
is a strong motivating force. But let me point out two things. If there is no
incentive or reward, there will be no effort put into a project. Why should an
individual or corporation risk capital on developing a product if there can be no
gain. Secondly, we must remember that financial gain comes only after or through
consumer acceptance. We cannot force individuals to use a product or service.
Yes, money will be made by those who are successful in the areas of biotech-
nology development and genetic transfer. That is the reward for contributions
in serving society. A major concern to me is public attitude and acceptance of
scientific advances generated by biotechnology. We all know that the public
seems to live on the edge of fear regarding food supply. Just a little push throws
many people off balance. Unfortunately, there are some scientists and others
who, for their own reasons, seem willing to provide that little nudge. I certainly
hope that scientists have a questioning attitude. That creates good science. It
would seem, however, that a goal should be to establish criteria that would
mean agreement on safety and acceptability.
It seems to me that the scientific community must become more active in
an educational, public relations type of effort to create consumer understanding
of biotechnology accomplishments. The public must understand that product
safety is of major concern to scientists. Really, scientists and farmers do not
want to produce products that harm consumers. To do so would be very
shortsighted. Consumers must become aware that scientists are dedicated to
actions that benefit consumers. At the same time, scientists are constrained by
program safeguards established by government, the scientific community, and
common sense.
The last issue I will mention is the establishment of public policy regarding
biotechnology. This is an area where sound-thinking individuals of the
scientific community must be active. You cannot let the extremist within your
ranks become the alarmist voices that poison the work done in biotechnology.
I hope scientists will discuss and disagree on issues. That causes progress. But I
would hope that self-discipline and self-control would be a major behavior of
scientists.
One thing is for certain — we must not turn over all the decision-making
about biotechnology to the politicians. To do so would guarantee an ineffective
program of biotechnology development, a costly boondoggled program, and
would assure the success of our competitors in other countries.
In closing let me summarize several points:
• Biotechnology is accepted by most farmers, and they know that this is
where the future lies.
• We must educate the consumers and bring them along as new products are
being developed.
• Safe must mean safe, and there needs to be an international body that is
respected and responsible to say so.
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• Incentives must be in place to encourage development and use.
• If we are going to remain strong agriculturally, protect the environment,
and be competitive in a world market, then in my view biotechnology is a
must.
I believe in the future of this nation and in agriculture, its most important
industry. I believe all parties will be better off in the future because of the efforts
being made in biotechnology. And, I believe that biotechnology will provide
better conditions for humans and the world. Therefore, biotechnology is
defendable.
INTRODUCTION
Lt. Governor Peeler closed his welcoming speech at this NABC meeting by
stressing the importance of family farming to South Carolina, and the fact that
much more needs to be done to help save family farms. I agree. Even so, when
we discuss research, technology and so on in relation to family farming, there
are often clashes among differing groups because competing social values
relating to the importance of family farming strike many as being outside of
the realm of science or empirical discourse, and difficult to choose between.
It is thus ironic, but also instructive, if we recognize that debates over the
environmental consequences of agricultural science and technology have
been as or more perplexing and just as contested as the matter of the social
implications of technology. In this paper I explore some of the reasons why this
has been the case, and offer what some appropriate responses from the public
agricultural research system should be.
The environmental implications of new agrofood biotechnology products
arguably represent today the most socially-salient issue relating to agricultural
biotechnology — and, for that matter, to agricultural technology in general.
This is not to suggest that the structure of agriculture or the socioeconomic
impacts of technology have ceased to be of concern to a good many people, or
that there are no longer expectations that agricultural research will contribute
to increased productivity, competitiveness, food safety, and so on. With the
shift of our national political culture — and most of the rest of the world’s —
over the past two decades or so, the issue of the socioeconomic consequences
of agricultural research and technological change is now on the margins of
the political agenda of most governments and agencies. Many of these
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socioeconomic concerns, however, have been repackaged as environmental
issues. In my part of the country, for example, there is a very significant level of
resistance to the siting of large-scale, integrated confinement hog operations in
rural communities. This issue is, at root, mainly a socioeconomic issue relating
to agricultural technology and the structure of agriculture, but it is increasingly
being played out on environmental grounds — odor, water quality, the risk of
lagoon accidents and spills, and so on. In the developing world, landlessness
and land tenure concerns have often been repackaged in the form of indigenous
rights or sustainability movements.
Much of this paper will revolve around the symbolic or subjective aspects of
environmental quality. Recognizing the fact that the environment is, in part, a
matter of subjectivity, perception, and symbolism is not meant to trivialize the
importance of the environmental implications of agriculture or agricultural
technology. Environmental impacts and constraints are extremely high priority
matters for agricultural researchers to address seriously. It is important to
recognize that scientific evidence alone, no matter how compelling it might
appear to the agricultural research community, will ultimately carry the day
only if it is consistent with how various groups in society see their own lives
and futures. There must also be societal trust in government, universities,
and other institutions generating this evidence. Not only is there a tendency
for agricultural scientists’ calculations of risks to be different than those of
nonscientists, but public environmental concerns do not always coincide well
with data from environmental science research.
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The classical tradition in sociology and all the other major social sciences has
revolved around stressing that the realm of the social can — and must — be
understood apart from the natural world. Thus, for most of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, social scientists thought that an explanation was
satisfactory only if it was a social explanation (i.e., in terms of a social variable
such as social class, culture, or power). There was deep suspicion and a lack of
professional regard if social phenomena were explained in terms of physical or
biological forces such as genetic heritage, climate, biophysical environment,
and so on. In my discipline it is still the case today that scholars who study
societal-environmental relationships, or who try to explain social phenomena
by using biophysical variables, are considered more or less out of the
mainstream (Harper, 1996).
When the environment rose to prominence as an issue nearly 30 years ago,
some sociologists were of the view that their disciplinary tools needed to be
dramatically changed if they were to be able to understand the significance of
the environment. This has given rise to a substantial community of sociologists
who take the environment seriously. There are now a goodly number of
sociologists and other social scientists who are exploring the social significance
of the natural world as a source of materials, resources, and (ecosystem)
services as well as being a decisive constraint on human activities. But it is
also very apparent to these environmental sociologists that the significance
of the environment to human social life goes beyond the matter of the goods
and services that humans obtain from nature, and the impacts that societies
have on nature.
For example, the very notion of the environment can be seen as a Western
cultural construct that is predicated on the distinction between society and the
natural world. However, if we look at how humans have related to the natural
world historically and cross-culturally, it becomes clear that the Western
distinction between society and environment is by no means a universal one.
The cultures (or “cosmologies”) of many of the world’s people today still
involve seeing humanity as an integral and inseparable part of nature. For
them, the notion that society or technology has “impacts” on “the environ-
ment” is unfamiliar or even nonsensical. Even so, the symbolic salience of
the environment is still important in the Western world and in much of the
remainder of the world that is undergoing Westernization and modernization.
Widespread public concern about the environment is one of the defining
features of social life in the late twentieth century.
Some sociologists believe that the essence of environmental concern is
basically a response to the growing knowledge that the ecological/environ-
mental sciences have been generating about how the expansion of human
societies and modern technological practices are prejudicing the quality of the
biophysical environment. Without denying that this process plays an important
role, I believe that the significance of environmental concern is more social and
symbolic (Hannigan, 1995). Matters such as personal security (particularly
health), aesthetics, community livability, and the future quality of life for one’s
children tend to be the most enduring types of environmental concerns. Some
movement leaders, however, have had a tendency to want to stress global
environmental concerns that cannot be directly experienced by individuals
and communities. One of the ways that environmental issues become socially
salient is through the formation of public perceptions that there exist
environmental risks that are unwarranted or unreasonable. This can occur
when there is an environmental event that can be attributable to or blamed
on an institution or organization in which there is a lack of trust. We, of
course, live in a world where there is fairly widespread cynicism about major
institutions, including both government and industry, creating fertile ground
for cycles of concern about environmental and technological risks (Beck, 1992;
Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997).
Whether or not we define a particular social issue as an environmental one
or not is therefore as much a process of social “framing” (Hannigan, 1995)
and culture as it is a deduction from scientific research. I noted earlier that
agricultural biotechnology has been contested increasingly on the grounds of
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whether this type of technology will or will not have adverse environmental
implications. Thus, groups that for one reason or another have concerns about
agricultural biotechnology are increasingly couching these concerns in
environmental terms. Similarly, proponents of agricultural biotechnology,
including many of the large private biotechnology firms, devote considerable
effort to justifying these technologies on environmental grounds.
These debates about the environmental advantages and disadvantages of
biotechnology occur not only in the media as direct or indirect attempts of
various groups — including those of us at this conference — to influence the
views of the public. They also occur in a variety of political, regulatory, and
scholarly arenas. It is increasingly the case today that groups on opposite sides
of a social policy issue will both actively use scientific arguments to bolster
their case. In particular, it has increasingly been the case that social movements
— including but not limited to environmental movements — will couch their
arguments in science. This process, which I call the “scientization of social
movements,” is having significant impact on the work and practices of
scientists (Yearley, 1991). This is particularly the case in the sciences whose
processes or outcomes have potential environmental impacts. Agricultural
biotechnology is a prime example of the “scientization” of public policy
discourse. A parallel process that I find particularly significant as well is that
professional and interest groups are increasingly conducting themselves more
or less like social movements, in the sense that they actively hone ideological
positions and claims in order to influence policymakers and the public. And in
this process of the “social movementization” of professional and interest groups
it is commonly the case that these groups rely on scientific arguments, and also
make appeals to environmental concern or greenness.
The typical configuration of these policy debates and conflicts today is that
environmental-type groups employ scientific reasoning about how technolo-
gies, policies, or other interventions will lead to environmental and other risks.
Their opponents will typically respond with claims that in the reputable (or
“sound”) scientific literature there is no evidence that an adverse environmental
impact necessarily will occur. And increasingly the response is complemented
with uncertainty arguments. It is typically argued that the risks discussed by
environmentalists are only hypothetical, that there is doubt in the scientific
predictions and conjectures used to forecast risk, and that it would be
imprudent to make costly responses to risks that are only hypothetical.
Typically, both sides sincerely believe that “sound science” is on their side.
It should be stressed, though, that risk and uncertainty, while they are common
words in our language that have several meanings (Thompson, 1997), are
perfectly legitimate scientific concepts. But they are employed so often as
rhetorical weapons that there is now a growing cynicism in policy circles about
whether they are more-so political slogans or methods of scientific analysis.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY: SOME OBSERVATIONS
Why is there so much debate and concern about the environmental implica-
tions of agricultural biotechnology? My analysis thus far is that one dimension
of this concern is socially constructed. One implication of this point is that
scientific evidence and argument alone can play only a partial role in resolving
policy conflicts whose origins have deep roots in society and social structure.
But it is important to recognize that these conflicts are not merely symbolic —
or, some might say, nonempirical or irrational — ones. The fact that agricultural
biotechnology remains controversial nearly 20 years after the onset of large-
scale public and private R&D suggests that concern about the technology
is much more than an irrational obstacle or public resistance to change.
Agricultural applications of biotechnology account for less than 15 percent
of private biotechnology R&D investment, but perhaps 80 percent or more of
the conflicts and controversies over the technology have been agriculturally
related (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1995). In part, this is because many of the first
generation of crop biotechnology products — particularly herbicide-tolerant
and Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) engineered crop varieties — have had environ-
mental liabilities or vulnerabilities.
Second, agriculture in the US and elsewhere faces some considerable environ-
mental and resource management challenges, and the nature of ongoing trends
suggests that the path we are on is problematic for dealing with these chal-
lenges. Agricultural chemical use has increased, and since the late 1980s there
has been a decisive reversal of the farm-crisis-induced decline of agrochemical
usage (Goodman and Redclift, 1989). Nitrogen usage has never been higher.
Despite much touting of integrated pest management (IPM) technology,
agricultural pesticide usage (as measured by pounds of active ingredients)
remains virtually unchanged from the levels of 15 years ago (GAO, 1995).
Cultivation of highly erodible land is still widespread (ERS, 1995a, 1995b).
Agriculture remains the most significant contributor to impairment of the
quality of the nation’s water resources. About 38 percent of the miles in lakes
and streams, and 44 percent of the nation’s lake acres, were estimated to be not
fully supporting their intended uses, according to US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) data for 1992 (GAO, 1995). Agriculture was the leading source
of impairment of the quality of water in rivers, streams, and lakes. At some
point over the next decade or two the national and world agricultural
communities will need to address the interrelated problems of the excess of
fixed nitrogen compounds in the global environment (Vitousek et al., 1997;
Hellemans, 1998), and the impact of agricultural production on the quantity
and quality of water resources. Add to these macro-level environmental
constraints the more highly salient public concerns about food quality and
safety, the odors and water quality impacts of animal wastes, and so on, and it
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becomes clear how important the environmental dimensions of agricultural
technology will be in the future.
There have traditionally been two major ways in which the environmental
implications of agricultural biotechnology have been analyzed and dealt with
in policymaking. The first approach to assessing the environmental implica-
tions of biotechnology has been to undertake experimental field or laboratory
assessment of whether a particular biotechnology, such as Bt-engineered corn or
herbicide-tolerant soybean varieties, has definite, empirically verifiable adverse
environmental consequences. Experimental assessment of a specific biotechnol-
ogy product generates data that can be useful in regulatory arenas. There is, to
be sure, more than a small amount of grumbling about the EPA, the US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) regulation of agricultural biotechnology. But it has been
very seldom that regulatory roadblocks have derailed an attractive agricultural
technology. And a strong regulatory process serves a useful long-term purpose
in building public trust and in discouraging scientists from bringing highly
risky technologies to the market. Nonetheless, these experimental data, while
they are of clear use in addressing what might be termed the population-
ecological and ecotoxicological effects of agricultural biotechnology, do not
exhaust the broader environmental issues that relate to agriculture.
The second approach has been to make assessments about whether biotech-
nology as a class of technologies is likely to be environmentally friendly or
environmentally destructive. For example, many proponents argue that because
biotechnology will make possible increased productivity and output, these
technologies are environmentally friendly because they will enable food to
be produced on smaller acreages than would otherwise be the case. There
will, therefore, be less “pressure” on tropical rainforests, wetlands, marginal
agricultural environments, and so on. This type of argument, however, has
a good many fallacies. It is premised on the notion that biotechnology is the
only possible way to increase the productivity and output of the world’s
croplands. The nature of technological change in the industrial countries,
where biotechnology products will be most extensively used, are not likely to
have much effect on land use in the tropics. This argument also ignores the
fact that to the degree to which there is rapid technological change in the
developing world and this technological change is of the capital-intensive type
(as is the case with most biotechnology products), it is likely to exacerbate
landlessness. All things being equal, landlessness will result in more rather than
less of a tendency for the rural poor in the developing world to seek land for
subsistence in rainforests and other ecologically significant zones. Similarly,
some observers (including some opponents of biotechnology) argue that due
to the nature of the technology it will lead to genetic uniformity and to risk of
widespread incidence of pest and pathogen outbreaks. It is not clear, however,
that biotechnological methods will lead to genetic uniformity of a magnitude
greater than what conventional plant breeding makes possible.
I am not inclined to put very much stock in claims that agricultural biotech-
nology is environmentally friendly or not due to the methods that are used in
research and development. In part, this is because of the fact that biotechnology
is not a particularly meaningful term anymore. Granted, there is a certain
coherence to biotechnology if we say that it involves cellular or subcellular
manipulation of life forms. Recombinant DNA is the most significant — and
controversial — technique in the cluster that is generally referred to as biotech-
nology, but relatively few agricultural scientists actually create transgenic
organisms. Gene mapping is a central technique of biotechnology, but again
gene mapping is not a common activity among agricultural scientists, and gene
mapping can be useful in ways other than creating new organisms. Marker-
assisted plant breeding is a tool of general utility. Thus, “biotechnology” is a
diverse set of research methods. Further, as with most scientific methods, the
implications of the technologies that derive from these methods are shaped
more so by the research priorities that these methods are used to achieve than
by the methods themselves. Thus, there is no inherent reason to either promote
or disparage the technologies that can be developed through use of these
methods on environmental or other grounds.
Nonetheless, if forced to make some overall judgment about the environmen-
tal implications of biotechnology, my guesses about plant biotechnology
products would be as follows. The crop biotechnology products that have been
commercialized or are in the pipeline are basically derivative technologies. By
this I mean that these technologies are basically being derived from or being
grafted onto an established trajectory, rather than defining or crystallizing a
new one. This established trajectory in crop agriculture consists of a predomi-
nance of farm- and regional-level specialization — basically monoculture,
continuous cropping, and spatial homogenization — along with incremental
shifts toward labor-saving technology and larger scales of production. New
technologies such as the first generation of biotechnology products basically
provide some management options for dealing with the problems of large-scale,
specialized crop agriculture. Herbicide-tolerant crop varieties, for example, may
help to rationalize herbicide usage by expanding the scope of usage of less toxic
and/or less persistent herbicides and enabling these crop protection chemicals
to be used postemergence. Bt engineered varieties (and other biopesticide
products) enable the large commercial producer to control pests without
having to resort to crop rotations. Contemporary commercial biotechnology
is essentially based on high-value, single-gene traits. We need to recognize
that there is an economic-environmental contradiction of single-gene-trait
biotechnology. The more valuable the trait the more widespread it will become,
and the greater the selection pressures for resistance and other forms of
environmental disruption. I would suggest that crop biotechnology products
will basically nudge world and US agriculture a little farther along the trajectory
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of specialization, ecological homogeneity, and incremental increases in chemical
use that was initiated earlier in this century. They are not likely to dramatically
exacerbate these problems, nor will they do much to solve them.
The technological products derived from biotechnology (and of other
combinations of research methods and research priorities) will need to be
assessed in meaningful packages that avoid the limits of the two prevailing
assessment methods. Meaningful clusters of biotechnology products are much
smaller than that of biotechnologies as a whole, but larger than that of a specific
biotechnology product. Most importantly, environmental assessment of
meaningful clusters of biotechnologies must address the implications of these
technologies for the degree to which they will make a significant contribution
to addressing the overarching environmental problems of agriculture, such as
global nitrogen overload, water quality and quantity, and maintenance of
ecosystem services. However, these assessments must not be narrowly
environmental or ecological in nature. For instance, the ecological impacts
of technology often occur through socioeconomic processes. Hybrid corn, for
example, historically led to soil erosion problems, but not because hybrid corn
was intrinsically destructive of soil. Rather, the technology involved a high level
of genetic uniformity, and was highly consistent with mechanization. The
mechanization of tillage, and especially harvesting, led to incentives for
monocultural production, and in many areas to soil erosion. Assessments of
environmental implications and risks need to take into consideration the
context of the use of technology — particularly the structure of the production
sectors for which they are being developed (Kunkel et al., 1998).
Thus far I have not placed much emphasis on global environmental issues.
This might seem to be a serious omission when we consider the fact that the
major western environmental organizations have long tended to stress global
climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, and so on.
And in my own discussion of the agricultural environment I have stressed the
importance of macro-level, if not global, environmental issues. The global
surplus of fixed nitrogen is a particularly important example of a large-scale
environmental issue in agriculture that we need to take into account as we
think about the environmental implication of biotechnology.
Even if we grant that the matter of the global surplus of fixed nitrogen is a
relatively new issue (National Research Council, 1997; Burns and Hardy, 1975),
it is still worth noting that there is currently no organized movement oriented
toward encouraging agricultural researchers and policymakers to address this
matter, and there is not likely to be such a movement any time soon. If we
think about why this has been the case it can tell us something very important
about the often-imperfect alignment between public environmental concerns
and global environmental issues. Most people are likely to care more about
environmental problems that they can directly experience, that affect their
quality of life, their sense of personal safety, or their community integrity. It is
usually the case, however, that the typical citizen cannot directly experience
global-scale environmental problems such as climate change or the rising level
of fixed nitrogen in the environment. This is because these problems will
generally not be fully apparent for decades, their impacts may be felt most
strongly by others, or any solutions implemented now will mainly benefit
future generations. Thus, it is not surprising that while environmental
mobilizations around global issues such as atmospheric warming can grab
headlines and attention for a while, these issues do not have much public
staying power. Global climate change, for example, has now almost entirely
disappeared as a major public issue.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Is biotechnology a threat to the environment in some sociological or objective
biophysical sense? I do not think this question has a meaningful answer. The
technologies that will derive from cellular and subcellular manipulation of
organisms will be a function of research priorities or public policy.
Will biotechnology, in and of itself, lead to solutions to the major environ-
mental concerns that I distinguished between earlier? Probably not without
some significant institutional changes such as ecological taxes. But if there are
some institutional changes, biotechnological methods will have a lot to
contribute. I have a strong feeling, however, that we will get the most out of
biotechnology if we begin to invest a lot more in agroecological approaches to
agricultural systems.
Should agricultural researchers pay attention to the public and the rank-and-
file of their clienteles and respond to their environmental concerns? Or should
the research system be attentive to the more macro environmental constraints?
We need to do both. We always need to listen to our constituents — even the
ones we disagree with — and strive to open new lines of communication. This
is an integral part of the process of building public trust and being a responsive
public institution. And this means more than getting in contact in order to
convince them about our data and our views. But we also have an obligation
to be forward looking and to anticipate the kinds of technologies that could be
possible and desirable in the more environmentally constrained world that we’ll
meet up with in the next century.
Is the public essentially becoming anti-science or anti-biotechnology? There
is no evidence at all that this is the case. There have been no major changes in
public trust in science over the past two decades. The only key shifts are that
minorities, and to a modest extent women, have declined in their trust in
science (when education is controlled), and that today the very well educated
are somewhat more polarized between very pro-science and anti-science views
than in the 1970s. In general, though, there is no significant public opposition
to biotechnology, or science in general, provided that we meet our obligations
as scientists and universities of taking the public seriously. But you don’t need a
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sociologist to tell you this. It basically involves doing what the Morrill Act and
Hatch Act established the land-grant system to do.
Agriculture has some significant issues to address if it is to build this trust.
Farm numbers are again declining rapidly, after a period of relative stability
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Livestock industrialization is creating some
very problematic public relations for agricultural research institutions, and food
and agriculture in general. Many agricultural groups are active politically (in
pursuit of “right to farm” and “food disparagement” legislation, in opposition
to land use planning) in ways that many in the public find to be narrowly self-
interested. Agriculture needs to reestablish itself as a public (rather than
primarily a private) goods-generating set of institutions if it is to rebuild this
trust.
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The promises of agricultural biotechnology are becoming reality. It is exciting
to watch this field develop. Farmer acceptance of transgenic crops has been
phenomenal. It took hybrid corn about fifteen years in Iowa to become
completely accepted. Anything takes time, but the use of biotechnology crops
has been limited mostly by seed availability.
We have recognized for a number of years that consumer acceptance is really
the ultimate determinant of the success of these products (Hoban and Kendall,
1993). We also now realize that the products must be acceptable in the
international marketplace. In some European countries, interest groups have
expressed opposition to the products of biotechnology.
Education is very important, but it must be based on an in-depth understand-
ing of public knowledge and public attitudes. This paper will review some of
the trends of public perception or consumer acceptance of biotechnology as we
have tracked it for almost a decade (Hoban, 1996; Hoban and Katic, 1998). It
will also present some very new information about consumer attitudes and
awareness around the world (Einsiedel, 1997; European Commission, 1997;
Hoban and Miller, 1998).
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PROJECTS
The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) sponsored our first study in 1992
(Hoban and Kendall, 1992). We did a national telephone survey of more than
1,200 people in the US. A couple of years later I followed up with a study
focusing on the then hot topic of bovine somatotropin (BST) (Hoban, 1994). I
also have worked over the years with another group in Washington, DC — the
Food Marketing Institute (FMI). They included some questions on biotechnol-
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ogy in their US surveys (Food Marketing Institute, 1996) and the same
questions on their 1995 European survey.
I conducted a national study of Japanese consumers in 1995 and in 1998
(Hoban, 1996a). In March of 1997, I worked with the International Food
Information Council (IFIC) on a study of American consumers’ attitudes
(Hoban and Katic, 1998). The objective of that project was to determine any
impact from the report of cloning sheep and the related issues. Some very new
information is just becoming available from an international team of scientists.
A contingent of European researchers conducted a survey in Europe of more
than 16,000 consumers (European Commission, 1997), as part of a periodic
Euro-barometer study. A Canadian researcher conducted the same survey in
Canada with 1,000 consumers (Einsiedel, 1997). Jon Miller, a colleague of
mine, and I recently conducted a US survey of more than 1,000 consumers
(Hoban and Miller, 1998). Some very interesting information was obtained,
particularly country comparisons since there were many common questions.
CONSUMER ATTITUDES ABOUT BIOTECHNOLOGY
It is important to compare results from surveys of consumers in the US over a
fairly long time period. Throughout the past decade there has been remarkable
stability of people’s opinions on biotechnology in the US. These results are as
close to identical as you can find from a series of surveys. In all three years we
asked towards the end of each interview, as a summary comment: “Tell me
whether you support or oppose the use of biotechnology in agriculture and
food production.” In 1992, 70 percent said they supported it, a few did not
know, and less than twenty percent were opposed. In 1994, during the height
of the controversy over BST, 72 percent said they were supportive of it. In 1998,
we again found 72 percent supportive.
We wanted to determine if there were demographic differences among
groups. Two key ones stand out. Men are clearly more positive than women
are in their evaluation of biotechnology, and this has occurred over the years in
response to a variety of questions. There is a narrowing of this gender gap in
1998. This difference is important because women set the family food policy.
They serve as food gatekeepers in our society as far as what is acceptable food
for the family.
There are also significant differences based on formal educational level. In all
three surveys from 1992 to 1998, respondents with a college degree were much
more likely to support biotechnology than those with only a high school
degree. College tends to provide an opportunity to be exposed to a variety of
different ideas. However, not all college graduates have a good understanding
of science.
Two FMI studies and the 1997 IFIC survey provide additional data over
time in the US. Three out of four people would be willing to buy potatoes or
tomatoes developed through biotechnology to require fewer pesticides and be
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protected from insect damage. This finding is remarkably consistent over time.
A majority of consumers would also be willing to buy produce that tasted
fresher and better through biotechnology.
There is a comparison of three questions in 1995 across the countries in
Europe, as well as the US, Canada, and Japan (Figure 1). The vast majority of
European countries were above 50 percent in terms of consumers’ willingness
to buy insect-protected produce. There are only two countries where acceptance
is very low: Austria with only 22 percent consumer acceptance, and Germany
with about 30 percent. Europe is not a homogeneous market. The European
willingness to buy fresher and better tasting produce follows the same basic
pattern, but is a bit lower in all countries than for insect protection.
The recently completed surveys in Europe, Canada, and the US asked
consumers to evaluate six different applications of biotechnology. Two of them
related to food, two to animals, and two to human health care. As you might
imagine, human health care is acceptable and seen as valuable to about 85
percent of people around the world. The insect-protected crop plants were seen
as third most acceptable, right after human medicine. Canada is very positive,
as is the Netherlands, Italy, the UK, and Finland. The only country that is quite
negative is Austria. They have a lot more organic farmers and low government
support for biotechnology.
Figure 2 provides a summary to whether or not consumers agreed or dis-
agreed that insect-protected crops developed through biotechnology should
be encouraged. The results are generally positive. Support among Canadian
and US consumers is very strong. Consumers in Finland, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and a number of other countries are also quite positive about
plant biotechnology. Half the German citizens felt these products should be
encouraged. That is a very different story from the perception that all of Europe
is negative on biotechnology. In fact, the data show that only Austria is very
negative. There certainly are groups within some European countries that are
negative, but these results are a random sampling of citizens, not the opponents
who get all the media attention.
It is important to put attitudes about biotechnology in perspective. Figure 3
shows US consumers’ relative perceptions of whether biotechnology is a risk to
their health compared to other concerns. The one that gets the most attention
in the media (and probably the one most consumers ought to worry about) is
microbial contamination that was identified by three out of four people as a
serious hazard. Consumers then identified pesticide residues, which actually
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declined in recent years as a risk. Antibiotics and hormones, irradiated foods,
additives, and preservatives were identified next in decreasing risk. Foods
developed through biotechnology are lowest on the list of potential health risks
perceived by the US public.
European consumers have similar perceptions (Figure 4). They see “genetic
engineering” as slightly more risky than artificial coloring, nitrites, cholesterol,
and fat, and well below the others that are of more concern to them. These
issues need to be kept in perspective. Greenpeace would make you think that
genetic engineering is the biggest food concern of European consumers; it is
not.
There are some striking country-by-country differences (Figure 5) with
Sweden, Austria, and Germany having the higher levels of concern. In most
other countries, less than half the consumers saw biotechnology as a serious
hazard. Portugal is an unusual case with very high acceptance and very high
perceived risk.
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BIOTECHNOLOGY AWARENESS
Our surveys in the United States have tracked public awareness over time.
Respondents were asked “How much have you heard or read about biotech-
nology?” Two thirds of US consumers (Figure 6) had heard only little or
nothing about biotechnology between 1992 and 1996. In fact, awareness
seemed to have gone down slightly in recent times. Then, in March of 1997,
almost half of all respondents reported “a lot” or “some” awareness. Awareness
in the US increased substantially with all the news on cloning the sheep, but
as shown previously, attitudes about plant biotechnology had not changed,
with willingness to buy foods from biotechnology remaining high.
Respondents to the most recent surveys in the United States, Canada, and
Europe were asked “Have you heard or read anything about biotechnology in
the past three months?” In the US and Canada just over half the respondents
said they had. Awareness was higher in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Germany.
Other countries tended to be relatively low in terms of awareness and media
coverage. This does reflect the extent to which biotechnology is an issue. If
people are really interested in a subject they will talk to somebody about it.
That may be a family member, friend, physician, or even a scientist. Figure 7
reports how many claimed to have ever talked to someone about biotechnology
in each of the countries. If they have not discussed it, they are not very
concerned or interested in it. There are some major differences. Germany is
the highest, followed by Sweden, Austria, and Finland. When something is
controversial, there is a tendency to talk about it more. Some of the countries
(such as Ireland and Spain) have not had much discussion about biotechnology.
European awareness reveals some interesting contradictions. The two
countries that were lowest in their willingness to buy biotechnology produce
were Germany and Austria (Figure 1) yet a relatively high awareness was also
reported. This observation does not, however, mean that education doesn’t
work. It depends to a large extent on what people have heard or read. People
who have done media analysis in Germany and Austria have found mostly
negative reports. The opponents had the chance to tell their story in 1996
without much balance. So, consumers read a whole lot more about it in those
countries, but what they had heard or read was very negative. There is some
evidence that this has changed in the last year with more positive media
coverage.
Several knowledge questions were asked on the recent European, Canadian,
and US surveys. These also reflect the types of impressions people have of
biotechnology. Consumers need a basic understanding of how food is produced.
Respondents were asked if it was true that “Yeast for brewing beer consists of
living organisms.” Results are shown in Figure 8. Remember, this is a random
sample of consumers not scientists. In the US and Canada, three out of four
people gave the correct answer. A number of people admitted they did not
know. About 10 percent actually said it is false (that yeast is not a living
organism). There is some variation in Europe, (e.g., in Spain, less than half
of the people recognized this as true). Consumers in Sweden and the UK tend
to be among the highest in terms of their understanding of basic biological
principle.
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The questions got more difficult, and more specific to biotechnology.
Consumers were asked whether or not the following statement was true or
false: “Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified
ones do.” As shown in Figure 9, there is a lot of uncertainty on this question.
Not many people gave the right answer, and many people, including almost
half the Americans, did not know. This has important implications because if
consumers think that genetically modified tomatoes have something “different”
in them, concerns will be raised. We have to be sure to educate consumers
about the basic principles of biology at an early stage. There are major
differences between European countries in knowledge.
Another question asked if eating genetically modified food would change a
person’s genes. Figure 10 shows a great amount of variation in responses to
this statement. There is a better understanding in some countries (like the
Netherlands, Canada, and the US). On the other hand, 40 percent of Austrians
believe it to be true. This false impression may explain some of the perceived
risks and fears.
One to the key issues for education is to identify and use sources of informa-
tion that consumers trust. We asked US consumers whom they would trust as
sources of information about biotechnology. The American Medical Association
(AMA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), the American Dietetics Association, and university scientists
(which are third party scientific groups) tend to be the most trusted (Figure
11). Groups like TV news reporters, biotechnology companies, packaged food
manufacturers, chefs, activist groups, and grocery stores tend to have lower
credibility. The lowest three are also the ones who have been most negative on
biotechnology. In the European countries, this is basically reversed. Environ-
mental and consumer groups are at the top of the list. Government and
industry are both quite low in credibility. This is not surprising in light of
the “mad cow” controversy and other recent problems.
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LABELING ISSUES
The last set of findings seeks to determine whether or not consumers want
foods developed through biotechnology to carry special labels. When surveys
have simply asked “Should foods be labeled?” the majority say “yes.” But, we
get a very different answer if we ask about support for the FDA policy. In this
case we describe the FDA policy in a shorthand way ( i.e., that foods will be
labeled if they have been changed in a material way, otherwise no special labels
will be required.) In the 1997 IFIC survey, almost 80 percent supported the
FDA position on labeling. We believe the approach of explaining the FDA
policy to consumers and then asking if they support it provides a more valid
answer on the need for labeling.
In 1992 we conducted eight focus groups where a lot of time was spent
talking to consumers about labeling issues. Consumers started out by saying
they wanted information about everything. But then we learned that they only
expect a label if the food has been changed in some way. In response to the
example of recombinant chymosin, which is essentially the same as the rennet
traditionally used to produce cheese, consumers said there was no need for
special labels. The labels just say “enzyme,” not how the enzyme is made.
We found an interesting difference in whole versus processed foods. A
consumer would want to differentiate a whole, fresh tomato so they can pick
out the genetically enhanced ones. This becomes important if they are being
charged a premium for that particular product. Next we asked about the case
where processors blend together a range of different tomatoes to produce
ketchup. The first thing a consumer would generally ask is “What do you mean
that they blend together different kinds of tomatoes to make ketchup?” There is
not a clear understanding that some varieties are higher in solids or some are
sweeter. Processors blend them together to get the taste or consistency they
want. Consumers would agree there wasn’t much need to label such processed
food. Then we asked “What about tomato paste used on a frozen pizza.” By that
time, consumers said they didn’t care if the tomato had been genetically
modified because it is already processed.
The other thing we found was that consumers don’t place much value on
labeling. We asked if they would be willing to pay more if it cost extra to keep
the food segregated. People generally said, “No, we should not have to pay, just
let the food companies pay for it.” However these costs would be passed on to
the consumer. Labeling is not education. The recent Nutritional Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA) states that information on a label should be clear,
meaningful, and consistent. All labeling should start with this premise.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Labeling is still the “hot button” issue for activist groups. The FDA requires
labeling when there is a significant change. For most consumers, that is all
that’s really meaningful. The costs and logistical problems with segregating
commodities are considerable. If there is no real benefit for a consumer, it will
be very hard to recover these additional costs. A label on a processed food that
says it  contains genetically modified organism (GMO) ingredients is not going
to be helpful to consumers. It will raise anxiety and confusion about what the
statement means. There will be niche producers of non-biotech crops if there is
a premium market.
The majority of US consumers have positive attitudes about biotechnology.
They perceive benefits and will buy the products. The NatureMark™ potato
did quite well in market tests when they were labeled and put next to others.
Consumers perceived a benefit of the reduced use of pesticides. There was
a very clear preference among British consumers for tomato paste from
genetically modified tomatoes. Biotechnology is not a high priority issue for
consumers. When studies ask “What is the major problem facing our country?”
no one says “biotechnology.” Maybe one percent will say “the environment.”
Nobody even says “food.” The biggest concerns are crime, the economy, and
breakdown of moral values. We have conferences like this where everybody is
interested in the subject. However, the average consumer is just not interested
or concerned.
Consumers’ attitudes about biotechnology are closely related to their general
beliefs about science, technology, and food. In the US, there is a strong public
support for and appreciation of science. People recognize that they have
received major benefits from science and technology. The public may feel there
is a potential down side, but overall they are very supportive of new develop-
ments. People are pragmatic about food. With any food product, consumers
mainly want to know about taste, nutrition, safety, convenience, and price.
Those are the main questions a consumer will want answered about food
produced through biotechnology or any other means.
The future prospects in Europe are less certain, at least in the short term.
Seed companies, farmers, and suppliers in the US and Canada want to make
sure the European controversy is short lived. The US government is not going
to accept mandatory segregation of crops. That would be a logistical nightmare.
The Europeans had a chance to buy elsewhere in 1996 when the transgenic
crops were introduced. Now, South American farmers and others are starting to
raise crops developed through biotechnology. In fact, more products are going
to arrive on the market from around the world. Europe will soon have few
options except to pay more for food certified as “GMO-free.” European leaders
also have concerns about lost jobs, increased food prices, and other economic
costs that are going to result from rejection of biotechnology.
Educational efforts will continue to be very important in Europe. Such efforts
are starting to take hold among European leaders and consumers. A meeting
sponsored by the Georgetown Center for Food and Nutrition Policy in
Washington, DC, a little over a year ago invited leaders from the European
Union. They were hungry for information. These were some of the top
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European officials, but most of what they had heard about biotechnology up
to that point had come from Greenpeace.
Statistical analysis has helped evaluate what influences people’s acceptance
of biotechnology (Hoban et al., 1993). At the top of the list is awareness and
knowledge. People need to have some level of knowledge about biotechnology.
They also need to recognize a societal benefit or feel there is something in it
for them personally. They need to view it as ethically acceptable. Ultimately
acceptance comes down to confidence in government and trust in the
information sources.
The educational opportunities and challenges are very important. There still
is a lot of work to do in Europe. In the US, we’ve been able to effectively reach
consumers by educating opinion leaders, including scientists and government
officials. The media in the US have had ample opportunity to learn about
biotechnology. Through groups like the NABC and the IFIC, they are provided
with the latest factual information on biotechnology. Finally, farmers and the
food industry need more education. It is very important that food retailers and
others who have direct contact with consumers have enough information to
answer any questions.
Through education, we need to talk about the benefits and the uses of
biotechnology. This will give people a reason to accept the products. We must
address consumer concerns, including labeling, allergens, and other questions
that are on people’s minds. It is also important to tell consumers about third-
party oversight and regulations. Consumers want to know that the government
is regulating biotechnology. In the US, the FDA and the USDA have done a
good job of keeping the public confidence high. Europe has been a much
different story.
Finally, it is important to put biotechnology into a historical context.
We need to tell people that we have been breeding plants for years. Some
consumers seem surprised to learn that scientists have already changed plants.
Overall, we need to increase consumer understanding of food production and
processing. Most consumers simply think that food comes from the grocery
store or, increasingly, from restaurants. These are all part of the educational
challenges and opportunities with biotechnology.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1997 corn, cotton and potato cultivars that produce insecticidal proteins
were grown on more than five million acres of US farmland. The acreage
dedicated to these cultivars is likely to increase dramatically in the next two-
to-five years. The use of these cultivars decreases the use of broad spectrum
insecticides, especially in cotton and potato production. The toxin gene
is derived from the bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), which has been
naturally fermented and used as an organic pest control tool for decades.
The toxin breaks down rapidly in the environment and is harmless to humans,
vertebrates, and even most beneficial insects. In almost all ways this is the
natural insecticide that you might expect environmentalists to dream about.
So why have Bt toxin-producing crops been met with so much concern from
the environmental and academic community? The issue is sustainability. Until
recently, all formulations of fermented Bt had incredibly short insecticidal half
lives in the field. The toxic action of the bacteria all but disappeared within two
days after exposure to sunlight. Organic and conventional farmers who relied
on Bt had to carefully time their spraying of the spore/crystal formulations to
make sure that the bacteria were in the right place at the right time. This was
difficult, but the positive side to this was that the pest population was typically
exposed to the toxin only at times of peak pest densities. (Farmers would be
wasting money if they sprayed pests when densities were low.) From an
evolutionary perspective, this meant that the majority of insects in the pest
population were never exposed to the toxin. These unexposed insects served
as an “evolutionary buffer” to the development of resistance in the pest
population.
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Currently available Bt toxin-producing cultivars have the potential to almost
completely eliminate this evolutionary buffer because they typically produce
the toxin in all plant parts throughout the growing season. This means that if
the engineered cultivars were widely adopted, almost all of the insects in the
targeted population would be exposed to the toxin. We have learned the lesson
over and over again with persistent synthetic pesticides that when an insect
population is put under relentless exposure to a pesticide, it typically responds
with genetic changes that make it resistant to the pesticide. Rapid pest
adaptation is not limited to synthetic insecticides. Insect pests have adapted
to cultural controls and biological control agents when the selection pressure
is intense (Gould, 1991). There is no reason to think that the situation will be
dramatically different with engineered crops.
There are two general types of responses to the potential problem of pest
adaptation to Bt crops:
1) We can search for novel Bt toxins and other insecticidal proteins. Gene
coding for these toxins could be engineered into crop plants when the
efficacy of the currently used Bt toxins is lost to pest resistance.
2) We can develop approaches for using Bt toxin-producing plants that
maintain evolutionary buffers that slow the rate at which resistance
evolves.
I think it would be economically and ecologically prudent to take both
approaches. There would be economic benefits for certain groups if resistance
to Bt evolves quickly, because they already own the replacements. These could
either be producers of the next generation of transgenic insecticidal cultivars,
or producers of the conventional insecticides that may replace Bt cultivars.
For all the other stakeholders, a longer life for Bt crops would seem to be
economically beneficial.
On the environmental side, Bt toxins appear to be exceptionally benign to
non-target organisms. It is feasible that other proteins (or more novel resistance
factors) will be found that are equally benign, but this is far from assured. It
is likely that searches for environmentally friendly but pesticidal proteins will
be of benefit to society at large. Even with the best resistance management
program, some pest species are likely to adapt to Bt toxins, and there is always
the problem that there are some pests for which no effective Bt toxins have yet
been found. Perhaps the novel proteins found in broad surveys of microbial
proteins will fill pest control niches that Bt toxins can’t fill. Basic studies of pest
and plant biochemistry might also reveal some new approaches for developing
insect resistant cultivars that don’t involve the use of toxins at all.
Unfortunately, today we have no clear replacements for Bt toxins. There has
been a lot of talk about replacements but we lack human toxicology studies,
environmental fate studies, and data on the impact of novel Bt replacements on
crop productivity. I have and will continue to emphasize insecticidal cultivars in
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this paper because I am familiar with them and because they are currently
the most widely used transgenic pest control tools (herbicide tolerant crops
do not offer direct crop protection). Of course, there are other transgenic pest
control tools such as virus resistant plants. Little is known about the potential
for viruses to adapt to these plants, but it is certainly not outside the realm
of possibilities. Viruses and other plant pathogens have always presented
plant breeders with a formidable challenge because of their ability to adapt to
resistant cultivars (Gould, 1991). There is no special reason to expect that these
organisms will not be able to adapt to transgenic, pathogen-resistant cultivars.
For the rest of this paper I will focus on the potential of slowing down the
evolution of pest resistance to Bt crops. Slowing the evolution of such resistance
could be useful to society, and from a more pragmatic perspective it is useful to
understand how and why the EPA is proceeding to use regulations to help
enforce resistance management in Bt crops.
GENERAL RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR TRANSGENIC
INSECTICIDAL CULTIVARS
Resistance management is based on general principles of population genetics.
A number of reviews are available that discuss details of applying these
principles to engineered crops (Roush, 1996, 1997; Tabashnik, 1994; Gould,
1991, 1998). Below I will give a general overview of principles of resistance
management techniques in engineered crops. I will sacrifice some precision
in hopes of making the presentation more accessible. Readers can obtain more
details from the references in the bibliography.
Resistance management techniques take advantage of two factors in
population genetics that can impact the rate of evolution. The first factor is
the difference in fitness between resistant and susceptible genotypes. Fitness
is defined as the number of offspring contributed to the next generation by a
single female. It is approximately equal to the probability of survival multiplied
by the average number of offspring expected from each survivor. (We typically
express fitness as a relative value, setting the fitness of the most fit genotype to
1.0. The fitness of the other genotype then become a proportion of the fitness
of the most fit genotype.) Because it is very hard to estimate fecundity, many
studies only measure survival and assume that all survivors have the same
fecundity. Any approach to engineering or deploying toxic cultivars that
decreases the difference in fitness between resistant and susceptible insects
slows the rate of evolution.
The second factor used in resistance management is manipulation of the
inheritance of fitness. When resistance is inherited as a dominant trait, the
heterozygotes (RS) are just as fit as homozygous resistant insects (RR). Because
the RS heterozygotes are initially much more common than resistant RR
homozygous insects, dominant expression of the resistance in these RS
heterozygotes speeds up evolution of resistance. Conversely, when resistance
is inherited as a recessive trait the RS heterozygote is no more fit than the
susceptible homozygote, so any change in the number of resistant individuals
is based on high fitness of the rare RR resistant homozygotes. This typically
slows the rate of evolution.
An example may help to clarify this point. If the initial frequency of
resistance genes is one in one thousand (0.001), and each individual carries
two genes, we expect there to be about 0.002 (or two in one thousand) RS
heterozygotes, 0.998 SS susceptible homozygotes, and only 0.000001 RR
homozygote resistant insects. If resistance was recessive and both the RS and
SS insects had a fitness of 0.01 (1 percent) compared to the RR fitness of 1.0,
the frequency of resistance genes would increase to about 0.002 in the next
generation. This happens because the one in a million RR insects each produce
100 times more offspring than the other genotypes. In a rough approximation,
the decimal point moves two places to the right (0.000001 to 0.0001) but that
still is very few individuals. If resistance is dominant, then the fitness of the RR
and RS insects would be 1.0, while the fitness of the SS insects would be 0.01.
This causes the frequency of resistance genes to increase from 0.001 to 0.0835
in the next generation. This much faster rate of change is due to the fact that RS
heterozygotes start at 0.002 and move to 0.2. The point is that RR homozygotes
are so rare, initially, that they can’t cause a rapid change in the overall
proportion of resistance genes, even if they were a thousand times more fit than
the other genotypes.
A resistance management strategy that can cause inheritance of resistance
to be recessive will typically slow down resistance evolution in the population.
How can this be done? One way is to have plants produce a very high
concentration of the Bt toxin. The US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
Science Advisory Panel (EPA, 1998) recently defined this high dose as 25 times
the amount of Bt toxin needed to kill 99 percent of the SS insects. They came
up with this definition because genetic studies of insects with resistance genes
have shown that RS insects can not survive when the concentration of the Bt is
25 times higher than the concentration that kills SS insects. This basically
means that the high dose kills almost all SS and RS insects, making their fitness
almost equal (i.e., almost recessive). The approach of building a plant with this
high dose has also been the goal of industry (Fischoff, 1996).
The EPA Science Advisory Panel concurred with findings of other scientists
in concluding that the high dose by itself wasn’t sufficient because even with
this recessive inheritance resistant pest populations would still evolve too
quickly. They recommended that the first population genetics principle
described above be added to any resistance-management strategy. This is the
idea of decreasing the difference in fitness between RR, RS, and SS insects. They
recommended providing refuges for susceptible insects to achieve this. How
does this decrease the fitness difference? Again, an example is useful. If the RR
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fitness is 100 times that of SS insects when they are on Bt plants, but their
fitness are equal on non-Bt plants, a small refuge of non-Bt plants can have a
dramatic effect on the fitness difference. When 10 percent of the plants are non-
Bt, the fitness of the RR insects is 1.0 times 0.9 (i. e., the frequency of Bt plants)
plus 1.0 times 0.1 (i. e., the frequency of non-Bt plants). The total is 1.0, no
surprise. For the SS insects fitness is 0.01 times 0.9 plus 1.0 times 0.1. The total
is 0.109. So without a refuge the difference in fitness between the RR and SS
insects is 100-fold. With the 10 percent refuge it is a little less than 10 fold.
This small refuge slows the rate of resistance development dramatically.
The refuge serves another essential function. It ensures that the RR insects
will likely mate with SS insects coming from the refuge. This will produce RS
insects that will be killed by the high dose of Bt toxin. If the refuge is placed
relatively far away from the Bt plants compared to the insects ability to move
before mating, the refuge is less beneficial because RR insects will mate with
each other instead of with the SS insects.
Combining the refuge and high dose is widely accepted as the most feasible
way of slowing the rate of resistance development at this time. Other
approaches have been discussed (Gould, 1998; Roush, 1996), but they have
not gained acceptance or are not feasible with today’s technology. These other
approaches should not be ignored, but in the next few years we will need to
concentrate on the refuge/high dose approach. Most scientists agree that the
refuge/high dose approach has one theoretical Achilles’ heel. This is the
possibility that a resistance mechanism is present in some insects which confers
more than 25 fold resistance on the RS insects. If this happens the effectiveness
of the high dose decreases dramatically.
IMPLEMENTING THE REFUGE/HIGH DOSE APPROACH
Most applied entomologists regard the theoretical Achilles’ heel of the refuge/
high dose approach as much less troublesome than the problems associated
with implementing this approach.
A number of reports have recently been published that evaluate current
attempts at implementing the refuge/high dose approach and make recommen-
dations (Ostlie et al., 1997; Forrester and Pyke, 1997; EPA, 1998; Andow and
Hutchison, 1998; Gould and Tabashnik, 1998; Whalon and Ferro, 1998). Most
of these reports are crop specific because the implementation problems are
highly dependent on the biology of the pests and the agricultural practices
associated with the crop. I will try to summarize some of the issues that have
arisen regarding Bt corn, cotton, and potato.
Corn
Of the three Bt crops, corn is grown on the largest acreage. The most often
discussed target pest is the European corn borer (ECB), which can feed on
many plants, but feeds primarily on corn in large agricultural areas. Relatively
little insecticide is used to control the ECB because the larvae feed inside the
plant where they are hard to reach with sprays and where they cause damage
that is hard to notice. Bt corn can increase yields by around 10 percent in many
areas. If the Bt genes were placed in cultivars that were also best in agronomic
performance there could be incentive for farmers to plant wall to wall Bt
cultivars and forget about refuges. The EPA did not initially mandate refuges
because it was assumed that Bt cultivars would initially be limited. The EPA is
now revisiting this issue (EPA, 1998). It was also expected that all Bt cultivars
would provide a high dose for ECB throughout the summer. It is now clear that
some cultivars do not provide such a dose (Ostlie et al., 1997; Andow and
Hutchison, 1998).
In revisiting the refuge issue it has become apparent that the ECB moths
don’t typically move long distances before mating. Although there is certainly a
need for more research in this area, we already know enough to recommend
that refuges be placed adjacent to the Bt crop.
Because ECB mostly feeds on corn, the refuge must be composed of non-Bt
corn. The current recommendations are between 20 and 50 percent of corn
acreage in non-Bt corn depending at least in part on whether the farmer sprays
the non-Bt corn for ECB control. Any time a farmer sprays a non-Bt field its
refuge status is diminished. The more effective the spray the more the refuge is
diminished.
Can farmers and society accept a 25 percent unsprayed refuge? The first year
this is implemented there could certainly be economic damage to the refuge
corn. But, consider the fact that with a 25 percent refuge only one out of four
eggs lands on a non-Bt corn plant. We must ask if an ECB population whose
fitness has been diminished from 1.0 to 0.25 will remain a major corn pest. An
economic analysis (Hurley et al., 1998) has indicated that over a long period of
years farmers may gain more by having a 20 percent refuge than by maintaining
no refuge at all, even if resistance does not evolve.
ECB is only one major corn pest affected by Bt. In some areas, the Southwest-
ern corn borer (SWCB) is a major pest. Because it is naturally more tolerant of
Bt toxins there is some question about whether current corn cultivars provide a
high dose (Ostlie et al., 1997; EPA 1998). There is definitely a need for more
research in this area. The corn earworm (also known as the cotton bollworm)
attacks corn but is not generally considered a major pest of corn. The impact of
Bt corn on this pest will be discussed in the cotton section.
Cotton
Unlike corn, cotton is typically sprayed to control the target pests of Bt
cultivars. Left unchecked, the cotton bollworm (also known as the corn
earworm), the tobacco budworm, and the pink bollworm can each cause
significant yield loss. The EPA and Monsanto, the producer of Bt cotton,
developed a refuge/high dose plan before Bt cotton was commercialized. This
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plan gives farmers two refuge options. They can plant up to 96 percent Bt
cotton if they leave a four percent refuge that is not treated with conventional
insecticides that kill the target pests. Alternatively, they can plant up to 80
percent of their cotton acreage in Bt cultivars and manage insects in the 20
percent non-Bt cotton with all registered insecticides except Bt sprays. It is
assumed that the conventional controls kill about 80 percent of the insects in
the non-Bt cotton. This mortality reduces the 20 percent refuge to about four
percent in terms of SS moths produced.
Gould and Tabashnik (1998) pointed out a number of problems with this
plan, as did the EPA (1998). One striking problem was the assumption that
there was a high dose. Although a high dose (by EPA 1998 standards) is
achieved for the tobacco budworm, and may be achieved for the pink
bollworm, it is certainly not achieved for the cotton bollworm. With this pest
species 20 percent or more of the larvae survive the dose of Bt in plants with
the Monsanto gene. This creates a real dilemma. Industry and the EPA have set
the refuge/high dose approach as the standard, but the current plants don’t
produce a high dose. Population genetic models indicate that without a high
dose the refuge needs to be much larger than four percent. Gould and
Tabashnik (1998) argue for a refuge of about 50 percent or 17 percent,
depending on whether farmers are or are not allowed to use conventional
insecticides in the non-Bt cotton.
It has been proposed that there is less need for a non-Bt cotton refuge in the
case of the cotton bollworm because a large proportion of the larvae feed on
corn. There are two problems with this proposal. One is that the corn only has
a large proportion of cotton bollworms in one of the three to five generations of
bollworms over the summer. The second problem is that companies are trying
to get the EPA to allow them to plant Bt corn in areas where Bt cotton is grown.
The Bt corn also produces less than a high dose for this insect, so if the two
crops with moderate doses are planted near each other the risk for resistance
becomes very high.
While we assume that there is a high dose for tobacco budworm and pink
bollworm, field data from Australia indicates that this assumption requires
more testing. In Australia, it has been found the environmental factors can
significantly decrease the production of Bt-toxin in cotton plants (Forrester and
Pyke, 1997).
Another problem with the current resistance management plan is the lack of
limits on the distance between the refuge and the Bt crop. The tobacco
budworm moths appear to move long distances early in the spring, but in the
summer they tend to move very little. The pink bollworm often stays in the
same field for a number of generations. This has prompted recommendations
for keeping the Bt and non-Bt cotton plants within 0.5 miles of each other
whenever the tobacco budworm is a pest, and to interplant Bt and non-Bt
cotton as blocks within fields when the pink bollworm is present.
It is not recommended to plant a seed mixture of Bt and non-Bt seeds,
especially for the tobacco budworm because the larvae move from plant to
plant. If Bt and non- Bt plants are within crawling distance, a RS larva might
feed on a high dose plant for just long enough to get an intermediate dose and
then could move onto a non-Bt plant. Lab and field studies have shown that
larvae spend less time on Bt than non-Bt plants. This would ruin the high dose
part of the resistance management plan.
Potato
The potato has only one target pest for Bt toxin in the US, the Colorado potato
beetle (CPB). Fortunately, the plants produce a very high dose relative to the
CPB’s tolerance. The only real problems with Bt potatoes are the placement and
maintenance of the refuge. Here, the CPB offers a real challenge. Unlike all the
other pests mentioned above, the CPB is a beetle that feeds on plants as a larva
and as an adult. Additionally, the adults often move short distances before
mating. The problem is that seed piece mixes can’t be recommended because
the larvae and adults move between plants while feeding, and field to field
mixtures are a problem because adults don’t move far enough before they mate.
Whalon and Ferro (1998) recommend that blocks of non-Bt potatoes be
planted on the edges (or within) Bt potato fields.
Another problem is that potatoes are high value crops so farmers are
reluctant to allow any CPB damage. A new insecticide, Imidicloprid, commonly
used in potato, can kill almost 100 percent of the potato beetles. If this
insecticide is used in a refuge, the refuge basically disappears. Whalon and
Ferro (1998) recommend that farmers rotate fields to decrease CPB numbers
and avoid use of this extremely toxic insecticide. In the appendix to the EPA
(1998) document, a rough guide is given for how to determine if a refuge is
producing enough insects to slow the development of resistance. The rule of
thumb that emerges from this is that at least 500 insects should be produced in
the refuge for every resistant insect produced in the Bt crop. This can be
achieved with relatively small refuge size if the Bt crop, like Bt potato, produces
a very high dose and insects in the refuge are not heavily sprayed.
CONCLUSIONS
Resistance management with Bt crops is far from simple. It has forced
researchers to learn a lot more about the biology of the targeted insects. And,
we still have a lot more to learn. It is pointed out in the EPA Science Advisory
Panel Report (1998) that we should take a conservative approach in developing
management plans until we know enough to make the plan requirements less
stringent.
In the consensus statement of the EPA Science Advisory Panel it is
recommended that:
1) A refuge/high dose strategy must be employed for target pests within the
current understanding of the technology.
2) Regulatory strategies should serve to provide growers with a sustainable
approach that encourages compliance for utilizing this valuable and
environmentally friendly technology.
3) To the extent possible, feasibility should figure in the development of
resistance management plans.
4) Needs of growers who rely on Bt sprays should be taken into consid-
eration.
If the EPA follows the general guidance of the Science Advisory Panel, as well
as more detailed recommendations by informed researchers (e.g., Andow and
Hutchison, 1998), the use of Bt crops could probably be sustained until the
next generation of environmentally benign transgenic cultivars are carefully
tested and ready for commercialization.
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INTRODUCTION
Pathogen derived resistance (PDR) refers to using sequences from a pathogen
to protect the host from the effects of the pathogen (Sanford and Johnson,
1985). Following the first example of coat protein (CP)-mediated resistance,
a type of PDR, to protect transgenic tobacco plants from infection by tobacco
mosaic virus (TMV) (Powell-Abel et al., 1986) there have been many reports
of different types of PDR. Genes that produce virus-derived antisense RNAs,
(+) sense RNAs that do not encode proteins, modified and wild type replicases,
and wild type and mutant cell-cell movement proteins have been used to
confer resistance. Certain gene strategies appear to be more effective than
others depending upon the virus and host. Likewise, certain strategies are
anticipated to be more useful in agricultural settings than others. To date, the
most common type of PDR in advanced stages of development is CP-mediated
resistance; furthermore, government regulatory agencies have approved the use
of CP genes to protect plants in agriculture. Other types of genes are being
reviewed for similar status.
During the technical stage of development and applications of PDR, a variety
of questions have been raised related to the relative safety of transgenic plants
that contain virus-derived gene sequences. Some of the concerns are based
upon lack of understanding of the methods used to develop resistance, or the
biology of virus infection and disease, while certain concerns have some degree
of validity. This short paper highlights several of the arguments offered to
restrict the use of PDR and those presented to promote its use. This is followed
by a summary of recent results that show that knowledge of mechanisms of
resistance can lead to increased efficacy of PDR and can reduce concerns about
safety and durability of PDR in agriculture.
Pathogen Derived Resistance and
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STRATEGIES FOR PATHOGEN DERIVED RESISTANCE AND REDUCING
BIOSAFETY ISSUES
A) Replicase-mediated and RNA-mediated resistance. The first report of
resistance in transgenic plants that resulted from expression of virus gene
sequences involved in virus replication (e.g. replicase, helicase and methyl-
transferase) was reported by Golemboski et al. (1990). In this work, the
sequence of the TMV 54-kDa open-reading frame conferred high levels of
resistance to TMV in transgenic tobacco plants. Subsequent papers reported
resistance that was conferred by genes that produce complete, or partial, virus
proteins that were either wild type or mutated to eliminate function of the
replication protein (Beachy, 1997; Palukaitis and Zaitlin, 1997). In some cases,
resistance was due to what is referred to as RNA-mediated resistance (Beachy,
1997). In some examples of replicase-mediated resistance, transgenic plants are
highly resistant to infection, and in some cases, are essentially not infected by
the virus from which the replicase gene is derived. However, such plants are
usually susceptible to closely related viruses and virus strains (Palukaitis and
Zaitlin, 1997).
The objection most often raised in relation to use of replicase-mediated
resistance is based upon the possibility that recombination may occur between
the virus that infects the transgenic plants and the mRNA produced by the
transgene. In this situation, mRNA sequences produced by the transgene are
‘captured’ during replication by the second virus. Capture may occur if replicase
jumps, or switches, from the viral genome to mRNA (template switching)
produced by the transgene. Template switching may result in chimeric viral
RNA that increases the host range or virulence of the resulting virus. Template
switching has been observed to occur in plants infected by several viruses
that are closely related to each other (Simon and Bujarski, 1994). Transgene
caputure was detected in transgenic plants that were challenge-infected by a
mutant virus that would survive only if a recombinant virus was produced
(Greene and Allison, 1994; Allison et al., 1996). In another case, recombination
was observed under conditions that are considered to be less stringent to the
selection of recombinant virus (Wintermantel and Schoelz, 1996; Király et al.,
1998).
It is now known that template switching or other types of intergenomic
recombination occurs more frequently with certain groups of viruses than
with others (Simon and Bujarski, 1994). For example, it has been documented
to occur with certain potyviruses (Cervera et al., 1993), tobravirus (Robinson
et al., 1987; Angenent et al., 1989), bromoviruses (Allison et al., 1989) and
geminiviruses (Liu et al., 1998), but apparently occurs at much lower frequency
for other viruses (e.g. tobamoviruses) (Fraile et al., 1997).
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In considering the potential impact of recombination between viruses and
host mRNAs, it is important to recall the biological nature of virus infection.
Viruses survive in nature because their replication is ensured by their genetic
composition, and viruses that cannot replicate cannot survive. Thus, the
likelihood that a virus that lacks a replicase would cause an infection in
transgenic plants that contains a replicase gene sequence, and subsequently
acquire a functional replicase gene, is very remote. It is theoretically possible
(though unlikely) that defective viruses that lack a replicase would be co-
transferred during insect or other transmission from plants that are infected
by multiple viruses. Such virus may, under very selective and as yet unknown
conditions, gain competitive advantage for recombination. It is important to
gain a more complete understanding of virus replication and recombination,
and, if possible, to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of recombination
in pathogen derived resistance. For example, if the “hot spots” for virus
recombination are known, it may be possible to develop transgenes that lack
such sequences. Indeed, when sequences that are involved in strand switching/
recombination were removed from a transgene, the frequency of sequence
capture by challenge virus was substantially reduced or eliminated (Greene
and Allison, 1996; Allison et al., 1996). Similar results were found when the
sequences involved in recombination between RNAs associated with turnip
crinkle virus (TCV) were modified (Cascone et al., 1993).
B) Movement protein (MP)-mediated resistance. Cell-cell and long distance
spread of virus infection requires one or more viral proteins (Hull, 1991; Séron
and Haenni, 1996; Nelson and van Bel, 1998). In certain cases virus host range
and pathogenicity are determined by movement protein(s). Therefore, there
is legitimate concern about the use of movement proteins to confer pathogen-
derived resistance. On the other hand, because many viruses accomplish spread
in the host via common, intercellular channels known as plasmodesmata, there
is a strong likelihood that durable and broad resistance to multiple viruses
could be achieved if cell-cell and long distance spread could be blocked by
expression of a transgene (Deom et al., 1992). Several research groups have
demonstrated moderate levels of virus resistance in transgenic plants that
express non-functional mutants of movement proteins. Such proteins pre-
sumably act as dominant negative mutants for one or more functions of
movement proteins that are produced during virus infection [i.e. defective
movement protein of TMV expressed in transgenic plants confers protection
against multiple viruses from different groups (Cooper et al., 1995)].
Based upon the role of movement proteins in virus disease it is easy to
understand the concerns about using wild type movement proteins as resistance
genes in transgenic plants. However, the fact that sequences of movement
proteins are vastly different between different viruses dramatically lowers the
likelihood that movement protein sequences will be captured during infection
by non-related viruses. Such differences make it highly unlikely that ‘functional
domains’ could be reconstructed in the event that MP sequences are captured
by virus infection. Using movement proteins that are made non-functional by
directed mutagenesis further reduces potential risk.
C) Coat Protein (CP) mediated resistance. Coat, or capsid proteins, protect
the viral nucleic acid from degradation. CP can also be important in several
stages in virus infection, including acquisition and transmission of virus by
insect vectors, cell-cell and long distance spread in the host, and for some
viruses, CP regulates one or more steps of virus replication. It has been argued
that transgenic plants that exhibit CP-mediated resistances represent a biosafety
risk because the CP may encapsidate the genome of unrelated viruses that
infect the transgenic plant, and that such viruses may be acquired and spread
to non-hosts by the insect vector. In addition, it is known that certain CPs
can encapsidate non-related RNAs (Robinson, 1996). In mixed infections of
zucchini yellow mosaic potyviruses strain ZYMV-NAT (non-aphid-transmis-
sible) with papaya ringspot potyvirus (aphid transmissible) their CP molecules
can co-assemble. As a result, aphids can acquire and transmit ZYMV-NAT by
virtue of mixed encapsidation by both CPs (Bourdin and Lecoq, 1991).
Likewise, it was shown that in transgenic plants heterologous encapsidation
of RNA of the challenge virus by the transgenic CP could occur. For example,
in transgenic plants that contain CP of the strain N of Potato virus Y (PVYN),
and infected by strain O of PVY (PVYO), the transgenic CP can co-assemble
with the challenge virus (Farinelli et al., 1992). Similarly, it was shown that
transgenic plants that contain CP of the aphid transmissible plum pox
potyvirus (PPV), and infected by the non-aphid-transmissible strain NAT of
ZYMV, transgenic CP could co-assemble with the challenge virus. As a result
of the co-assembly, ZYMV can be transmitted by aphids (Lecoq et al., 1993).
DOES TRANS-ENCAPSIDATION REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT RISK TO
THE ENVIRONMENT?
Since virus replication is determined by the viral genome rather than the
capsid, it is unlikely that trans-encapsidation per se will lead to permanently
expanded host range of a particular virus. Furthermore, since multiple viruses
infect many plants, including viruses that are in the same taxonomic group, it
is likely that trans-encapsidation that may occur in transgenic plants poses
no greater risk than trans-encapsidation that occurs in mixed virus infections.
It is possible to reduce the risk of trans-encapsidation by using CP that is
incapable of assembly or insect transmission. Recently, we constructed mutants
of TMV CP that are incapable of forming viable virus particles but confer CP-
mediated resistance against TMV (Clark et al., 1995; Bendahmane et al., 1997).
Similarly, the amino acid sequences on CP molecules that are required for insect
acquisition and/or transmission are known for potyviruses (Atreya et al., 1990;
Gal-on et al., 1992; Blanc et al., 1997) and cucumber mosaic cucumovirus
(Perry et al., 1998). As such sequences are identified they can be removed from
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CP genes that are used for CP-mediated resistance (Stark and Beachy, 1989;
Jacquet et al., 1998). Taking steps to reduce insect acquisition and virus
assembly of CP molecules used in CP-mediated resistance will reduce some of
the concerns regarding possible insect transmission of trans-encapsidated virus.
IMPROVING THE EFFICACY OF COAT PROTEIN-MEDIATED RESISTANCE
Based on a series of studies, we proposed that CP-mediated resistance to TMV
resulted when CP in the transgenic plant formed an appropriate interaction
with CP of the challenge virus to prevent disassembly and virus replication
(reviewed by Fitchen and Beachy, 1993). In more recent studies to clarify the
molecular mechanisms of CP-mediated resistance, we developed mutants of
TMV CP, determined the effect of the mutation on virus assembly, and, whether
or not transgenic plants that produced the mutant CPs were resistant to TMV.
Mutants were created, based upon the known structure of the CP and the
virus, that were predicted to increase or decrease interactions between CP
molecules. In published studies, changes were made to CP codons 28 to encode
isoleucine rather than threonine (Clark et al, 1995) or CP codon 28, 42, and
89, to encode tryptophan rather than threonine (Bendahmane et al., 1997). In
these cases the volume of the amino acid side chains was increased. None of the
mutant CP molecules was capable of assembly with viral RNA, and the proteins
were therefore unable to form infectious virus. However, all but one of the
mutants was capable of self-assembly and formed various types of aggregates,
some of which were virus-like while other mutants produced paracrystalline
arrays of CP. Mutant CP that failed to assemble (i.e., did not form virus-like
particles or other aggregates) did not confer CP-mediated resistance. Mutants
that produced highly stable aggregates conferred high levels of CP-mediated
resistance while aggregates with intermediate levels of stability conferred
intermediate levels of resistance. Interestingly, the CP mutants that formed
virus-like particles that were more stable than those produced by wild type
CP conferred a higher level of CP-mediated resistance than did the wild type
(Bendahmane et al., 1997). We suggest that increased resistance resulted from
increased H-bonds between transgenic CP and challenge virus, which decreased
virus disassembly and virus infection.
CONCLUSIONS
Pathogen derived resistance can be used to develop transgenic plants that are
resistant to virus infection. It is possible to reduce both potential and perceived
risks associated with the transgenes by constructing transgenes that reduce
potential for trans-capsidation, insect transmission, and sequence capture
(recombination). The recent studies of TMV coat protein that resulted in high
levels of CP-mediated resistance demonstrate that knowledge of the structural
and cellular mechanisms of resistance can lead to the development of a ‘second
generation’ of transgenes that have both increased efficacy and greater
environmental safely.
REFERENCES
Allison, R.F., Janda, M., and Ahlquist, P. 1989. “Sequence of cowpea chlorotic
mottle virus RNAs 2 and 3 and evidence of a recombination event during
bromovirus evolution.” Virology 172:321-330
Allison, R.F., Schneider, W.L. and Greene, A.E. 1996. “Recombination in plants
expressing viral transgenes.” Sem. Virol. 7:417-422
Angenent, G.C., Posthumus, E., Brederode, F.T., and Bol, J.F. 1989. “Genome
structure of tobacco rattle virus strain PLB: further evidence on the
occurrence of RNA recombination among tobraviruses.” Virology 171:271-
274
Atreya, C.D., Raccah, B., and Pirone, T.P. 1990. “A point mutation in the coat
protein abolishes aphid transmissibility of a potyvirus.” Virology, 178:161-165
Beachy, R.N. 1997. “Mechanisms and applications of pathogen-derived
resistance in transgenic plants.” Curr. Opin. Biotech. 8:215-220
Bendahmane, M., Fitchen, J. H., Zang G.H., and Beachy, R. N. 1997. “Studies of
Coat Protein Mediated Resistance to TMV: Correlation between assembly of
mutant coat proteins and resistance.” J. Virol. 71:7942-7950
Blanc, S., Lopez -Moya, J.J., Wang, R., Garcia-Lampasona, S., Thornbury, D.W.,
and Pirone T.P. 1997. “A specific interaction between coat protein and the
helper component correlates with aphid transmission of a potyvirus.
”Virology 231:141-147
Bourdin, D., and Lecoq, H. 1991. “Evidence that heteroencapsidation between
two potyviruses is involved in aphid transmission of a non-aphid-transmis-
sible isolate from mixed infections.” Phytopathology, 81:1459-1464
Cascone, P.J., Hadar, T.F., and Simon, A.E. 1993. “Sequences and structures
required for recombination between virus-associated RNAs.” Science
260:801-805
Cervera, M.T., Riechmann, J.L., Martin, M.T., and Garcia, J.A. 1993. “3’-
terminal sequence of plum pox virus PS and O6 isolates: evidence for RNA
recombination within the potyvirus group.” J. Gen. Virol. 74:329-334
Clark, W. G., Fitchen, J. H., and Beachy, R. N. 1995a. “Studies of coat protein-
mediated resistance to TMV: i. the PM2 assembly defective mutant confers
resistance to TMV.” Virology 208:485-491
Cooper, B., Lapidot, M., Heick, J.A., Dodds, A.J., and Beachy, R.N. 1995. “A
defective movement protein of TMV in transgenic plants confers resistance to
multiple viruses whereas the functional analog increases susceptibility.”
Virology 206:307-313
Deom, C.M., Lapido, M., and Beachy, R.N. 1992. “Plant virus movement
proteins.” Cell 69:221-224
Farinelli, L., Malnoë, P., and Collet, G.F. 1992. “Heterologous encapsidation of
potato virus Y strain O (PVYO) with the transgenic coat protein of PVY strain
N (PVYN) in Solanum tuberosum cv Bintje.” Bio/Technology, 10:1020-1025
Beachy and Bendahmane
Fitchen, J. H., and R. N. Beachy. 1993. “Genetically engineered protection
against viruses in transgenic plants.” Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 47:739-763
Fraile, A., Escriu, F., Aranda, M.A., Malpica, J.M., Gibbs, A.J., and Garcia-
Arenal, F. 1997. “A century of tobamovirus evolution in an Australian
population of Nicotiana glauca..” J. Virol. 71:8316-8320
Gal-on, A., Antignus, Y., Rosner, A., and Raccah, B. 1992. “A zucchini yellow
mosaic virus coat protein gene mutation restores aphid transmissibility but
has no effect on multiplication.” J. Gen. Virol. 73:2183-2187
Golemboski, B.D., Lomonossoff, G.P., and Zaitlin, M. 1990. “Plants transformed
with a tobacco mosaic virus non structural gene sequence are resistant to the
virus.” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 87:6311-6315
Greene, A.E., and Allison, R.F. 1994. “Recombination between viral RNA and
transgenic transcripts.” Science 263:1423-1425
Greene, A.E., and Allison, R.F. 1996. “Deletions in the 3’ untranslated region of
cowpea chlorotic mottle virus transgene reduce recovery of recombinant
viruses in transgenic plants.” Virology 225:231-234
Jacquet, C., Decolle, B., Raccah, B., Lecoq, H., Dunez, J., and Ravelonandro, M.
1998. “Use of modified plum pox virus coat protein genes developed to limit
heteroencapsidation-associated risks in transgenic plants.” J. Gen. Virol.
79:1509-1517
Király, L., Bourque, J.E., and Schoelz, J.E. 1998. “Temporal and spatial
appearance of recombinant viruses formed between cauliflower mosaic virus
(CaMV) and CaMV sequences present in transgenic Nicotiana Bigelovii..”
Mol. Plant-Microbe Interact. 11:309-316
Lecoq, H., Ravelonandro, M., Wipf-Scheibel, C., Monsion, M., Raccah, B., and
Dunez, J. 1993. “Aphid transmission of a non-aphid-transmissible strain of
zucchini yellow mosaic potyvirus from transgenic plants expressing the
capsid protein of plum pox potyvirus.” Mol. Plant-Microbe interact. 6:403-406
Liu, Y., Robinson, D.J., and Harrison, B.D. 1998. “Defective forms of cotton leaf
curl virus DNA-A that have different recombinations of sequence deletion,
duplication, inversion and rearrangement.” J. Gen. Virol. 79:1501-1508
Nelson, R.S., and van Bel, A.J.E. 1998. “The mystery of virus trafficking into,
trough and out of vascular tissue.” Prog. Bot. 59:476-533
Palukaitis, P. and Zaitlin, M. 1997. “Replicase-mediated resistance to plant
viruses.” Adv. Virus Res. 48:349-377
Perry, K.L., Hang, L., and Palukaitis, P. 1998. “Amino acid changes in the coat
protein of cucumber mosaic virus differentially affect transmission by the
aphids Myzus persicae and Aphis gossipii..”Virology 242:204-210
Powell-Abel, P., Nelson, R. S., De, B., Hoffmann, N., Rogers, S. G., Fraley, R. T.,
and R. N. Beachy. 1986. “Delay of disease development in transgenic plants
that express the tobacco mosaic virus coat protein gene.” Science. 232:738-
743
Robinson, D.J., Hamilton, W.D.O., Harrison, B.D., and Baulcombe, D.C. 1987.
“Two anomalous tobravirus isolates:evidence for RNA recombination in
nature.” J. Gen. Virol. 68:2551-2561
Robinson, D.J. 1996. “Environmental risk assessment of releases of transgenic
plants containing virus-derived inserts.” Transgenic Research 5:359-362
Sanford, J. C., and Johnston, S. A. 1985. “The concept of parasite-derived
resistance. Deriving resistance genes from the parasite’s own genome.” J.
Theor. Biol. 113:395-405
Seron, K., and Haenni, A.L. 1996. “Vascular movement of plant viruses.” Mol.
Plant-Microbe Interact. 9:435-442
Simon, A.E., and Bujarski J.J. 1994. “RNA-RNA recombination and evolution in
virus-infected plants.” Annu. Rev. Phytopathol. 32:337-362
Stark, D.M., and Beachy, R.N. 1989. “Protection against potyvirus infection in
transgenic plants: evidence for broad spectrum resistance.” Bio/Technology
7:1257-1262
Wintermantel, W.M., and Schoelz, J.E. 1996. “Isolation of recombinant viruses
between cauliflower mosaic virus and viral gene in transgenic plants under
conditions of moderate selection pressure.”Virology 223:156-164
ABSTRACT
It is evident from many recent analyses that the world’s population will increase
significantly in the near future. As a result, the demand for healthy, affordable
food will also grow. Given that the area of available arable land required to
produce food will not expand, new and environmentally sound technologies
allowing farmers to produce more on the same amount of land must be
developed. The development of genetically modified crops through biotech-
nology is one of several technologies now available to help address the world’s
increasing future demand for food. The first products from genetic engineering
have been introduced recently into the market. Genetically modified plants
tolerant to herbicides with superior environmental properties, along with crops
that are protected from insect predation while posing negligible risks to
beneficial insects, are now commercial realities. Unlike their traditionally bred
counterparts, genetically modified crops have been studied in great detail to
assure their food, feed and environmental safety. For the genetically modified
crops currently on the market, the risk has been assessed in relationship to the
benefits. An overview of ecological risk assessment is presented below along
with an example of the environmental impact of Roundup Ready® Canola
where attention was given to the potential for and impact of outcrossing.
THE NEED FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY IN FOOD PRODUCTION
One of the most important questions confronting society today is how will we
produce food in a sustainable manner for a growing world population? Certain
facts must be considered in the context of this discussion. Firstly, the world
population will significantly increase to some level over the next 30 years.
Global population estimates range from around eight billion people to much
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higher values. The exact value is almost irrelevant if we simply accept the fact
that population increases will be greatest among the poorest people in the
world. Secondly, the world’s landmass is essentially fixed and only a small
portion of this land is suitable for producing food. Almost all of the world’s
food is produced in an area about the size of North America. Were the
population to double, given current agricultural productivity, the land used
to produce the food for these people would have to increase substantially. The
simple fact is that this “extra” land does not exist. Furthermore, the world’s
most significant ecological and environmental problems are being created
by the conversion of forest and desert areas temporarily suitable for food
production. Shortsighted strategies to address the economic, social and
environmental problems of a growing population will not be sustainable.
Several technologies and new strategies are being developed and implemented
to address the need for sustainable food production. A short list of these
approaches is given in Table 1.
Advances in genomics (mapping genes and genetic combinations) are an
exciting new area that will enhance the ability to develop new and more
productive crops. Plant breeders are also using marker-assisted breeding to
facilitate the development of new varieties and reduce the time required to
bring these varieties to market. Agrochemical discovery remains an area of
important research. Environmentally superior crop protection agents are
needed immediately to control pests and promote the growth of crops. In
addition to chemical agents, biocontrol offers the opportunity for enhancing
safe and efficient agricultural productivity. Important improvements in farming
practices such as precision farming, conservation tillage and water management
will enable farmers to be better stewards of their land. These technologies
combined with advances in biotechnology like genetic engineering of plants are
the foundation upon which the important improvements in food production are
currently based.
TABLE 1. TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THE
NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD PRODUCTION
• Genomics
• Marker Assisted Breeding
• Agrochemical Discovery
• Biocontrol
• New Farm Management Practices
• Biotechnology
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Monsanto scientists are committed to using the techniques of genetic
engineering of plants to develop products for the sustainable production of
abundant food. As such these products must enable farmers to produce food
in a cost effective, socially acceptable, and environmentally sound manner. In
other words, to be sustainable, an agricultural product must meet the economic
and environmental needs of the increasing world population. The increasing
concern and demand for sustainable agricultural products, particularly those
derived through the techniques of modern biotechnology, has resulted in
significantly more detailed assessments of the safety of new products. This
paper discusses some of the potential ecological and environmental impacts
of genetically modified crops with particular emphasis on the impact of
outcrossing. The discussion begins with an overview of the principles and
methods for conducting environmental risk assessment, and concludes with
a specific example from a product that has a significant potential to outcross,
Roundup Ready® Canola.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT
We have completed detailed environmental risk assessments on our Roundup
Ready® and Insect Protected products according to scientific principles
developed and accepted internationally (Kjellsson, 1997; OECD, 1992). The
basic concepts of risk assessment applied to genetically modified crops are
similar to those used for chemical pesticides where the risk is equal to the
product of the exposure and the hazard.
Risk = Exposure x Hazard
In this model, exposure is the probability that something could happen that
might potentially be harmful, while the hazard is the degree to which the
occurrence is harmful. As a purely mathematical formulation, no exposure or
no hazard (exposure = 0, or hazard =0) equate to no risk. However, in science
and society there is no situation of zero risk since the potential for exposure
and hazard can always be estimated to be greater than zero. This leads us to
the concept of acceptable risk that is much more complicated, defies scientific
definition and is culturally grounded.
Several principles have been developed to provide general direction to
assessing the safety of products derived from modern biotechnology. These
principles have been applied to assessing the food, feed, and environmental
safety of modified crop plants. Firstly, products developed through genetic
engineering using plant transformation technology require a complete risk
assessment that is reviewed by regulatory authorities. Secondly, the risk
assessment will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Broad conclusions such
as all “genetically modified crops are environmentally safe” can not be made,
and the long and short-term effects of each unique product must be examined.
Thirdly, the information requested in a risk assessment must be science-based.
Experiments have to be designed to give clearly interpretable results concerning
the environmental and ecological risks presented by the release of a genetically
engineered plant. The safety factors imposed on modified plants will be
modified based on increased information and experience (NRC, 1989). Taken
as a whole, these principles establish a rational and cautious approach to
assessing the safety of a product.
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
The first step in conducting an environmental risk assessment is that one must
start with the most obvious potential environmental hazard posed by any
product, its potential toxic effect. Genetically modified plants often, but not
always, express novel proteins responsible for the improved phenotype and
selection of transformed plants. If, as has been the case with Roundup Ready®,
the potential toxicity of these proteins has been shown to be negligible, the risk
assessment focuses on the properties of the modified plant. In the case of
products modified to express a protein such as the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
protein, an assessment of potential effects on nontarget organisms is conducted
in addition to an evaluation of the modified plant. The focus of this paper is on
the risk assessment of the modified plant. A separate safety assessment of the Bt
protein is conducted and will not be discussed further.
Procedurally, risk assessment is an iterative four-phase process including:
• Problem Formulation
• Risk Analysis
• Risk Characterization
• Risk Management
In the first phase, the risk manager assesses the problem using available
information about the plant, the trait, and experimental endpoints. The risk
analysis phase can also be termed the data collection phase where all the
planning during problem formulation is reduced to data gathering. Thirdly is
risk characterization, or data analysis. Based on the information gathered, the
risk is characterized and the likelihood of an effect assessed. Lastly is risk
management where the acceptability or unacceptability of the risk is deter-
mined. Very importantly in the risk management phase decisions are made as
to future steps and conditions, if any, that must be imposed. The process is
repeated until the risk manager is satisfied that all the relevant factors have
been considered. In the process of gaining regulatory approval for a modified
plant, the conclusions of the risk manager will be reviewed and questioned by
scientists in the regulatory or reviewing bodies. It is also important to note that
the risk assessment process does not stop after a product has gained regulatory
approval or commercial acceptance.
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PROBLEM FORMULATION
Much information is available in the literature about the biology, use and
agronomic characteristics of plants that have been genetically modified. To date
over 25,000 field releases have occurred. The experience and information
gained from these releases as well as other data from the literature serve as the
basis for determining the important measurements to be taken and the accepted
range of experimental results. In formulating the appropriate questions for
Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected products, we thoroughly reviewed the
literature of the host crop (the traditional unmodified counterpart) looking
closely at the agronomic, ecological and environmental properties of the plant.
In addition, key academics were requested to provide expert input concerning
the biology of the crop plant. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges in the
problem formulation was assessing the acceptable variability present in the risk
assessment experiments. This variation occurs from genetic and environmental
sources, and is present due to the natural complexity of biological systems.
Choice of the appropriate control and reference samples is key to developing a
valid risk analysis. Information concerning interactions with other organisms,
especially beneficial organisms, is often reviewed. The weediness potential and
invasiveness properties, as well as the potential for gene flow through
volunteers or to wild relatives (outcrossing) are also essential components.
Since some crops like canola and sugarbeet have high potential for outcrossing,
the necessary management strategies had to be formulated prior to release of
the modified plant.
Other important factors related to the potential routes of exposure and
hazard were considered in the risk assessments we have conducted on our
Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected products. Special attention was given to
end use and dissemination. A detailed understanding of how the modified crop
would be produced, handled and transported was completed for each product.
Since the Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected traits effect an agronomic
advantage, it was assumed that their use would not change the production uses
of the modified crop. Careful analysis was also given to the nature of the trait,
its potential to confer a selective advantage and to produce harmful effect to a
species other than the target. The potential for enhanced toxicity of the
modified plant was determined by measuring levels of known toxicants (e.g.,
glucosinolates in canola and gossypol in cotton). Also, as stated earlier, all gene
products, as well as the marker proteins used to produce Roundup Ready® and
Insect Protected crops, were thoroughly evaluated and shown to be safe.
Because unintended effects are remotely possible, consideration is given to
the potential impact of our products on biodiversity. In addition, the experi-
mental strategy takes into account secondary genetic effects such as gene
instability and pleiotropic effects. Genetic instability would be clearly evident
in a loss or sudden change in the plant phenotype. Lastly, based on the factors
considered during the problem formulation phase, experimental design and
endpoints are determined. The process is repeated when new information and
knowledge gained from experimental results obtained during risk analysis.
RISK ANALYSIS
We have used a tiered approach to the risk assessment of Roundup Ready® and
Insect Protected crops based on the results of our problem formulation. The
Tier I data is summarized in Table 2. We have assessed that these data are
sufficient to thoroughly assess the risk associated with genetically modified
crops. However, a second tier has been included for the situation where more
data are needed.
In Tier I, data related to the emergence and germination, plant growth,
reproductive potential, weediness, and susceptibility to pests were collected. In
addition, fields were monitored for effects on subsequent rotations and any
evidence for gene flow / outcrossing. When detected, volunteers were assessed
for their quantity and tolerance to management practices. Most importantly, all
field data and observations were made using a control that was a nonmodified
counterpart of the genetically modified plant. For the Roundup Ready® and
Insect Protected crops, these data provide a detailed picture of the potential
ecological impact present.
If the risk presented by a genetically modified crop were characterized to be
significant after Tier I analysis, or if the Risk Manager concludes that more data
are required, some or all Tier II analyses could be conducted. Some of the
analyses listed in Table 3 are very detailed and may necessitate multiple years to
complete.
The results of our risk analysis using Tier I data have been sufficient to
conclude environmental safety for all Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected
crops. Nevertheless, we have facilitated Tier II analyses of some of our products.
For example we supported an outcrossing study with Roundup Ready® canola
(Bing, 1991). We also purposely made hybrids between Roundup Ready®
sugarbeet and wild beet to study the effect of the trait in the weed (unpub-
TABLE 2. TIER I RISK ANALYSIS FOR ROUNDUP READY® AND
INSECT PROTECTED CROPS
• germination / emergence
• growth assessments
• reproductive potential
• seedbank longevity
• volunteer potential
• susceptibility to pests and management
• field observations and monitoring
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lished). Monsanto will continue to conduct more than the minimum risk
analysis as well as make improvements to our risk assessment procedures as
a part of our commitment to product safety and overall stewardship.
It is interesting to highlight that outcrossing studies are not a component
of Tier I experiments. This is due to the fact that much is usually known
about outcrossing to wild relatives from breeding and the scientific literature.
Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the inherent ecological risks associated
with gene flow from modified crops are not related to the phenomenon of
outcrossing (Jorgenson et al., 1997; Hancock et al., 1997).
RISK CHARACTERIZATION
In the third phase of the risk assessment process, all experimental data and
observational information are submitted to risk characterization. For the
Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected products, the basis for characterization
of the modified plant is founded in the concept of substantial equivalence.
Though originally developed for assessing the safety of foods and feeds derived
from modified plants (OECD, 1990), the basic premise is also appropriate for
assessing the ecological and environmental safety of modified crops. The null
hypothesis for genetically modified crops with agronomic traits such as
Roundup Ready® and Bt is that the modified plant is substantially equivalent
to the traditional counterpart. In other words, the modified plant has not been
changed in any substantive way in terms of its impact on the environment
allowing for the presence of the novel trait. Furthermore, the trait is assessed
separately for its potential ecological and environmental impact. Once the
experimental data confirm that the plant is unchanged in its ecological and
environmental properties (allowing for the presence of the novel trait which is
assessed separately) it can be concluded that the modified plant is as safe as the
traditional plant.
This method is widely accepted as scientifically valid because of the extensive
experience with large-scale environmental releases of the traditional plant.
Furthermore, as products with improved environmental properties are
developed and introduced, the principle of substantial equivalence and use of
appropriate controls will serve as the reference point for future improvements
TABLE 3. TIER II RISK ANALYSIS
• Hybridization studies
• Outcrossing studies
• Tier I analysis of hybrids
• Allele persistence
• Morphological character analysis
• Multiple crossing experiments
and sustainable products. However, there is probably a need to differentiate
substantial equivalence in the context of food and feed safety from ecological
and environmental safety. As such we propose using a term like biological
equivalence which defines that the modified plant is biologically (ecologically
and agronomically) equivalent to the nonmodified plant in the absence of the
target of the intended modification, i.e., the herbicide or insects.
In addition to the risk characterization of substantially (biologically)
equivalent, it is possible to conclude that the plant is not substantially
(biologically) equivalent. If this were the case, one would proceed appropriately
in the risk management phase (vide infra).
As mentioned above, the risk of the introduced trait must be thoroughly
characterized. For the Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected traits, the most
significant potential impacts have been characterized as resistance management
to glyphosate and Bt protein, respectively. These characterizations serve as the
focus for the risk management phase of the risk assessment for these crops.
Appropriate risk management procedures will define the overall impact of the
release of a modified plant and the introduced trait.
RISK MANAGEMENT
The philosophical basis for risk management must be founded in product
stewardship. Products developed under a strict philosophy of stewardship
where the quality, integrity and benefits of the product are viewed against the
risk they present will meet the requirements of the stakeholders (customers,
consumers, and society in general). Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected
products from Monsanto must afford environmental and economic benefit as
mentioned earlier, and must enhance the ability to produce a crop in a
sustainable manner. The safety of products derived through genetic engineering
are assessed by independent regulatory agencies and determined to be at least
as safe as existing agricultural technologies. This review is one assurance that
appropriate stewardship policies and practices are being utilized. Other
assurances are risk management and product support practices after commer-
cialization.
Upon completion of risk characterization, the risk manager must weigh the
risk presented by the product against the benefit gained. Clearly, such analyses
assume that no action (or inaction) has zero risk. It is this balance between risk
and benefit that form the concept of acceptable risk. When the benefits
outweigh the risk, the risk is acceptable. All Roundup Ready® and Insect
Protected products on the market today have exceeded these criteria. In
addition and because our risk management is based on product stewardship
principles, appropriate monitoring and resistant management procedures have
been developed. These post market surveillance practices are continually being
refined based on input from the leading experts in the fields of insect and weed
resistance and knowledge gained after release of the modified plant.
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Conversely, when the benefits are inadequate compared to the risk, the risk
is unacceptable. In both situations, secondary steps must be taken as a part
of appropriate risk management. The risk manager may wish to conduct
additional tests (eg. Tier II) or propose post marketing management procedures
that will manage the risk. In this situation, one additional option available is to
consult regulatory, industry and academic experts regarding appropriate
management strategies.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE RELEASE OF
ROUNDUP READY® CANOLA
Since the focus of this meeting is the impact of outcrossing from genetically
modified crops, I will address this issue specifically. Risk assessment experts
around the world have shown that introduced genes are inherited in the same
manner as endogenous genes (Jorgenson et. al., 1997, Hancock et. al., 1997).
Furthermore, outcrossing is not a new phenomenon created through genetic
engineering. Plant breeders have been using these principles for years to modify
and improve crops. Thus, the impact of outcrossing is not dependent on the
phenomenon. Rather, it is related to the nature of the introduced trait. Since the
environmental properties of the trait are thoroughly evaluated in the risk
assessment, one can gain insight into the impact of outcrossing based on the
selective advantage observed in field tests. If the trait confers a selective
advantage to the modified plant, it is reasonable to conclude that any hybrids
resulting from outcrossing of the trait will also possess the selective advantage.
A real life example of a highly outcrossing plant that also tends to volunteer
that has shown no environmental impact is Roundup Ready® Canola (Brassica
napus var. oleifera). This product contains the genes for two proteins, CP4 5-
enolpyruylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (CP4 EPSPS) and Glyphosate
Oxidoreductase (GOX) which confer tolerance to glyphosate the active
ingredient in Roundup® herbicide. The commercial line was first field tested
in 1991 and ultimately received environmental regulatory approval in Canada
in 1995. In their decision, Agriculture and Agrifood Canada looked very closely
at the issue of outcrossing because B. napus is sexually compatible with two
common weeds B. rapa and B. juncea. They concluded that outcrossing to
weedy relatives is likely to occur at some low frequency, but that the presence
of the herbicide tolerance trait in the weeds confers no greater fitness either in
managed or unmanaged situations. They could state this because the plant had
not undergone any fundamental changes in its biology, and currently accepted
weed management measures were still applicable to control weedy relatives and
volunteers. In 1998 the potential exists to plant approximately three million
acres of Roundup Ready® Canola in Canada.
Based on farmer experience over the last 3 years, we can confidently
conclude that the impact of outcrossing from Roundup Ready® Canola has been
negligible. Furthermore, the issue of control of Roundup Ready® Canola
volunteer plants has been manageable.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the ecological and environmental impact of genetically modified
crops can be estimated through a rigorous science-based risk assessment.
Furthermore, the impact of outcrossing will be assessed in the course of this
experimental work. Based on our experience and information to date, the
Roundup Ready® and Insect Protected products are at least as safe as their
nonmodified counterparts. These new products offer benefits and fit better
with sustainable agricultural practices. Most importantly however, risk
assessment does not stop once a product receives regulatory approval and
commercial acceptance. Superior risk management must be grounded in
product stewardship which includes post market surveillance, resistance
management, customer service and feedback and other appropriate monitoring
practices. One of the critical challenges facing industry and academia today is
to design appropriate post-commercialization monitoring activities that will
ensure that these and future products contribute to sustainable agriculture.
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THE RULE OF BAD SCIENCE AND BIG BUSINESS
Genetic engineering biotechnology is hailed as the solution to all the problems
facing humanity. It promises food for the starving billions in the Third World,
greener agriculture, miracle cures and vaccines for cancer and other diseases,
genetic diagnosis, gene therapy, genetic enhancements and even cloning of
human beings. It threatens to change every aspect of our lives, not the least
of which, our value system as human beings. Why is there so little debate?
In particular, why is almost no one questioning the science, which is taken
to be unadulterated good not just by spokespersons for the industry, but also
by our government representatives, by scientists, and the mainstream media?
It is the latest offering in a reductionist tradition that has already brought
us radioactive and toxic wastes, greenhouse gases, holes in the ozone layer,
agrochemicals, environmental degradation, and other legacies of the Green
Revolution. Can it really solve problems that reductionist science has created
in the first place? Or are we facing dangers of a different order than anything
that reductionist science has given us so far? I shall confine discussions to
agriculture, although many of the main arguments are relevant to human
genetics where major moral issues are raised in genetic discrimination,
eugenics, and human cloning. A more comprehensive treatment can be found
in my book: Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? The Brave New World
of Bad Science and Big Business (Ho, 1998).
The reality, in my view, is that bad science and big business, both out of
control, have formed a dangerous liaison that is gambling with our food
security, biodiversity, and health, and at the same time tearing at the fabric
of civilized society. The liaison is reinforced by a shared mindset that claims to
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be objective and neutral, but in reality, starts from some pretty simplistic and
immoral assumptions. They see the world in bits and pieces, as selfish genes
and selfish individuals instead of organisms, societies, and ecosystems. All of
nature, including human beings and their genes, are objects to be manipulated
and exploited for gain. Life and business are both in a competitive Darwinian
struggle for the survival of the fittest.
The corporations are getting bigger and more competitive all the time. Just
six agrochemical giants are poised to take control of world food production and
distribution: Monsanto, Novartis, AgrEvo, DuPont, Zeneca and Dow (Vidal and
Milner, 1997). In international financial organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),
legislation is being rewritten to remove all real or perceived barriers to trade
and investment to enable corporations to better exploit the poor and the weak,
to maximally internalize profit, and to externalize risks and costs with impunity
(unpublished manuscript). At the same time, restrictive “trade related
intellectual property rights” are to be protected, the most immoral of which are
the patents on life that include seed varieties and knowledge stolen from Third
World countries, as well as genes and cell lines taken from indigenous peoples
under false pretext (Baumann, et al., 1996).
Patents on transgenic crops and other organisms will turn farmers every-
where into contracted laborers, and drastically reduce agricultural biodiversity
as farmers will no longer be free to grow non-certified varieties. Farming will
concentrate into fewer hands, displacing millions of small farmers or throwing
them out of work by destroying export markets. Patents on human genes and
cell lines will compromise healthcare for ordinary people who cannot afford
to pay royalties or license fees. Basic scientific and medical research will also
suffer. Most of all, these patents effectively grant monopolistic ownership
of living organisms, including human beings and their genes, to powerful
corporations that cannot be held accountable. Unfortunately, intense lobbying
by the biotechnology corporations has persuaded the European Parliament
to vote in favor of a directive that will make these patents legal. Patents that
violate basic human rights are being legitimized by the dominant reductionist
science that purports to set standards of propriety and probity.
This same science is also setting standards of what is safe, as we are
repeatedly told by expert scientific committees at the United Nations, the
European Union, and many national governments that have approved nearly
all the genetically engineered products to date. The key concept is the
“principle of substantial equivalence” on which all risk assessment is to be
based. This principle is elaborated in a report issued jointly in 1996 by the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO), whose Codex Alimentarius sets world safety standards. It would be
deemed illegal for countries to ban imports of any genetically engineered
products so long as the Codex considers them safe. The principle is validated
by the science, which pronounces that there is no essential difference between
transgenic lines and conventional varieties produced by selective breeding. A
product assessed to be substantially equivalent is regarded as safe and fit for
human consumption.
However, substantial equivalence can be claimed in advance, in which case
subsequent risk assessment is most perfunctory. Furthermore, “substantial
equivalence” does not mean equivalence to the unengineered plant or animal
variety. The genetically engineered food could be compared to any and all
varieties within the species. It could have the worst characteristics of all the
varieties and still be considered substantially equivalent. It could even be
compared to a product from a totally unrelated species or collection of species.
Worse still, there are no defined tests that products have to go through to
establish substantial equivalence. The tests are so undiscriminating that
unintended changes, such as toxins and allergens, could easily escape detection.
For example, a grossly altered genetically engineered potato with deformed
tubers was tested and passed as substantially equivalent (Conner, 1995). Risk
assessment based on the principle of substantial equivalence, in my view, is
the stuff of farce. It is a case of “don’t need - don’t look - don’t see.” Biotechnol-
ogy corporations are effectively given carte blanche to do as they please, while
regulators are serving to diffuse and allay legitimate public fears and opposition
(Ho and Steinbrecher, 1998).
It is significant that a lawsuit challenging the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) policy on genetically engineered foods has just been filed
by a coalition of scientists, health professionals, religious leaders, and chefs
demanding adequate safety testing and mandatory labeling. According to a
press release issued by the International Center for Technology Assessment,
the FDA policy is scientifically unsound and ignores significant health risks.
NOT FEEDING THE WORLD
It is clear that no one needs genetically engineered foods, least of all peasant
farmers in the Third World. “World hunger” is usually blamed exclusively on
population increases in the Third World (Kendall et al., 1997; Food and Drink
Federation, 1995; and Brown, 1998). Not mentioned are the large dam projects
that continue to be supported by the World Bank. A total of 40,000 large dams
already took 400,000 square kilometers of the best agricultural land out of
production displacing 60 million farmers and further ruining vast areas of
arable land by unsustainable irrigation practices that result in salination, water-
logging, drought and erosion (Goldsmith and Hilyard, 1984-92). At the same
time, the policies of trade liberalization (WTO) enable corporations operating
in the Third World to divert food-growing lands to non-food crops such as
flowers and other luxury commodities, and to leisure complexes such as golf
courses, turning traditionally food-exporting countries into importers
(Cainglet, 1998). Over the past two years, 65 golf courses have been con-
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structed in the Philippines alone, and the Government’s own projections reveal
that 1.5 million hectares of rice lands are to be converted into cash crops and
golf courses. This is a country where 70 percent of the population are farmers,
but the majority is landless, and less than one percent of the population
controls more than 50 percent of all agricultural land. Those peasants still
fortunate enough to own land have no more than two hectares. The Philippines
has become a net importer of rice as a result, and the volume of import is set
to grow. The same story is repeated all over the Third World, in Mexico, and
in Russia.
Corporate interests are now offering genetic engineering agriculture to the
Third World, with the World Bank as a major player (Kendall, et al., 1997). Far
from feeding the world, genetic engineering agriculture, operating under the
patents on life regime, will reinforce and intensify corporate control of food
production and distribution, swelling the masses of displaced farmers, making
the poor even poorer and hungrier.
Furthermore, in my view, it poses serious threats to food security, bio-
diversity, and human and animal health, and has the potential to unleash
uncontrollable epidemics of drug and antibiotic-resistant infectious diseases.
Those hazards are not teething problems, but inherent to the reductionist
mindset of a bad science misguiding a hit-or-miss technology.
THE BAD SCIENCE OF GENETIC DETERMINISM
Genetic engineering is a set of techniques for cutting, joining, modifying, and
multiplying genes, especially for transferring genes from one species to another,
most of which would never interbreed in nature. Thus, human genes are trans-
ferred to pig, mouse, fish, plants, and bacteria. And genes of all species can be
recombined, cloned, and modified in any and every way. Genetic engineering is
a new departure from conventional breeding techniques, and introduces new
problems and dangers. But let us look first at the science motivating the
technology.
This is what the public is told: “Research scientists can now precisely identify
the individual gene that governs a desired trait, extract it, copy it, and insert the
copy into another organism. That organism (and its offspring) will then have
the desired trait” (Food and Drink Federation, 1995). This description is typical
of literature supposedly promoting public understanding, and neatly encapsu-
lates the bad science of genetic determinism. It gives the highly misleading
impression of a precise technology, implying that:
• Genes determine characters in linear causal chains, one gene giving rise to
one character;
• Genes are not subject to influence from the environment;
• Genes remain stable and constant;
• Genes remain in organisms and stay where they are put.
This is the most extreme version of the classical genetics that has dominated
biology roughly from the 1930s up to the 1970s when genetic engineering
began. It is so extreme that no biologist would admit to actually subscribing
to it. But, why else would they suggest that by manipulating genes, practically
all the problems of the world can be solved?
Genetic determinism goes counter to all the scientific evidence accumulated
especially within the past 20 years, which gives us the new genetics. What is
the new genetics of the present day really like (Ho, 1998)?
• No gene ever works in isolation, but in an extremely complicated genetic
network where the function of each gene is dependent on the context of all
the other genes in the genome. So, the same gene will have very different
effects from individual to individual, because other genes are different.
There is so much genetic diversity within any outbreeding population,
such as human beings, that each individual is genetically unique. And,
especially if the gene is transferred to another species, it is most likely, in
my view, to have new and unpredictable effects.
• The genetic network, in turn, is subject to layers of feedback regulation
from the physiology of the organism and its relationship to the external
environment.
• These layers of feedback regulation not only change the function of genes
but can rearrange them, multiply copies of them, mutate them to order, or
make them move around.
• And, genes can even travel outside the original organism to infect
another—this is referred to as horizontal gene transfer.
The new picture of the gene is diametrically opposite to the old static,
reductionist view. The gene has a very complicated ecology consisting of the
interconnected levels of the genome, the physiology of the organism and
its external environment (Ho, 1998; Ho et al., 1998). Putting a new gene into
an organism will create disturbances that can propagate out to the external
environment. Conversely, changes in the environment will be transmitted
inwards and may alter the genes themselves. Genetic engineering profoundly
disturbs the ecology of genes at all levels, and that is where the problems and
dangers arise.
GENETIC ENGINEERING IS A CRUDE, IMPRECISE OPERATION
First of all, I must dispel the myth that genetic engineering is a precise
operation. It is not. The insertion of foreign genes into the host cell genome is
a random process not under the control of the genetic engineer. It is done by
means of artificial vectors for horizontal gene transfer. Horizontal gene transfer
is naturally done by infectious agents such as viruses and virus-like elements
(plasmids and transposons) that are passed from cell to cell and from organism
to organism, sometimes causing diseases including cancer, and spreading drug
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and antibiotic-resistance genes. The gene(s) to be transferred are usually
integrated into the genetic material of the vector; viruses can also transfer
genes that are not integrated but are merely packaged within the protein coat
that envelops the genetic material.
Species barriers limit natural agents, and all cells have mechanisms that break
down or inactivate foreign genes. However, genetic engineers make artificial
vectors for transferring genes by joining together parts of the most aggressive
agents to overcome all species barriers. Most of the genes causing diseases are
removed, but the antibiotic-resistance genes are left in. The gene to be
transferred (transgene) is inserted into an artificial vector containing one or
more antibiotic-resistance marker genes, which makes it possible to select for
cells that have taken up the vector carrying the transgene. The vector carrying
the transgene and marker gene(s) can either be replicated many times in the
cell or become integrated into the genome, resulting in a transgenic cell from
which a transgenic organism may be regenerated. The integration of the vector
is random and not controllable by the genetic engineer (Walden et al., 1991).
This gives rise to correspondingly random genetic effects: inappropriate
activation or inactivation of host genes, including, in my opinion, cancer
(Doerfler et al., 1997). Recent studies document genetic disturbances that
propagate far from the site of insertion of the foreign genes into the host
genome (Parr, 1997). Furthermore, the foreign genes are equipped with very
strong signals, most often from viruses, called promoters or enhancers, that
force the organism to express the foreign genes at rates 10 to 100 times greater
than its own genes. In other words, the genetic engineering process, both by
design and otherwise, completely upsets the first two levels in the ecology of
genes — the genome and the physiology — with dire consequences. It is my
belief that the lines produced are unstable and are a threat to food security.
For every product that reaches the market, there are perhaps 20 or more
others that have failed. However, even products that reach the market are
failing:
• The FlavrSavr™ tomato was a commercial disaster and has disappeared
(Fox, 1997).
• Monsanto’s Bt-cotton, engineered with an insecticide from the soil
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, failed to perform in the field in both US
and Australia in 1996, and suffered excessive damages from Bt-resistant
pests (Fox, 1997).
• Monsanto’s 1997 Roundup Ready® cotton crops fared no better. The cotton
bolls drop off when sprayed with Roundup and farmers in seven states in
the US are seeking compensation for losses.
• The transgenic Innovator herbicide-tolerant canola failed to perform
consistently in Canada. This has led the Saskatchewan Canola Growers
Association to call for an official seed vigor test.
• Monsanto’s entire Canadian genetically engineered rapeseed crop had to
be recalled in 1997 because of “technical difficulties” (Monsanto Monitor,
1998).
Because genes respond to the environment; plants that perform in green-
houses may well fail in the field. But transgenic plants have additional
problems.
There is widespread instability of transgenic lines, not only do they fail
to perform consistently in the field, they generally do not breed true. In
my opinion, transgenic lines are unstable because of the way they are made
(see below).
TRANSGENIC INSTABILITY
Traditional breeding methods involve crossing closely related varieties or
species containing different forms of the same genes. Selection is practiced
over many generations under field conditions so that the desired characteristics
and the genes influencing those characteristics, in the appropriate environment,
are tested and harmonized for stable expression over a range of genetic back-
grounds. Different genetic combinations moreover will vary in performance in
different environments. This “genotype-environment” interaction is well known
in traditional breeding so it is not possible to predict how a new variety will
perform in untested environments. In many cases, new varieties will lose their
characteristics in later generations as genes become shuffled and recombined,
or as they respond to environmental changes.
This problem is greatly exacerbated in genetic engineering. First of all,
completely exotic genes are often introduced into organisms. Secondly, the
procedures for creating transgenic organisms inherently generate increased
genetic instability, In plants, the genes are often introduced into cells in tissue
culture, and transgenic plants are regenerated from the cells after selection in
culture.
• The tissue culture technique itself introduces new genetic variations at
high frequencies; these are known as somaclonal variations (Cooking,
1989). In my view, that is because the cells are removed from the internal,
physiological environment of the plant which, together with the ecological
environment, keep gene expression, genes, and genome structure stable
in the cells and the organism as a whole (Ho, 1998). Unilever used tissue
culture techniques to regenerate oil palms for planting in Malaysia several
years ago. This has now been abandoned as many plants aborted in the
field or failed to flower (Perlas, 1995).
• The process of gene insertion is random and many secondary genetic
effects can result, as mentioned earlier.
• The extra DNA integrated into the transgenic organism’s genome disrupts
the structure of its chromosome, and can itself cause chromosomal
rearrangement (Wahl et al., 1984), further affecting gene function.
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• The integrated vector containing the transgene(s) and marker gene(s) has
the potential to move out again or reinsert into another site, causing
further genetic disturbances (Ho, 1998; Ho and Steinbrecher, 1998;
Walden et al., 1991; Doerfler et al., 1997).
• The highly mosaic character of most vector constructs make them
structurally unstable and prone to recombination (Ho et al., 1998). This
may be why viral-resistant transgenic plants generate recombinant viruses
more readily than non-transgenic plants (see below).
• The use of aggressive promoters and enhancers to boost expression of
transgenes stress and unbalance the physiological system and increases
instability, as already stated.
• All cells have mechanisms that silence foreign genes (Finnegan and
McElroy, 1994). One common mechanism is methylation — a chemical
reaction that adds a methyl group to the base adenine or cytosine in the
DNA (there are four bases in DNA, adenine, cytosine, guanine and
thymine) — as the result of which, the gene is no longer expressed.
Transgene instability occurs both in farm animals (Colman, 1996) and plants
(Lee et al., 1995). The transgenic sheep Tracy, engineered to produce human
alpha-antitrypsin at high levels in her milk, failed to reproduce female offspring
that match her performance. That is why cloning techniques that resulted in
Dolly the sheep were contemplated. Much more is known about instability in
plants. In tobacco, 64 to 92 percent of the first generation of transgenic plants
become unstable. The frequency of transgene loss in Arabidopsis ranges
between 50 and 90 percent. Instability arises during the production of germ
cells and in cell division during plant growth. It can be triggered by transplanta-
tion or mild trauma (Parr, 1997).
Transgenic lines, therefore, often do not breed true. A typical case is the
supposedly non-allergenic rice produced in Japan (Tada et al., 1996), which
turned out to be both ineffective and unstable. The transgenic plants of the
second and third generations showed only a 20 to 30 percent reduction of the
allergens. The project has been abandoned (Devlen et al., 1995).
There is, in fact, no data documenting the stability of any transgenic line in
gene expression, or in structure and location of the insert in the genome. Such
data must include the level of gene expression, as well as a genetic map and
DNA base sequence of the insert and its site of insertion in the host genome in
each successive generation. No such data has ever been provided by industry,
nor requested by regulatory authorities.
The instability of transgenic lines creates difficulties in quality control and
traceability. It also raises serious safety concerns. A transgenic variety with a
certain gene insert may be assessed safe, and completely change in characteris-
tics when the insert moves to another position in the genome. Furthermore,
one does not have to be prescient to see that transgenic instability makes
biotechnology unsustainable. It is my belief that it may ruin our agriculture and
food supply just by being widely planted in place of nongenetically engineered
and traditional, well-tried varieties. Small farmers in Third World countries will
be especially vulnerable.
DANGERS FROM NOVEL GENE PRODUCTS BOTH INTENDED
AND UNINTENDED
Genetic engineering introduced new genes and gene products into our food
chain, many from viruses and bacteria, which we have never eaten before and
certainly not in such quantities. The viral “promoters” or “enhancers” that
boost the expression of introduced genes continuously at a high rate essentially
places them outside normal control. These promoters may also have further
affects on host genes. As no gene in a normal organism is on at full blast all the
time, the genetically engineered organism is under permanent metabolic stress
which, in my opinion, makes it an unwholesome food.
More importantly, because no gene functions in isolation, the introduced
genes are bound to interact with the host genes to give unintended effects,
among which are, I believe, likely to be toxins and allergens. The most
notorious case of unintended toxin is a batch of genetically engineered
tryptophan, an amino acid widely sold in health-food stores. It killed 37 and
made thousands ill. Graphic illustrations of “unintended effects” are failures in
transgenic animals, which is disastrous for animal welfare (Mayeno and Gleich,
1994).
• The superpig engineered with human growth hormone gene turned out
arthritic, ulcerous, blind and impotent (Cox, 1996).
• The supersalmon engineered to grow as fast as possible ended up with big
monstrous heads and died from not being able to breathe or feed properly
(GenEthics News; Devlen et al., 1995a).
• The latest clones of the sheep Polly are abnormal and eight times as likely
to die at birth compared with ordinary lambs (Devlen et al., 1995b).
And it is possible that the carcasses of failed transgenic experiments and
xenotransplant pigs could turn up as meat on our dinner table. They have
already been approved for sale by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
in 1994, without being labelled as such. They will all pass as “substantially
equivalent”. And if not, then GRAS, Generally Regarded As Safe, according to
the standards set by the FAO/WHO food safety report (FAO/WHO, 1996)
THREATS TO BIODIVERSITY
Agricultural biotechnology is already posing unacceptable threats to bio-
diversity, not surprisingly because wider ecological impacts are ignored by
the reductionist science.
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• Broad-spectrum herbicides used with herbicide-tolerant transgenic crops,
such as glufosinate (Mendelson, 1998) (Novartis’ Basta) and glyphosate
(Cox, 1996) (Monsanto’s Roundup) destroy plants indiscriminately, many
of which are habitats for wildlife. They are toxic to animals and human
beings. Glufosinate also causes birth defects and glyphosate is mutagenic
(Cox, 1995).
• Transgenic plants with insecticidal transgenes not only harm beneficial
species directly, but also indirectly down the food chain, such as lacewings
and ladybirds feeding on prey species that have eaten transgenic plants
(Kale, et al., 1995) and Birch, et al., 1997). In a field trial of Bt-cotton in
Thailand, 30 percent of the bees around the test fields died (Hilbeck et al.,
1997).
• Transgenic crops with insecticidal genes or herbicide tolerant genes
actually favour the widespread mutation to resistance (Ho, 1998). In
other words, they exacerbate the problem they are supposed to solve.
Pesticide resistance and herbicide tolerance are not due to the natural
selection of pre-existing, rare random mutations, as we have been told in
textbooks for years. They are due to genetic mutations that can occur in not
all of the individuals in the populations in response to sublethal levels of the
pesticide or herbicide. So, just as pesticidal transgenic plants, in my opinion,
lead to rapid evolution of resistance among pests, the use of herbicide-tolerant
transgenic plants will, I believe, also result in the widespread evolution of
herbicide tolerance among weeds, even in the absence of cross-pollination.
(The spread of transgenes by cross-pollination has already been demonstrated.)
This has been known more than 10 years (Hyrien and Buttin, 1986). The
genetic changes are part and parcel of the physiological mechanisms common
to all cells and organisms challenged with toxic substances, not only pesticides
and herbicides (Mikkelson, et al., 1996), but also anti-cancer drugs in
mammalian cells and most dangerously, antibiotics in bacteria (Ho, 1998; Ho
et al., 1998).
The use and abuse of antibiotics in intensive agriculture and conventional
medicine have been responsible for the evolution of antibiotic resistances in
pathogens. But, here is the final straw. Genes do not stay where they are put,
but can travel horizontally between species that do not naturally interbreed.
Genetic engineering organisms contribute to drug and antibiotic-resistant
infectious diseases
As previously mentioned, genetic engineering involves transferring genes
horizontally between species that do not interbreed. While natural agents
are limited by species barriers, genetic engineers make artificial vectors for
transferring genes by joining together parts of the most aggressive agents to
overcome all species barriers.
Artificial vectors and the genes they carry have the potential to spread
horizontally to a wide range of species, to recombine with their genes to
generate new viral and bacterial pathogens. This very danger had made the
first molecular geneticists impose a moratorium on genetic engineering in
the Asilomar Declaration of 1975 (Hyrien and Buttin, 1986). But commercial
pressures soon intervened. Activities resumed after regulatory guidelines
were put in place and commercial production began. Were those guidelines
adequate? No, not in the light of recent scientific evidence as eight scientists
including myself argue in a new report (Ho et al., 1998).
There has been a resurgence of infectious diseases within the past 20 years,
diseases that are resistant to treatment by drugs and antibiotics. A public health
crisis is looming worldwide. Infectious diseases are responsible for one-third of
the 52 million deaths from all causes. Multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis is now
estimated to affect 10 million each year with 3 million deaths. At least 50 new
viruses attacking humans emerged between 1988 and 1996. Between 1986 and
1996, E. coli O157:H7 infections increased by 10-fold in England and Wales
and 100-fold in Scotland. Vancomycin resistance rose from 3 percent to 95
percent in San Francisco hospitals in the four years between 1993 and 1997.
And strains of dangerous bacteria including Staphyloccocus aureus (toxic shock
syndrome), Enterococcus faecalis (blood poisoning and wound infection),
Pseudomonas aeruginosa (blood poisoning and pneumonia) and Mycobacterium
tuberculosis (TB) are invulnerable to all known antibiotics (Walden et al., 1991;
Dobson, 1998).
Over the past three to four years, geneticists have discovered how horizontal
gene transfer and recombination are responsible for generating the new viral
and bacterial pathogens and spreading drug and antibiotic resistance genes (Ho,
1998; Ho et al., 1998). Are we unleashing widespread, cross-species epidemics
that will be impossible to control? The signs are that the worst case scenario,
predicted by the Asilomar Declaration, may already be with us as the result of
20 years of commercial gene technology.
Can transgenic plants and animals contribute to such processes? Yes. They
can. Transgenic plants have been found to transfer their transgenes and
antibiotic resistance marker genes to soil fungi and bacteria (Gainglet, 1998;
Hoffman et al.; Schluter et al., 1995). Plants engineered with a viral gene,
supposed to resist virus attack, actually have increased propensity to generate
new, superinfectious viruses by recombination (Gebhard and Smalla, 1998;
Vaden and Melcher, 1990; Lommel and Ziong, 1991; Greene and Allison, 1994;
Wintermantel and Schoelz, 1996). Genetic engineering, by enhancing
horizontal gene transfer and recombination, may, I believe, be greatly
multiplying the odds for generating new viral and bacterial pathogens and
spreading drug and antibiotic resistance genes.
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The regulatory guidelines set up after Asilomar were based largely on
assumptions, practically every one of which has been overturned by recent
scientific findings (Ho, 1998; Ho et al., 1998).
• Biologically “crippled” laboratory strains of bacteria can often survive in
the environment, or go dormant but continue to exchange genes with
other organisms (Jager and Tappeser, 1996).
• Routine chemical inactivation methods may leave up to 10 percent of
viruses and other pathogens in an infective state (Coghlan, 1997).
• Legal limits of “tolerated releases” from contained use vastly exceed the
minimum infective dose of some pathogens: 10,000 colony-forming units/
ml in air or water (Novo Nordisk) versus a minimum infective dose of 50
bacteria for E. coli O157:H7 (Smith, 1997)
• Antibiotics increase the frequency of horizontal gene transfer 10 to 10,000-
fold (Lorenz and Wackernagel, 1994; Davies, 1994).
• DNA released from dead and living cells persist in the environment and
transfer to other organisms (Sandaa and Enger, 1994; Yin and Stotzky,
1997).
• Naked viral and vector DNA may be more infectious, and have a wider
host range than the virus (Traavik, 1995).
• Viral DNA resists digestion in the gut of mice; enters the blood stream
to infect white blood cells, spleen and liver cells; and integrates into the
mouse cell genome (Ho et al., 1998; Schubbert et al., 1994; Schubbert
et al., 1997).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, genetically engineering agriculture is unnecessary and unethical.
It is based on science that is unsound, and the foods produced are, in my
opinion, unwholesome. It is unsustainable because the technology is hit or
miss. Most of all I believe it is inherently unsafe.
Erwin Chargaff, a founding father of molecular biology, warned that all
innovation does not result in “progress.” He once referred to genetic engineer-
ing as “a molecular Auschwitz” and warned that the technology of genetic
engineering poses a greater threat to the world than the advent of nuclear
technology. “I have the feeling that science has transgressed a barrier that
should have remained inviolate,” he wrote in his autobiography, Herculean Fire,
“. . . you cannot recall a new form of life . . . It will survive you and your
children and your children’s children. An irreversible attack on the biosphere
is something so unheard of, so unthinkable to previous generations, that I
could only wish that mine had not been guilty of it.”
In the face of the wealth of existing scientific evidence and the precautionary
principle, the least our governments could do is to impose a five-year mora-
torium and to support independent scientists to go back to basic research on
the legitimate, sustainable, and safe uses of the technology. At the same time,
there should be a major public inquiry in which the scientific, social, and
moral issues are considered together and openly debated. Most of all, we need
to seriously rethink where the priorities are, and the sort of life we want as a
civil society.
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OVERVIEW OF EPA REGULATIONS OF PESTICIDES
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates pesticides under two
major statutory authorities: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), and the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Under
FIFRA, the EPA has the authority to regulate the development, sale, distribu-
tion, use, storage, and disposal of pesticides. To be registered, FIFRA required
that a pesticide will not cause “unreasonable adverse effects” to human health
or the environment. The Federal Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA)
modified the test for “unreasonable adverse effects,” effective August 3, 1996.
The EPA determines if a pesticide would cause an unreasonable adverse effect
by considering “the economic, social, and environmental costs [risks] and
benefits” of the use of the pesticides. FIFRA generally prohibits the sale or
distribution of a pesticide unless it is registered. A product may be registered
either unconditionally (see FIFRA section 3(c)5) or conditionally(see FIFRA
section 3(c)(7)).
FIFRA, amended by FQPA, defines the term “unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment” to mean: “(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental
costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from
residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with
the standard under section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act”
(7 U. S. C. 136(bb)). Before the FQPA amendments took effect on August 3,
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1996, FIFRA contained only the first definition of “unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment.” FQPA added the second definition regarding consistency
with the FFDCA section 408 standard.
FFDCA gives broad authority to protect human dietary risks that might be
posed by the use of any pesticide in food for humans, or as feed for animals.
Under FFDCA, the EPA is responsible for determining the amount of pesticide
residue that is allowable in raw and processed agricultural commodities”
and that may enter commerce. The EPA determines that “there is a reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from complete exposure of the pesticide
chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other
exposures for which there is reliable information”(21 U. S. C. 346a(b)(2)
and c(2)(A)).
TYPES OF PESTICIDES
There are two basic types of pesticides: conventional chemical pesticides
and biopesticides. Biopesticides include: microbial, biochemical, and plant-
pesticides. Microbial pesticides are living organisms used as pesticides, e. g,
microorganisms, fungi, and viruses. Biochemical pesticides are naturally
occurring or analogous to naturally occurring pesticidal substances with a
non-toxic mode of action against the target pest e. g., pheromones and other
semiochemicals used for mating disruption. Plant-pesticides are defined as
a pesticidal substance(s) produced in a living plant and the genetic material
necessary for the production of that pesticidal substance e. g., delta-endotoxins
produced by Cry genes from the soil microorganism Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt),
expressed in crop plants. These types of plant-pesticides are referred to as Bt
plant-pesticides or more commonly as Bt crops.
REGULATION OF PLANT-PESTICIDES
Regulatory Development
As part of the agreement with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), stated in the Office of Science
Technology and Policy’s 1986 Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology
Products, the EPA proposed a rule on November 23, 1994 (59 FR 60496,
60519, 60535, 60542, and 60545 Nov. 23, 1994) for the regulation of plant-
pesticides. In that proposal, the EPA describes what compounds it considers
to be plant-pesticides and how these would be regulated both under FIFRA
and FFDCA. In this proposed policy, the EPA makes clear that it would focus
its regulatory authority on the pesticidal substances and the genetic material
necessary for their production rather than on the plant, per se, and designates
the pesticidal substances as plant-pesticides. In addition to the policy state-
ment, the EPA issued proposed regulations that define certain categories
of plant-pesticides that would be exempt from regulation under FIFRA and
FFDCA. Plant-pesticides not exempt would be subject to regulation.
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Even though there are no specific plant-pesticide guidelines for data
supporting registration, there are regulations governing the registration
of these pesticides and requiring the submission of data necessary to enable
the Agency to make the requisite findings for registration under section 3(c)(5)
and (7). In addition, there are draft guidance documents to aid registrants
in their development of appropriate data. After the plant-pesticide rule and
regulations are made final, the EPA will issue proposed data requirements for
plant-pesticides (including Bt plant-pesticides) and go through a public notice
and comment period including holding at least one FIFRA Scientific Advisory
Panel meeting.
PROPOSED PLANT-PESTICIDE RULE
The main features of the rule and its status are discussed below.
Definitions
In the proposed policy, plant-pesticides are defined in FIFRA as the pesticidal
substance produced in a living plant and the genetic material necessary for
the production of that pesticidal substance. This definition is intended to focus
the safety assessment on the pesticidal substance itself, rather than the plant
in which it was produced. Inclusion of the genetic material as part of the
active ingredient of the plant-pesticide recognizes the biological reality that
a pesticidal substance will not be produced in a plant without a gene to direct
that production. In addition, inclusion of the genetic material provides a
mechanism to address the escape of the gene into other plants and a consistent
regulatory coverage for parts of a plant’s life cycle when the pesticidal substance
may not be actively produced.
FIFRA Scope and Exemptions
All plants produce secondary plant compounds that act as pesticidal substances
to protect against or mitigate pests. Some plants even produce herbicidal
compounds that aid in their colonization of a habitat. The broad definition of
plant-pesticide under FIFRA and the extensive knowledge of plant science
about certain pesticidal traits suggest that the EPA could easily exempt
categories of plant-pesticides from regulation based on a history of exposure
and/or safe consumption. A major focus of the rule is to describe these exempt
categories of plant-pesticides and explain the triggers for regulatory oversight
of other plant-pesticides. The trigger for closer examination under FIFRA
focuses on plant-pesticides that have new exposures, either dietary or
environmental. Pesticidal traits derived from sources that are not sexually
compatible with the host plant would probably not have a history of expression
in that host plant and would, as a result, be most likely to cause adverse dietary
or environmental effects. Therefore, pesticidal substance originating from a
sexually compatible plant species would be exempted from regulation. Also
exempted from regulation would be plant-pathogenic virus coat proteins and
traits that affect only the host plant such as physical barriers or some types of
disease resistance genes.
Labeling
An important feature of the EPA’s regulatory approach to plant-pesticides is
that it will not register the plant, but rather the plant-pesticide active ingredient
and the genetic material necessary for its production. The official FIFRA label
is issued to the registrant. There will be no FIFRA-type label accompanying the
seed sold in commerce, but rather informational material (referred to here as
labeling information) that will instruct the grower on how to use the crop
expressing the plant-pesticide (e.g. Bt). The registered label (the FIFRA label)
may require that registrants put certain statements or guidance on all informa-
tional materials (e.g., technical bulletins, grower guides, Internet materials,
videos etc.) that may accompany the Bt crop seed or other propagative material
at the time of sale, similar to the information that accompanies seeds treated
with conventional pesticides. For example, an informational label statement
could tell growers that certain resistance management strategies should or must
be followed.
FFDCA Scope and Exemptions
The EPA also has responsibilities under FFDCA to establish a safe level of
pesticide residues allowed on food crops. For plant-pesticides, the EPA believes
the major human exposure to pesticidal substances will be dietary. There are
numerous plant species that have been safely consumed as food. Therefore,
plant-pesticides that do not represent a novel dietary exposure in the new host
plant would be exempt under the proposed regulations under FFDCA. The
triggers for examination under FFDCA are if the pesticidal substance from a
normally inedible portion of a food plant is found in the edible portion of the
new plant, if the pesticidal substance is from a food plant normally processed
before consumption and introduced into a food usually eaten without
processing, and if the pesticidal substance has been altered from its original
structure or function. The movement of known food allergens from one part
of a plant to another part of a plant is being discouraged. The plant-pesticides
that qualify for an exemption from the requirement for a food tolerance are
those pesticidal substances from sexually compatible plants and viral coat
proteins based on the history of safe consumption of these components in the
current food supply. In addition, the EPA believes there probably is no dietary
risk with the consumption of the small amount of additional genetic material
coding for any plant-pesticide so the genetic material necessary for the
production of a plant-pesticide is also exempt from a food tolerance.
Current Status
Since the November 1994 publication of the proposed policy in the Federal
Register, the EPA has been reviewing the comments received and preparing for
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publication of the final rule. During the comment review period, Congress
passed the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) in August 1996 that amended
both FIFRA and the FFDCA. These amendments altered some aspects of the
process for assessing the food safety of pesticide chemical residues. Therefore,
the EPA recently published supplemental notices in the Federal Register to
notify the public how the proposed tolerance exemptions for plant-pesticides
met the new safety standards of the FFDCA as amended by the FQPA. The final
rule for plant-pesticides under FIFRA and associated food tolerance exemptions
under FFDCA should be published soon.
PUBLIC MEETINGS HELD ON BT PLANT-PESTICIDES
While there are no published plant-pesticide data guidelines, the Agency has
sponsored, or cosponsored with other Federal agencies, four conferences
dealing with plant-pesticides and the pertinent data needed to perform a risk
assessment: 1) a “Transgenic Plant Conference” in Annapolis, Maryland,
September 8-9, 1988; 2) a meeting on “Genetically Engineered Plants:
Regulatory Considerations” at the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant
Research, Ithaca, New York, October 19-21, 1987; 3) a conference on
“Pesticidal Transgenic Plants: Development, Risk Assessment, and Data Needs”,
November 6-7, 1990, and 4) a “Conference on Scientific Issues Related to
Potential Allergenicity in Transgenic Food Crops” at Annapolis, Maryland, April
18-19, 1994. In addition, the Agency has requested the advice of four scientific
advisory committees on FIFRA and FFDCA-related scientific issues. On
December 18, 1992, a Subpanel of the FIFRA Science Advisory Panel (SAP)
was convened to review a draft policy statement on plant-pesticides and
respond to a series of scientific questions posed by the EPA’s approach under
FIFRA. On July 13, 1993, a Subcommittee of the EPA Biotechnology Science
Advisory Committee (BSAC) was convened to address a series of scientific
questions primarily on the EPA’s approach under FFDCA. On January 21, 1994,
a joint meeting of the SAP/BSAC Subpanel on plant-pesticides was held to
discuss additional scientific questions. Information from these conferences
and scientific advisory committees has been used by the Agency to develop
a “points to consider” document as guidance for what data are required to
support the registration of plant-pesticides and development of the draft plant-
pesticide policy and regulations. The Agency has also provided guidance to
registrants on the elements needed for a resistance management strategy for
plant-pesticides. On March 1, 1995, a Subpanel of the FIFRA SAP was
convened to review the Agency’s risk assessment and resistance management
analysis for Bt potato (CryIIIA).
Two independent Subpanels of the FIFRA SAP met, in part, to address
resistance management of Bt crops. On December 18, 1992, a Subpanel of the
FIFRA SAP addressed the issue of development of pest resistance to pesticidal
substances produced by plants. The Subpanel felt that delaying the evolution of
resistance was very important and urged the EPA to actively assess the problem
of pesticide resistance, especially when the pesticide is part of the progression
toward use of “safer” pesticides. A third independent SAP Subpanel met
exclusively to discuss Bt plant-pesticide resistance management issues on
February 9-10, 1998. The findings of this Subpanel are discussed below.
The March 1, 1995 SAP met to discuss in part, resistance management of
Bt crops. This subpanel was in agreement with the Agency’s review of the
Monsanto plan for Bt CryIII(A) delta-endotoxin produced in potatoes and the
general elements necessary for a resistance management plan to address
resistance to Bt delta-endotoxins produced in potatoes. The Agency and the
SAP agreed that Monsanto’s resistance management strategy for the potato
variety producing the Bt CryIII(A) delta endotoxin, although adequate for
the present, should be further refined in the future as additional data become
available. Many of the specific questions with respect to monitoring for
resistance development and strategies to retard resistance development can
best be addressed when use of the potatoes producing the Bt CryIII(A) delta
endotoxin has reached commercial scale production over a period of several
years throughout potato producing regions. Refinements of resistance
management strategies are typically needed during the years of actual use of
any pesticide. Monsanto agreed to voluntarily implement the resistance
management plan for the Bt CryIII(A) delta endotoxin produced in potatoes
and has agreed to continue to voluntarily work with the Agency on refinements
to the resistance management plan as more information is gathered during
wide-scale commercial use.
Although the 1995 SAP meeting focused primarily on the review of the risk
assessment and resistance management issues for Bt potatoes, the FIFRA SAP
Subpanel also generally discussed resistant management issues for Bt corn and
Bt cotton. The Subpanel members recommended that in order to refine existing
resistance management plans, large-scale use of these plant-pesticides was
needed. The Agency agreed with this approach and is allowing such large-scale
use, with appropriate safeguards to protect against the development of
resistance, while requiring registrants to conduct research necessary to develop
acceptable long-term resistance management plans.
The Agency has raised, in general, the issue of pesticide resistance manage-
ment to its Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee (PPDC) in July 1996.
The PPDC supports the EPA’s continued efforts to protect the use of Bt foliar
pesticides and plant-pesticides. The EPA has also held two public hearings,
one on March 21, 1997 (in Washington D. C.) and the other on May 21, 1997
(College Station, Texas), to solicit comments on resistance management plans
for plant pesticides. There were four issues open for comment: 1)the require-
ment for resistance management plans, 2) scientific needs for resistance
management plans, 3) use of “public good” as a criterion for the requirement
of resistance management plans, and 4) 1996 performance of Bt cotton.
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Approximately 100 individuals/organizations submitted written comments
and/or delivered presentations regarding the subject of Bt plant-pesticide
resistance management and the four issues open for comment. Copies of the
written comments are available in the Office of Pesticide Programs public
docket, OPP-00470.
The EPA held an Office of Pesticide Programs FIFRA SAP meeting on
February 9-10, 1998 to examine the resistance management strategies for Bt
delta-endotoxins expressed in potatoes, field corn, and cotton. The Agency
published a recent analysis of the current resistance management strategies for
Bt potato, Bt field corn, and Bt cotton in a paper entitled “The Environmental
Protection Agency’s White Paper on Bt Plant-Pesticide Resistance Management”
(January 14, 1998)-(EPA, 1998a). In this paper, the Agency summarized the
findings from the March and May 1997 public hearings on Bt plant-pesticide
resistance management (OPP Docket, OPP-00470), the 1996 growing season
reports on resistance management activities for Bt potato, Bt field corn, and Bt
cotton, and 1997 research efforts for resistance management strategies (EPA,
1998a). The Agency asked the SAP Subpanel to review specific questions posed
by the EPA based on its “White Paper. “Oral and written statements were
received from approximately 20 different groups representing industry, growers
or grower groups, trade organizations, academia, and environmental groups.
The Subpanel provided the Agency with a final report of the meeting on April
28, 1998 (SAP, 1998). Copies of the written statements and the Subpanel report
can be obtained from the OPP Docket Office (OPPTS-00231). The EPA White
Paper can also be obtained electronically from the EPA Home Page at: Federal
Register—Environmental Documents—”Laws and Regulations” (http: //www.
epa. gov/fedrgstr/). A summary of the key points made in the Subpanel report
and in the White Paper will be discussed later in this article. Other SAP
meetings are planned on Bt plant-pesticide resistance management in the
next several years.
REGISTRATION OF BT PLANT-PESTICIDES: SCIENTIFIC DATA
CONSIDERATIONS
Each registered Bt plant-pesticide has undergone a determination that the
proposed use of the plant-pesticide poses no “unreasonable adverse effects”,
including a thorough review of the human health and environmental risks and
a benefit assessment. Under FIFRA section 3(c)(7), time-limited conditional
registrations have been registered during which time the company is addressing
questions that were unanswered at the time of initial application. There have
been two types of plant-pesticides approved by the EPA to date: delta-
endotoxins derived from Bt and coat proteins from plant pathogenic viruses.
In addition, five other genes termed marker genes, used to tag the desired trait
during the trait development process and carried along with the plant pesticide
genes, have been evaluated by the EPA for food safety. These products have had
safety assessments done by the EPA for both human health and environmental
effects. The basis of the assessment was an accurate characterization of the
newly introduced trait, a description of the host plant biology, and adequate
information to assess the toxicity of the expressed pesticidal compound to
humans and exposed non-target species. A summary of all of the science review
findings and regulatory management conclusions for each of the registered Bt
plant-pesticides is found in the EPA Pesticide FACT sheets (EPA 1995a, b, c,
1996a, b, 1997, 1998b, c, d).
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ACTIVE INGREDIENT
Fundamental to the EPA’s risk assessment of the Bt plant-pesticides was a
thorough description of these plant-pesticides including the source of the
inserted sequences necessary to produce the pesticidal substance and any
novel proteins encoded by this introduced genetic material. For the individual
delta-endotoxins, a great deal of historical information was available to the EPA
due to the numerous registered microbial products known to contain such
endotoxins. However, the companies were required to verify that the inserted
DNA did, in fact, code for the toxins claimed and that these plant-expressed
toxins were similar to those found in the microbial products. This similarity
analysis was done using standard protein biochemistry analyses such as amino
acid sequencing, immunological recognition as well as biological activity
against target pests. Additionally, the expression of the pesticidal substance
was determined for various tissues at different maturities. Since the pesticidal
substances and associated proteins were adequately characterized, a reasonable
prediction of the type of data necessary to evaluate potential risks for
mammalian and environmental effects was proposed.
HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT
Dietary consumption was determined to be the predominant route of exposure
to humans and domestic animals for the crops engineered to express these
pesticidal substances. For crops producing proteinaceous pesticidal substances,
mammalian toxicology was assessed by acute oral studies in the rodent. If
significant prior human dietary exposure to the plant-pesticide could be
documented, some acute mammalian toxicology studies were waived. When
required, these acute oral studies in rodents were done with high doses of a
purified test material such as 2-5gm/kg bodyweight. No abnormalities were
seen in any tests done with the plant-pesticidal substances or related com-
pounds examined to date. The EPA also assessed information provided to
indicate the introduced traits were not responsible for a food allergy. This
information included a screen for amino acid homology to known food
allergens and an in vitro digestibility assay in artificial digestive fluids to
address the potential for a protein to persist in dietary exposure and possibly
induce food allergy or other toxicity. For all the pesticidal traits seen to date,
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the lack of mammalian toxicity has justified an exemption from the require-
ment for a food tolerance as required by the EPA’s responsibility under FFDCA.
ENVIRONMENTAL FATE AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
Ecological nontarget data needs are driven by exposure to the plant-pesticide.
The pesticidal active ingredient (e. g., the Bt delta-endotoxin and the genetic
material necessary for its production) is contained only within certain plant
parts of the crop plant into which it has been genetically engineered. This
means that nontarget organisms will only have a minimal exposure to the
pesticidal active ingredient. This type of exposure situation is quite different
from that associated with spray applications of pesticides. Exposure of
nontarget organisms to plant pesticides would occur primarily when wildlife
feed on plants expressing the pesticidal substance or if sexual transfer of the
new trait(s) to nontarget wild/weedy relatives occurs by cross-pollination.
Therefore, the ecological effects data are based on the expected exposure of
non-target species to the plant-pesticide and by geographical use considerations
based on the proximity to related cultivars or weedy relatives that can cross-
pollinate with plants expressing the pesticidal substance. This amounts to a
case-by-case analysis. Each risk assessment is made from an analysis of the
properties of the engineered organism and its target environment, i.e. on
the nature of the gene being introduced, the plant receiving the gene, the
environment where the plant will be grown, and the species susceptible to the
effects of the introduced gene. The degree of scrutiny depends on the type of
gene product, i.e. the protein or the product of metabolic pathway more akin
to conventional chemicals, and the intended mode of action. Protein products
are not expected to pose much, if any, nontarget hazard outside of living plant
tissue, while chemical compounds may be more resistant to degradation, more
toxic, and have a broader exposure.
For environmental effects, the EPA has examined the toxicity of the plant-
pesticidal traits in plant tissue to non-target organisms. The specific non-target
organisms tested were chosen as indicators of potential environmental effects
and are similar to those examined for microbial or biochemical pesticides. The
choice of appropriate indicator organisms for testing was based on the potential
exposure from data on plant-pesticide expression in the engineered plant. Trait
expression data are used to predict exposures for target organisms that may
impinge on resistance management decisions. For Bt plant-pesticides, the EPA
has examined the toxicity of the pesticidal substance to birds, fish, honeybees
and certain other beneficial insects. Among the beneficial species, data on
Collembola and earthworm species may be required if crop residue exposure is
a possibility. In the honeybee study, effect studies on immature individuals as
well as adults may be required if exposure to the Bt delta-endotoxin in pollen
is expected. The Agency has examined the environmental fate endpoints
regarding the movement and expression of the gene trait in other plant species
(biological fate) and persistence of the pesticidal product in the environment
(chemical fate). Specifically the environmental fate endpoints are: a) gene
product (chemical) persistence and movement in the environment, b) potential
for the genetically engineered plant to survive outside of cultivation and
become a weed (i.e. weediness potential), and c) potential for the introduced
genetic trait to confer a selective advantage to a wild relative (i.e. outcrossing
potential and ecosystem disruption). Data on the toxicity of the gene product to
nontarget insects are required when the proposed use pattern indicates that
insect predators and/or parasites may be exposed to the pesticide. Appropriate
test species should be chosen based on the ecosystem where the plant-pesticide
will be used.
THE EPA’S REVIEW OF BT-PLANT-PESTICIDE RESISTANCE
MANAGEMENT
With a greater focus on pollution prevention and pesticide risk reduction, the
EPA believes that it is important to implement effective resistance management
strategies for pesticides such as Bt plant-pesticides. Bt plant-pesticides and Bt
microbial pesticides are recognized as safer pest control resources and are part
of the “public good.”A great deal of Agency attention has focused on the
potential development of resistance to the delta-endotoxins of Bt genetically-
engineered into plants (Bt plant-pesticides). This is because Bt plant-pesticides
produce the pesticidal active ingredient, the Bt delta-endotoxin(s), throughout
the growing season. Long-term exposure to a pesticide is one of the factors that
increases the potential selection pressures upon both the target pests and any
other susceptible insects feeding on the transformed crop. The EPA recognizes
the value of Bt plant-pesticides as effective and safer pest management tools
and has determined it is appropriate to conserve this resource by requiring
resistance management plans for certain transformed crops. In addition to Bt
delta-endotoxins being used in plant-pesticides, they are also widely used in
a variety of Bt microbial spray products on many crops. Because the high
benefits of using Bt plant-pesticides could be diminished by the development
of resistance to individual Bt plant-pesticides and the threat cross-resistance
poses to Bt microbial pesticides, the Agency has requested that all registrants
for Bt plant-pesticides voluntarily submit pesticide resistance management
strategies as part of the registration submission.
The Agency identified seven elements that should be addressed in a Bt plant-
pesticide resistance management plan (Matten and Lewis, 1995). These
elements are: 1) knowledge of pest biology and ecology, 2) appropriate dose
expression strategy, 3) appropriate refugia (primarily for insecticides), 4)
monitoring and reporting of incidents of pesticide resistance development, 5)
employment of IPM, 6) communication and educational strategies on use of the
product, and 7) development of alternative modes of action. These elements
were presented to the March 1, 1995 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Science Advisory Panel (SAP) Subpanel on Plant-
Pesticides. The SAP Subpanel approved of these seven factors (SAP, 1995; see
Office of Pesticide Program (OPP) docket, OPP-00401). These elements are
discussed in more detail in Matten et al. (1996) and EPA White Paper on Bt
plant-pesticide resistance management (1998a). All registrants of Bt plant-
pesticides voluntarily submitted Bt plant-pesticide insect resistance
management strategies to the Agency for Bt delta-endotoxins produced in
potato (Bt potato); field corn (Bt corn), sweet corn (Bt sweet corn), and
popcorn (Bt popcorn); and cotton (Bt cotton). When necessary, the Agency
made certain recommendations and requirements of registration for data to
develop and implement long-term resistance management strategies as part of
the registration decisions. The Agency’s reviews of the resistance management
strategies for registered Bt plant-pesticides are summarized in the EPA Pesticide
FACT sheets (EPA 1995a, b, c, 1996 a, b, 1997, 1998 b, c, d).
In May 1995, the Agency registered the CryIIIA delta-endotoxin and the
genetic material necessary for its production in potato (Bt potato). Following
the advice of the March 1, 1995 SAP Subpanel, a resistance management plan
for Monsanto/Naturemark’s Bt potato was voluntary rather than mandatory. EPA
and Monsanto/Naturemark have worked together on the development and
implementation of appropriate long-term resistance management following the
registration of Bt potatoes in 1995. Monsanto/Naturemark requires growers to
sign a Grower Agreement to use the technology. The Grower Agreement
specifies that each grower must follow a mandatory structured refuge. The
original Bt potato resistance management strategy has been refined as more
data became available.
The Agency mandated specific resistance management data requirements and
mitigation measures with a resistance management strategy for all of the Bt corn
and Bt cotton registrations. Registrations for Bt corn plant-pesticide products
expire April 1, 2001 and the registration for Bt cotton plant-pesticide products
expire January 1, 2001. These registrations were conditional to allow, in part,
for completion of the studies related to resistance management. Collection of
various data, e. g. , target pest biology and behavior, secondary pest biology and
behavior, population dynamics, cross-resistance potential, refuge strategies,
dose deployment adequacy, baseline susceptibility, discriminating concentra-
tion, monitoring, and reporting were made conditions of registration for the Bt
corn and Bt cotton registrations. Refuge requirements were mandatory for Bt
cotton. Development of draft refuge options by August 1998, a final refuges
strategy by January 1999 with implementation by April 1, 2001were required
of Bt corn registrations. As part of the terms and conditions of registration, the
EPA will reevaluate the effectiveness of each registrant’s resistance management
plan before the expiration date and decide on whether to convert the
registration to a non-expiring registration.
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The Agency registered the use of CryIA(b) in sweet corn (Bt sweet corn) and
popcorn (Bt popcorn) in March 1998. Specific monitoring and sales reporting
were made requirements of the Bt sweet corn registration. No specific refuge
requirements were mandated for Bt sweet corn (Event BT 11) because
harvesting occurs before insects mature, approximately 21 days after silking.
Growers are instructed in all labeling and technical material to destroy any
CryIA(b) sweet corn silks that remain in the fields following harvest or within a
short period of time (a maximum of one month) later in accordance with local
production practices. Stalk destruction will help reduce the possibility of larvae
surviving to the next generation. The Bt sweet corn registration expires April 1,
2001. The Agency mandated specific refuge requirements on the use of Bt
popcorn (Event 176) based on the USDA NC-205 recommendations (Ostlie et
al. , 1997). Specifically, a 20-30 percent unsprayed or 40 percent sprayed non-Bt
corn structured refuge in close proximity to Bt corn is required. Spraying with
pesticides reduces the effectiveness of the refuge. The refuge must be
established within 0.5 miles of the Bt corn. Specific monitoring and sales
reporting requirements were also made for the Bt popcorn registration.
All previous data required for Bt field corn were also required for Bt popcorn.
The Bt (Event 176) field corn and popcorn registrations expire April 1, 2001.
The Agency registered the use of Cry9(c) field corn in May, 1998. This is a
one-year registration for 120,000 acres for animal feed, industrial non-food,
and seed increase uses expiring on May 30, 1999. EPA mandated specific refuge
requirements based on the USDA NC-205 recommendations (Ostlie et al.,
1997). Specifically, a 25 percent unsprayed or 40 percent sprayed non-Bt corn
structured refuge must be planted within 1500-2000 feet of Bt corn. Because
of the one-year duration of this registration, only sales reporting and grower
education are required as part of this registration. Additional resistance
management factors must be addressed for a full commercial registration.
All stakeholders are concerned with how the EPA regulates resistance
management for Bt plant-pesticides. Scientifically sound long-term resistance
management strategies are essential to the survival of Bt plant-pesticides,
maintaining the effectiveness of Bt microbial pesticides, and reduction in the
risks from the use of chemical pesticides. The EPA is continuing to evaluate and
refine how it regulates resistance management of Bt plant-pesticides. The EPA
has worked and is working with stakeholders (industry, extension and research
entomologists and other academic scientists, USDA, individual growers, user
groups, trade organization, public interest groups, and government agencies) to
address long-term resistance management strategies for Bt plant-pesticides.
THE EPA WHITE PAPER ON BT PLANT-PESTICIDE RESISTANCE
MANAGEMENT
As noted earlier, the EPA published a recent analysis of the current resistance
management strategies for Bt potato, Bt field corn, and Bt cotton in a paper
entitled “The Environmental Protection Agency’s White Paper on Bt Plant-
Pesticide Resistance Management” (EPA, 1998a). A summary of the EPA’s White
Paper is provided below.
WHITE PAPER SUMMARY
Since Bt plant-pesticides became commercially available in 1996, growers have
adopted this technology as part of their Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
practices to control pests in potato, corn, and cotton. Based on industry reports
sent to the EPA, the greatest adoption of Bt crop technology has been by cotton
growers, especially in the southeastern United States in 1996, with about 13
percent of the cotton acreage, 1. 8 million acres, and an estimated 2.2 to 2.4
million acres in 1997 planted in Bt cotton. Corn growers planted about 400,000
acres of Bt corn in 30 states in 1996 and an estimated four million acres in
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TABLE 1. REGISTERED BT PLANT-PESTICIDES AND ACTIONS PENDING
Events/ Year Registered Expiration Date Toxin Crop Company(s)
Products
New Leaf® May 1995 None Cry IIIA Potato NaturMark/
Monsanto
Bollgard™ October 1995 January 2001 Cry IA (c) Cotton Monsanto
Event 176 August 1995 April 2001 Cry I(A)b Field Corn Novartis Seeds
and Mycogen
Corporation
Event 176 March 1998 April 2001 Cry I(A)b Popcorn Novartis Seeds
BT11 October 1996 April 2001 Cry I(A)b Field Corn Novartis Seeds
BT11 March 1998 April 2001 Cry I(A)b Sweet Corn Novartis Seeds
MON810 December 1996 April 2001 Cry I(A)b Field Corn Monsanto
DBT-418 March 1997 April 2001 Cry IA (c) Field Corn DeKalb
Genetics
Corporation
CBH-351 May 1998 May 1999 Cry 9(c) Field Corn AgrEvo/PGS
1997. Potato growers planted about 10,000 acres of Bt potato in 1996 and an
estimated 25,000 acres in 1997. The differences in the rate of adoption of Bt
potato, Bt corn, and Bt cotton are likely due, in part, to the availability of
effective alternatives, the cost of the biotechnology crop, extent of regional pest
problems, and familiarity and acceptance of the technology by growers. For
example, there are several insecticide alternatives for control of Colorado potato
beetle. The cost of and lack of familiarity with the technology and type of
hybrids available may have discouraged a wider adoption by corn growers in
the first years of commercialization. The adoption rate for Bt cotton was
especially high for a new technology because few, if any, effective alternatives
existed to control tobacco budworm (Heliothis virescens (Fabricius), TBW) in
cotton especially where insect resistance to registered conventional pesticides
was extremely high in states such as Mississippi and Alabama.
No evidence exists that resistance to Bt delta-endotoxins expressed in
transgenic potato, corn, or cotton has developed in the 1996 or 1997 growing
season. Monitoring for changes in susceptibility to the different registered Cry
proteins, CryI(A)b, CryI(A)c, and CryIIIA, has been conducted for TBW,
Colorado potato beetle (Leptinotarsa decemlineata (Say), CPB), European corn
borer (Orsinia nubilalis (Habner), ECB), cotton bollworm (Helicoverpa zea
(Boddie), CBW), and pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiella (Saunders),
PBW). Baseline susceptibility studies show a wide-range of variability, so it is
important to look at susceptibility changes in the context of the baseline range
for a particular geographic location of the pest (i. e., different portions of a
state). No changes in baseline susceptibility have been detected for any of the
target insects exposed to the Bt delta-endotoxins expressed in Bt potato, Bt
corn, and Bt cotton. This information indicates that there has been no measured
increase in tolerance to date to the Bt delta-endotoxins expressed in potato,
field corn, and cotton.
Toxin-tolerant colonies of CPB, ECB, TBW, CBW, and PBW have been created
in the laboratory through selection against purified Cry proteins or mixtures of
Cry proteins using Bt microbial pesticides. The ability of insects to develop high
levels of tolerance to Bt in the laboratory indicates that these insects possess the
genetic potential to develop resistance to Cry delta-endotoxins expressed as Bt
plant-pesticides. Laboratory-tolerant colonies are useful to study the genetics
and biochemistry of resistance of possible resistance mechanisms that may exist
in the field. It is unlikely that laboratory selective procedures provide the
identical selective conditions that exist in the field. The ability to select for
tolerance to Cry proteins in the laboratory in different insect pests indicates
that it is prudent to use appropriate resistance management strategies.
In 1996, cotton bollworm populations were the highest seen in ten years in
parts of the Cotton belt (i. e., Brazos Valley, Texas, Mid-South and Southeast
growing regions). Monsanto reported to the Agency the potential Bt cotton
control failures as early as July, 1996, and followed up with a full analysis of
these incidents in the fall of 1996. Monsanto performed studies in all Bt cotton
areas affected by high CBW infestations to determine whether CBW susceptibil-
ity to the CryI(A)c toxin had changed, whether the Bt cotton was expressing
the CryI(A)c, and whether the CryI(A)c expression levels and patterns had
changed. Monsanto also provided the results of these studies in its 1996 annual
report on resistance monitoring activities. Results of these studies indicate that
there was no change in CBW susceptibility and no change in Bt expression in
the Bt cotton areas affected by high cotton bollworm infestations. These studies
indicated no detectable level of resistance in these populations. Unusually high
infestation levels of CBW may have, in part, resulted from the dramatic increase
in corn acreage in the South. In addition, CBW has a lower sensitivity (about
25-fold lower) to the CryI(A)c delta-endotoxin relative to TBW and PBW.
Scouting detected CBW larvae lower in the plant canopy of Bt cotton than
expected and, in some cases, supplemental chemical insecticides were used
to control CBW. The fact that supplemental insecticides might be necessary
to control unusually high CBW infestations was not unexpected and was
considered in the Agency’s review of the initial resistance management strategy
for Bt cotton. Modifications to the CBW scouting program for Bt cotton were
made for the 1997 season to improve detection of the CBW larvae which might
escape the Bt delta-endotoxin by feeding on blooms and bloom tags that are
lower in the cotton plant.
The vast majority of cotton growers complied with the structured refuge
requirements. Cotton growers seem to prefer the 20 percent sprayed refuge
option that allows them to treat the refuge with chemical insecticides normally
used to control TBW, CBW, and PBW (except for Bt microbial pesticides). This
option appears to provide a higher yield in the refuge acreage than the four
percent unsprayed refuge option that often had higher management costs and
lower yields. Most cotton researchers, who commented at the two public
hearings held in March and May 1997, favored the 20 percent structured refuge
as a better strategy for Bt cotton resistance management. They believed that
this refuge option is more likely to provide a greater percentage of susceptible
insects throughout the growing season to mate with any rare resistant
individuals that might survive in the Bt cotton fields. The EPA received
comments that the four percent unsprayed refuge was decimated early in the
growing season so that there were few, if any, adult moths surviving to mate
with any resistant insects that survived in the Bt cotton fields later in the
growing season. The EPA believed that during the first five years following the
first complete growing season in 1996, there would not be enough Bt corn
acreage to provide substantial Bt selection pressure for the development of ECB
resistance. Consequently, the EPA did not mandate specific refuge requirements
for Bt corn, but the EPA has required research data on the size, structure, and
deployment of a structured refuge. A combination of temporal and structured
refuges is being studied. A draft refuge strategy must be submitted to the
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Agency by August, 1998, and a final refuge strategy is required to be submitted
by January, 1999. Implementation of an EPA-approved structured refuge plan or
an EPA-approved alternative resistance plan is required no later than April 1,
2001. Monsanto and Dekalb are requiring structured refuges, either a five
percent unsprayed or 20 percent sprayed structured refuge, as part of grower
agreements. Beginning in the 1998 growing season, Novartis Seeds has adopted
the NC-205 consortium’s recommendations published in NCR-602 publication
entitled “Bt Corn & European Corn Borer - Long Term Success Through
Resistance Management” (Ostlie et al., 1997). As noted earlier, the NC-205
recommended a 20-30 percent structured non-Bt corn refuge to prevent Bt
delta-endotoxin exposure to 20-30 percent of the larval populations. They
also recommended that in continuous corn acreage sprayed with insecticides,
the refuge size would be increased to 40 percent to compensate for larval
mortality. In addition, a smaller refuge size may also be suitable if there
are many alternate hosts providing adequate numbers of susceptible ECB.
Mycogen has not made any specific refuge recommendations in its Grower
Guide, but is supportive of the use of refuges and supportive of the NC-205
recommendations.
Monsanto/Naturemark requires a structured refuge as part of grower
agreements for use of Bt potato. The EPA has required that Monsanto mandate
specific refuge requirements as a condition of registration for Bt cotton, either a
four- percent unsprayed or 20 percent sprayed structured refuge. Monsanto has
implemented these refuge requirements through a grower agreement. Research
is underway to study whether in-field narrow strip refuges or mixed Bt cotton/
non-Bt cotton seed mix options are viable for PBW resistance management
because of the limited larval movement. Based on Monsanto’s reports to the
Agency, there has been a high level of compliance with a structured refuge in
Bt cotton and Bt potato. The EPA is encouraged by reports of a tremendous
reduction in the use of conventional insecticides that has resulted from
adoption of Bt cotton (i.e., 250 thousand gallons of formulated product).
A great deal of research is underway to study the elements that are necessary
for long- term resistance management strategies for Bt potato, Bt corn, and Bt
cotton. Specific research data were required as part of the Bt corn and Bt cotton
conditional registrations and was recommended for the Bt potato registration.
These data included: the dosage effectiveness on the target pest(s), monitoring
data including baseline susceptibility and validation of the diagnostic dose
concentration, pest biology and ecology, influence of the Bt crop on secondary
lepidopteran pests, the impact of CryIA(b)/CryIA(c) produced in Bt corn on the
selection of CEW/CBW resistance in Bt corn and Bt cotton, impact of Bt on
CEW overwintering survival and fecundity, effective refuges, alternate hosts as
refuges, and cross-resistance potential. Additionally, alternative pest control
strategies and integration into existing IPM programs are being examined for
each of the Bt plant-pesticides. All of these data will provide the basis for
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specific improvements to the existing resistance management strategies. Future
information is especially important for understanding the selection of CEW/
CBW resistance in overlapping Bt corn and Bt cotton regions of the southern
United States. This is because CEW/CBW usually moves from silking corn
to cotton, has multiple generations per year, and overwinters in the South.
Exposure to Cry delta-endotoxins produced in both Bt corn and Bt cotton in
two or more generations per year could rapidly accelerate development of
resistance. Research results and predictive models studying this situation are
expected to be submitted to the Agency in 1998.
SCIENCE ADVISORY PANEL REVIEW OF EPA’S WHITE PAPER
The Agency asked the February 9-10, 1998 OPP FIFRA Science Advisory
Panel Subpanel on Bt plant-pesticide resistance management to review specific
questions posed by the EPA based on its “White Paper” (EPA, 1998a) on Bt
plant-pesticide resistance management strategies for Bt potato, Bt corn, and Bt
cotton. Oral and written statements were received from approximately 20
different groups representing industry, growers or grower groups, trade
organizations, academia, and environmental groups. The Subpanel provided
the Agency with a final report of the meeting on April 28, 1998 (SAP, 1998).
Copies of the written statements and the Subpanel report can be obtained from
the OPP Docket Office (OPPTS-00231). The Subpanel’s report can also be
obtained electronically. A brief summary of key points made in the Subpanel
report is provided below. The Subpanel agreed with the EPA that the wide-
spread use of crops that express Bt insecticides is in the public good by
providing additional pest control options to producers and by reducing the
use of conventional pesticides. The Subpanel also agreed with the EPA that
appropriate resistance management is necessary to suppress the emergence of
insect resistant to Bt toxins expressed in transgenic crop plants. The Subpanel
recognized that resistance management programs should be based on the use
of both high dose expression levels and structured refuges designed to provide
sufficient numbers of susceptible adult insects with a minimum of economic
impact on producers. Resistance management strategies should be sustainable
and to the extent possible, strongly consider grower acceptable and logistical
feasibility. The Subpanel made the following overall recommendations and
conclusions: a) EPA should require the use of structured refuges in all
registrations of Bt crops (unless proven to be harmful), b) a refuge/high dose
strategy is needed to delay the development of resistance for targeted pests, c)
precision of research models is good for evaluating refuge options, but is
limited in establishing specific refuge options, d) the EPA should establish
regional working groups for specific implementation of resistance management
strategies for each of the major Bt crop producing regions, e)grower participa-
tion is the key factor for successful implementation of a resistance management
strategy, and f) regulatory strategies should serve growers with a sustainable
approach to resistance management that encourages compliance with a
resistance management strategies. The Subpanel defined a high dose as 25
times the amount of Bt delta-endotoxin necessary to kill susceptible individu-
als. A cultivar could be considered to provide a high dose if verified by at least
two of the following five approaches: 1) Serial dilution bioassay with artificial
diet containing lyophilized tissues of Bt plants using tissues from non-Bt plants
as controls; 2) bioassays using plant lines with expression levels approximately
25-fold lower than the commercial cultivar determined by quantitative ELISA
or some more reliable technique; 3) survey large numbers of commercial plants
in the field to make sure that the cultivar is at the LD99.9 or higher to assure
that 95 percent of heterozygotes would be killed (see Andow and Hutchison,
1998); 4) similar to (3) above, but would use controlled infestation with a
laboratory strain of the pest that had an LD50 value similar to field strains; and
5) determine if a later larval instar of the targeted pest could be found with an
LD50 that was about 25-fold higher than that of the neonate larvae. If so, the
stage could be tested on the Bt crop plants to determine if 95 percent or more
of the later stage larvae were killed.
The Subpanel defined structured refuges to “include all suitable non-Bt host
plants for a targeted pest that are planted and managed by people. These
refuges could be planted to offer refuges at the same time when the Bt crops
are available to the pests or at times when the Bt crops are not available. “The
Subpanel stated that a good resistance management strategy should provide
efficacy of the toxin(s) for more than 10 years. The Subpanel suggested that a
production of 500 susceptible adults in the refuge that move into the transgenic
fields for every adult in the transgenic crop area (assuming a resistance allele
frequency of 5 X10-2) would be a suitable goal. The placement and size of the
structured refuge employed should be based on the current understanding of
the pest biology data and the technology.
MONITORING FOR BT PLANT-PESTICIDE RESISTANCE
The EPA currently mandates that both baseline susceptibility and a discriminat-
ing concentration be developed for each labeled target pest for Bt corn and Bt
cotton registrations (see EPA 1995b, c, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998b, c, d).
Monsanto/Naturemark voluntarily instituted a monitoring program for Bt
potato. If a discriminating concentration assay is unavailable then the registrant
must proceed with efforts to develop discriminating concentrations assays for
these target pests and ensure that monitoring studies are conducted annually
to determine the susceptibility of all the labeled target pests to the Bt plant-
pesticide. The resistance-monitoring program is being developed to measure
increased tolerance to Bt plant-pesticides above regional/state/local baseline
ranges. The results of the baseline susceptibility and monitoring studies must
be communicated to the Agency on an annual basis, by January 31 of the year
following the population collections for a given growing season. These annual
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reports must also describe progress towards development of a discriminating
dose assay for each target pest. These current requirements provide the Agency
with standardized information to determine whether resistance evolution is
occurring. However, there are additional monitoring techniques, other than
the discriminating concentration assay, which may be more aggressive to
proactively determine whether resistance is developing such as a F2 screen
(Andow and Alstad, 1998, Andow et al., 1998), in-field surveys including
sentinel plots, screening against test stocks (see Gould et al., 1997). The SAP
Subpanel report (SAP, 1998) provides a more detailed discussion of available
monitoring techniques.
NEXT STEPS
The EPA is reviewing the Subpanel report and other materials submitted as a
result of the February 9-10, 1998 SAP Subpanel Meeting. This information
will contribute to how EPA continues to evaluate and refine its regulation of
resistance management for Bt plant-pesticides.
The EPA will continue to work with stakeholders from industry, Extension
and research entomologists and other academic scientists, user groups, trade
organizations, public interest groups, and government agencies to address long-
term resistance management for Bt plant-pesticides.
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When discussing matters of the environment, private industry is often falsely
portrayed by some environmental groups as an enemy of our ecosystem. I am
here today, as a representative of the agri-business industry, to address concerns
of agricultural biotechnology and its impact on the environment, particularly
the concerns surrounding the environmental impact of gene escape from
transgenic plants to wild plants and the development of resistance by pests to
genetically altered hosts.
For the past decade I have served as the president of Delta and Pine Land
Company (D&PL). D&PL is a breeder, developer, and marketer of cotton and
soybean planting seed. We’re based in Scott, MS, which is in the heart of the
Mississippi Delta. Our Company comprises three seed companies: Deltapine
Seed, also based in Scott; Paymaster Cottonseed, based in Lubbock, TX, and
Sure Grow Seed, based in Centre, AL. Our international division, D&PL
International, is headquartered in Scott, as well. Through these divisions,
D&PL provides seed varieties that currently plant more than 70 percent of US
cotton acreage and 10 percent of Southern US soybean acreage.
Delta and Pine Land Company became a provider of biotechnology in 1996
when we, in conjunction with Monsanto, introduced one of the first successful
transgenic crops to the United States and the world. The crop was a variety of
cotton called NuCOTN 33B. This variety contains a Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis)
gene that controls the bollworm and tobacco budworm, and pink bollworm
pests that have historically plagued cotton farmers. Other seed companies have
incorporated Bt genes into corn and potatoes.
In 1997, D&PL and Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready® cotton to the
marketplace, and in 1998 we followed with our commercial introduction of
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Roundup Ready® soybeans. Roundup Ready® has expanded farmers’ options for
weed control by allowing them to spray Roundup herbicide over the top of
their crops, which does not damage the cotton or soybean plant when
appropriately applied. This technology offers significant advantages to our
farmers who experience weed problems.
As a participant in the delivery system for genetically enhanced crops, D&PL
supports biotechnology as a means to better serve our customers and to
improve farming practices that will benefit the farmer and the environment.
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Bt “in-plant” pesticide is a highly effective product that enables our customers
to lower their costs and improve the efficiency of their operations. By providing
Bt cotton to our customers, we are enabling them to increase the success of
their farming operations. Farmers have enthusiastically welcomed the
introduction of insect-resistant cotton because of its effective pest control
and its ability to reduce costs. In 1996, for example, an Arizona farmer planted
40 percent of his acreage to Bt cotton. This farmer described his experience as
both outstanding and incredible. Not only were his costs $100 per acre less for
Bt (including the technology fee) than for conventional cotton, but his yields
averaged one bale more per acre for Bt than for conventional cotton.
In addition to having no pink bollworm or other bollworm activity in his Bt
cotton, this Arizona grower did not need to spray for other pests. Neither the
whitefly nor lygus reached levels that would trigger treatment according to
University of Arizona guidelines. Beneficials, particularly spiders, were present
in high numbers in this case and played an important role in reducing the
numbers of insect pests.
Bt cotton offers cost saving benefits, and has been found by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to be safe to humans and the environment
and to offer many environmental benefits. Because the insect control agent
is contained within the plant, traditional exposure of the environment and
of workers to these pesticides during mixing, loading, and application is
eliminated. The use of transgenic Bt crops can also reduce the environmental
loading of conventional insecticides. Transgenic Bt also eliminates problems
associated with the use of spray materials, including the exposure of nontarget
sites.
In 1996, Bollgard cotton was planted on 42 percent of the Mississippi cotton
acres. End of season surveys indicated Bollgard fields received an average of less
than one pesticide treatment per field for bollworm and budworm control
compared to 3.05 treatments per field for conventional cotton. In 1996,
transgenic cotton reduced conventional pesticide application by 250,000
gallons. An additional environmental benefit is that the Bt protein does not
persist in the plant residue and degrades rapidly, unlike conventional pesticides.
In 1996, 77 percent of Alabama’s 560,000 cotton acres were planted to
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Bollgard cotton. An Extension entomologist noted that Alabama went from the
worst year on record for cotton insect losses (more than $41 million) in 1995,
to in 1996, the lowest amount of insecticide applications and usage since the
introduction of synthetic insecticide in the 1940s. Less than 20 percent of the
total cotton acreage in Alabama received any foliar insecticides in 1996. Less
than 10 percent of the Bt acreage was treated a single time. Most of this was in
the Gulf Coast region where plant bug sprays had suppressed beneficials and
fall armyworm populations were heaviest. By reducing the amount of pesticides
applied to cotton acreage, biotechnology is providing immediate and ongoing
benefits to the environment.
Roundup Ready®— Currently, Roundup Ready® herbicide tolerance genes are
in approximately 35 percent of US cotton acreage with the potential to reach 95
percent of US cotton acreage. Herbicide-tolerant genes currently make up about
15 percent of US soybean acreage, with the potential to reach the same level of
US market coverage as herbicide-tolerant cotton. As previously stated, Roundup
Ready® cotton and soybeans have been popular with farmers because of the
advantages they offer for weed control and crop management improvements.
As with the environmental benefits of Bt, herbicide tolerance allows many
farmers to use smaller amounts of chemicals in their crops. Therefore, a
reduced amount of chemicals is introduced into the environment.
Roundup Ready® varieties also assist with conservation tillage in controlling
soil erosion. Soil erosion due to wind and water create environmental and
agricultural sustainability issues. When water runs off from agricultural land
it carries soil and nutrients with it. This movement can “silt” streams, and
nutrients support increased algae growth. Loss of topsoil from the land
decreases its productivity. Conservation tillage leaves plant residue on the
surface to protect soils from wind erosion and provides greater infiltration of
rainwater thus decreasing runoff.
While conservator tillage has been a noble objective, adoption has been
complicated by a lack of options for weed control. Herbicide tolerant varieties
developed through molecular biology provide a tool that makes conservation
tillage more feasible. In 1997, 109.8 million (37 percent) of US cropland acres
were planted using conservation tillage. Experts expect the trend toward
minimum-till and no-till farming to continue at an accelerated pace with the
availability of herbicide tolerant cotton, soybeans, and corn.
According to scientific studies, Roundup should be a preferred herbicide in
the environment for several reasons. It provides broad-spectrum, nonselective,
postemergence effective weed control on a broad range of weeds. It does not
move in water due to strong binding with soil. It produces no solid residues. It
rapidly degrades to carbon dioxide, water and soil nutrients. It is essentially
nontoxic to mammals, birds, fish, insects, and most bacteria. It has also had
extensive use around the world since 1974, and has not induced Roundup
herbicide-resistant weeds.
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Certain environmental groups are of the opinion that the biotechnology used by
our industry is harmful to the environment. Delta and Pine Land Company, as
well as our partners in biotechnology, disagree with this opinion. According to
the American Crop Protection Association, there is no credible scientific
evidence to date showing that Bt plant pesticides pose a risk of adverse effects
to humans or other organisms, or that in-field uses have increased insect
resistance. Nor can the mere potential for resistance development be equated
with an “unreasonable adverse effect on the environment,” as has been claimed.
As a provider of biotechnology to the marketplace, we accept the responsi-
bilities that accompany this position. We follow the standards and regulations
set forth by the EPA, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate biotechnology. We cooperate fully
with these organizations and trust them to set forth regulations that are based
upon credible scientific evidence.
Pesticide Resistance — Members of the agri-business community are
concerned about the potential for pests to eventually develop a resistance to Bt.
We are following the EPA’s recommendations regarding pest resistance
management to help control this potential risk. The EPA has concluded that the
use of resistance management programs is an effective means of deterring the
development of resistance to transgenic Bt plant pesticides and that the
potential for resistance to development is not a significant current threat to the
environment. In The Environmental Protection Agency’s White Paper on Bt Plant-
pesticide Resistance Management published January 14, 1998, the EPA states
that: “The EPA recognizes the value of Bt plant-pesticides as effective and safer
pest management tools and has determined it is appropriate to conserve this
resource by requiring resistance management plans for certain transformed
crops.” We agree with the EPA in that Bt plant pesticide products are likely to
be beneficial by reducing the total pesticide burden on the environment and
reducing the overall human and environmental exposure to pesticides. We also
support the EPA’s recommendation for pesticide resistance management,
appropriate pesticide labeling, and education programs as a means to control
possible environmental risks that could result from biotechnology being
introduced to the environment.
Gene Escape — The probability of gene escape, meaning the escape of
transgenic genes into wild plants, is another topic debated by industry,
academics, and environmentalists. Again, we base our opinion on this issue
on recommendations supported by scientific evidence.
Despite the commercial approval of 25 transgenic crops in the United States
as of mid-1996, concern is still being expressed regarding the potential risks
associated with genetically engineered crops. One recurring issue is the
possibility of pollen-mediated escape of engineered genes into populations
of wild relatives of the crop. To address this concern, the scientific community
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has depended on literature on pollen dispersal generated from non-transgenic
organisms. Utilization of this information requires the assumption that the
pollen mediated movement of native genes and transgenes is the same. Studies
have indeed shown that dispersal of the native genes and transgene into non-
contiguous plots was identical, and if gene flow were to occur that it would
happen slowly and at a low probability under natural optimal conditions.
Another study conducted in Australia found that only a remote possibility
exists of transgenes from genetically engineered cultivars passing into natural
populations. To date, studies such as these suggest gene escape is not currently
the prevailing concern that many groups consider it to be. Industry members
are cautious in our development and delivery of biotechnology, and we believe
biotechnology to be a benefit to our customers and the environment.
TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION SYSTEM
Through biotechnology, we are developing tools to address the issue of
management of gene movement. Transformation of the chloroplast DNA is
one method being proposed. In most plant species, chloroplasts are maternally
inherited and cannot be passed on through the pollen.
Delta and Pine Land Company, along with the USDA, has been awarded a
patent for a Technology Protection System. The patent broadly covers all
species of plants and seed, both transgenic and conventional, for a system
designed to allow control of progeny seed viability without harming the crop.
The principal application of this technology will be to control unauthorized
planting of seed of proprietary varieties by making such practice non-economic.
However, the system may have other benefits such as controlling pollen-
mediated escape of engineered genes.
The system works as follows: Varieties developed incorporating this
technology will produce a normal crop when planted in the first growing
season. However, seed produced from this system in the second generation
will not germinate and would be useless for planting. Therefore, if transgenic
traits were to be transferred to a conventional plant, that plant would not
reproduce as a result of this technology protection system.
STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS
The agricultural industry participating in the biotechnology movement is
faced with many responsibilities that accompany our voluntary position in
the marketplace. The question we ask ourselves is not if we will accept these
responsibilities but how. As I stated before, we work in full cooperation with
the EPA and the USDA by following the regulations and abiding by the
standards they establish. For example, the EPA has issued temporary approvals
for pesticide-resistant and insecticidal genes with limitations on use coverage,
and we support pesticide resistance management plans established by the EPA
which benefit the American public by reducing the total pesticide burden on
the environment and by reducing the overall human and environmental
exposure to pesticides. We believe that it is industry’s responsibility to not only
abide by these plans but also to help ensure the successful development and
implementation of these management strategies. In addition, we support the
required isolations and movement procedures, labeling requirements, and
reporting responsibilities set forth by these regulatory agencies.
We also initiated standards of quality in our transgenic products. For
instance, D&PL ‘s varieties, both conventional and transgenic, must pass
stringent tests to meet our quality assurance standards. These rigorous
standards of D&PL provide our customers confidence that our seed is of
consistent superior quality in all aspects. The results of these painstaking and
expensive procedures are well recognized in the farming community. We have
earned the trust of our customers, and it is our commitment to maintain this
trust through responsible breeding, production, and marketing activities.
CONCLUSION
As we advance our knowledge of genetics through biotechnology, and as we
advance our abilities to manipulate plant life, we must proceed with caution in
these activities. We are breaking new ground. In doing so we must be prepared
for the skepticism and criticism that accompany such activity. We listen with
interest to those critics who support their hypotheses with credible science and
sound evidence. We do not accept the pressures of groups who use unfounded
statements and scare tactics to halt the progress of science and the advantages it
offers.
As a provider of biotechnology, the agricultural industry is helping improve
the success of its farmer customers. Our customers are an important gauge of
the viability of these transgenic technologies and will support only those
technologies that are truly advantageous to their business and to the environ-
ment. We will continue to work closely with regulatory agencies such as the
EPA and the USDA to protect our environment and to follow responsible
practices of biotechnology with regard to gene escape and insect resistance. In
addition, we will continue to consider the risks associated with biotechnology
and base our concerns and actions on credible scientific evidence. We will
continue to provide biotechnology to our customers as long as it is a proven
benefit to them, to agriculture, and to the environment.
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Vision for
Agricultural Research and Development
in the 21st Century
Biobased Products Will Provide Security and Sustainability
in Food, Health, Energy, Environment, and Economy
Prepared by the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council
December 14, 1998
The National Agricultural Biotechnology Council (NABC), a consortium of
26 major agricultural research and education institutions in the U.S. and
Canada, has formulated the attached “Vision for Agricultural Research and
Development in the 21st Century”.
The role of agriculture in the 21st century will see major expansion beyond
food, feed, and fiber. It will be the basis for the emerging biobased
industrial products era. In the 21st century we will not only continue to
have food security but will see improved nutritional quality and food
safety. In addition, the new biobased economy will bring increased
security in energy, materials, environment, and health. Agricultural R&D
will be the driving force for the new biobased economy.
We are excited about this opportunity and hope that this vision also
inspires you. Please contact us if you have questions or would like further
details on this vision of agricultural R&D and a sustainable economy. We
encourage you to share this vision with others.
Sincerely,
James R. Fischer Ralph W. F. Hardy
Chair, NABC President, NABC
Dean and Director, South Carolina
Agriculture and Forestry Research System
Clemson University
National Agricultural Biotechnology Council
419 Boyce Thompson Institute, Tower Road,  Ithaca, NY 14853
Tel: 607-254-4856 Fax: 607-254-1242 E-mail: NABC@cornell.edu
http://www.cals.cornell.edu/extension/nabc
Agricultural research and development (AR&D) will take the lead in providing
the technology for a biobased economy in the 21st century. In contrast with
our present fossil-based economy, the biobased economy will use renewable
resources such as plants instead of non-renewable fossil sources. With the
biobased industry now emerging, AR&D has a greatly expanded role beyond
the traditional areas of food, feed, and fiber. The 21st century biobased economy
will:
• be rooted in life-science, the dominant science as we enter the new
millennium, coupled with bio-engineering processes;
• reduce our vulnerability in access to and supply of petroleum for energy
and industrial products;
• make our industries more sustainable by utilizing domestically-produced
renewable plant resources;
• be driven by AR&D to improve cost-competitiveness of biobased vs. fossil-
based energy and products
• lessen projected global climate change by reducing the build up of carbon
dioxide, the major greenhouse gas;
• create rural and urban job opportunities in the agricultural and industrial
sectors;
• improve the quality of our air, water, and soil;
• improve the healthfulness of food;
• produce human health-related products in plants, microbes, and animals;
• produce value-added biobased products (fuels, chemicals, and materials)
for domestic use and export;
• impact favorably our balance of payments by reducing or potentially
eliminating our need for petroleum imports;
• be broadly distributed across the US; and
• make optimal use and improve sustainability of our agricultural land
growing food, feed, fiber, and bio-industrial crops.
Vision for Agricultural Research and
Development in the 21st Century
BIOBASED PRODUCTS WILL PROVIDE SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
IN FOOD, HEALTH, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND ECONOMY
Prepared by the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council, 1998
Thus, the biobased economy will be a major contributor to improved US
security in energy, industrial chemicals and materials, the environment, human
health, and our economy as well as maintaining the security of and improving
the quality of our food supply.
20th Century AR&D has enabled the US to have a secure, low-cost food
supply and to export surplus food to the rest of the world. 21st Century AR&D
will maintain this food security while improving nutritional quality and food
safety. Food will be modified to be more healthful with, for example, improved
levels of antioxidants and balance of oil types. Transgenic plants and animals
will produce health-related products such as pharmaceuticals and vaccines.
The energy resources and industrial chemicals of the 20th century are mainly
fossil-based, as are a growing portion of materials, such as synthetic fibers. The
dominant sources of energy and industrial products will become biobased, at
prices that are economically competitive with those that are fossil-based. With
AR&D investment, bio-industrial crops and novel biobased processes are being
developed to produce liquid fuels at approximately half the current cost of
producing ethanol thereby making it cost competitive with gasoline. Plants will
be modified genetically to make bio-polymers or be processed into chemicals,
polymers, and fibers. In the long term, the need for imported fossil fuel, e.g.
petroleum, could be eliminated, making the US self-secure in energy, chemicals,
and materials.
The fossil-based economy at the end of the 20th century is a major cause of
global, regional, and local environmental problems. The biobased economy
will minimize net carbon dioxide accumulation into the environment, thereby
significantly reducing the problem of global warming and improving
sustainability and global environmental security. Fossil-based products, both
in their manufacture and use, contaminate our air, water, and soil resulting in
numerous environmental and health concerns. The growth, processing, and
utilization of biobased products are less contaminating, thereby improving the
quality of our air, water, and soil, and thus, our health security.
Biobased industrial products will be a major US economic growth area in the
next century as fossil-based industrial products, such as synthetic chemicals
and liquid fuels, were in the 20th century. Biobased industrial products will
improve economic security through use of domestic versus imported resources,
optimal use of currently unused or underused land, and geographically
widespread production and manufacture across the US.
Investment in AR&D to develop the biobased industry of the 21st century
will enable the US to be the world leader in this major emerging industry while
expanding US security in food, energy, environment, health, and the economy.
The National Research Council Report on Biobased Industrial Products, issued
in 1998, outlines in some detail the opportunities of the biobased economy and
the need for an expanded AR&D.
Vision for Agricultural Research and Development in the 21st Century
We, the representatives to the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council (NABC), support the
 ASSOCIATION of RESEARCH DIRECTORS
Kenneth W. Bell,
Dean and Research Director,
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
Sam E. Curl,
Dean and Director, Division of
Agricultural Sciences & Natural Resources
BOYCE THOMPSON INSTITUTE
Charles J. Arntzen,
President and CEO
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
James R. Fischer,
 Dean and Director, South Carolina Agri-
culture & Forestry Research System
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
Thayne R. Dutson,
Dean, College of Agricultural Sciences;  Direc-
tor, Agricultural Experiment Station
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
W. Ronnie Coffman,
Associate Dean for Research,
College of Agriculture & Life Sci
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY
Patricia B. Swan,
 Vice Provost for
Research & Advanced Studies
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Robert D. Steele,
Dean, College of Agricultural Sciences
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
J. Ian Gray,
Director, Michigan Agricultural
Experiment Station
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Bobby D. Moser,
Vice President
for Agriculture Administration
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY
Johnny C. Wynne,
Assoc. Dean & Director, Agricultural Research Service,
College of Agriculture & Life Sciences
PURDUE UNIVERSITY
William R.  Woodson,
Assoc. Dean of Agriculture and Dire
of Agricultural Research Programs
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
Edward A. Hiler, Vice Chancellor & Dean,
Agriculture & Life Sciences;
Director, Agricultural Experiment Sta
UNIVERSITY of ARIZONA
Eugene G. Sander,
Vice Provost and Dean, College of Agriculture
UNIVERSITY of NEBRASKA-LINCOLN
Darrell Nelson,
Dean, Agricultural Research Division
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA-DAVIS
Alan Bennett,
Associate Dean, Plant SciencesUNIVERSITY of FLORIDA
Richard L. Jones,
Dean for Research; Director, Florida
Agricultural Experiment Station
UNIVERSITY of SASKATCHEWAN
Bryan Harvey,
Coordinator, Agricultural Research
UNIVERSITY of GEORGIA
Joe L. Key,
Vice President for Research
UNIVERSITY of HAWAII
H. Michael Harrington,
Interim  Director, College of Tropical
Agriculture & Human Resources
UNIVERSITY of WISCONSIN-MADISON
Elton Aberle,
Dean and Director, College of
Agricultural & Life Sciences
UNIVERSITY of ILLINOIS at CHAMPAIGN-URBANA
Steven Pueppke,
Associate Dean for Research,
College of Agricultural, Consumer & Environmental Scienc
UNIVERSITY of MINNESOTA
Michael Martin,
Dean, College of Agricultural, Food
&Environmental Sciences
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
James R. Carlson,
Associate Dean, Agriculture & Home Economics and
Associate Director, Ag Research Center
UNIVERSITY of MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
William C. Stringer,
Interim Dean, College of Agriculture, Food &
Natural Resources;  Director, Missouri
Agricultural Experiment Station
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
Ralph W. F. Hardy,
President
